

**Faith-Based Peace-Building:  
Mapping and Analysis of Christian,  
Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors**

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# Contents

<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>I. Introduction: a Study on Faith-Based Peace-Building Actors</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Relevance and Objectives	1
1.3 Methodology	4
1.4 Selection of the Actors	5
1.5 Limitations	9
1.6 Reading Outline	10
<b>II. Core Values Underpinning Christian and Muslim Peace-Building</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1 Key Concepts in Islam and Christianity	11
2.2. Observations	13
<b>III. Mapping Christian, Multi-Faith and Muslim Peace-Building Actors</b>	<b>15</b>
3.1 Introduction	15
3.2 Description of the Actors	16
3.3 Observations	16
<b>IV. Analysis of Christian, Multi-Faith and Muslim Peace-Building Actors</b>	<b>25</b>
4.1 Introduction	25
4.2 Analysis of the Actors	25
4.3 Observations	35
4.3.1 Multiple Contributions to Peace-Building	35
4.3.2 Ongoing Challenge of Measuring Impact	38
4.3.3 Strengths and Pitfalls of Faith-Based Peace-Building	39
<b>V. Conclusions</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>VI. Donor Recommendations</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>VII. Suggestions for Follow-Up Research</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Annexe I: Contact Information for Key Faith-Based Peace-Building Actors</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Annexe II: Example of Survey Questions Selected</b>	<b>61</b>

<b>Annexe III: Description and Analysis of Muslim, Christian and Multi-Faith Peace-Building Actors</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Annexe IV: Impact Measurement of Peace-Building Programmes: Two Illustrations</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>Annexe V: Factors Shaping Faith-Based Peace-Building</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>147</b>

## List of Abbreviations

ACRL	African Council of Religious Leaders
AFCR	Albanian Foundation for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Disputes
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AIV	Advisory Council of International Affairs
ARLPI	Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative
AU	African Union
BBO	<i>Bureau Beleidsvorming Ontwikkelingssamenwerking</i> (Office of Policy-Making Development Cooperation)
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CCSL	Christian Council of Sierra Leone
CJP	Centre for Justice and Peace-Building at EMU
CMPP	Community Mediation and Peace-Building Programme
COPA	Coalition for Peace in Africa
CPN	Catholic Peace-Building Network
CPRF	Committee to Protect Religious Freedom
CPT	Community Council for Peace and Tolerance
CRD(B-H)	Centre for Religious Dialogue (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
CRD(S)	Centre for Research and Dialogue (Somalia)
CRDC	Centre for World Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CRU	(Clingendael) Conflict Research Unit
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTP	Conflict Transformation Programme
CWS	Church World Service
DAF	Sub-Saharan Africa Department
DMV/VG	Good Governance and Peace-Building Division
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSI/VR	Women's Affairs Division
DVB	Security Policy Department
DZO	Southeast and Eastern Europe and Matra Programme Department
ECOSOC	(United Nations) Economic and Social Council
EMU	Eastern Mennonite University
EU	European Union
GoU	Government of Uganda
HIV-Aids	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome
IARF	International Association for Religious Freedom

ICCO	Inter-Church Organization for Development Cooperation
ICRD	International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy
IDMA	Investigation, Documentation, Monitoring and Advocacy
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFAPA	Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa
IFOR	International Fellowship of Reconciliation
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IKV	Inter-Church Peace Council
IQK	<i>Idaacadda Qur'anka Kariimka</i> (Holy Koran Radio)
IRC	Inter-Religious Council
IRC-BiH	Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina
IRC-K	Inter-Religious Council of Kosovo
IRC(S)	Inter-Religious Centre (Serbia)
IRCSL	Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone
ISHRC	Islamic Human Rights Commission
JNI	Jama'atu Nasril Islam
JYAK	Jamii Ya Kupatanisha
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
Mercy Corps CMG	Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group
MoFA	(Netherlands) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFO	Dutch Co-Financing Organization (Medefinancieringsorganisatie)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NERECOD	Network for Religious Coexistence and Development
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OCM	Observatoire Congolais des Medias
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation—Development Assistance Committee
OHR	Office of the High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAD	Peace and Development Platform
PI	Practice Institute
PRCP	Programme in Religion, Conflict and Peace-Building
RFYI	Religious Freedom Youth Programme
RIREC	Research Initiative on the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict
RKK	Rissho Kosei-Kai
RPMI	Religion and Peace-Making Initiative
RTC	Responding to Conflict
SIRC	Sudan Inter-Religious Council
SPA	Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement
SPI	Summer Institute on Peace-Building
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army

SSF	Salam Sudan Foundation
STAR	Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience
TD	Transformational Development (Programmes)
TECT	The Evangelical College of Theology
TEKAN	Ecumenical Council of Churches in Northern Nigeria
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UMSC	Uganda Muslim Supreme Council
UMWV	Uganda Muslim Women Vision
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund for Women
URNG	Union Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
UWIN	Uganda Women Inter-Religious Network
VPA	Volunteer Peace Animators
WACC	West Africa Inter-Religious Coordinating Committee
WCRP	World Conference of Religions for Peace
WPDC	Wajir Peace and Development Committee
WSPI	War-Torn Societies Project International
WVI	World Vision International

## Executive Summary

Religion has become an important topic on today's policy agenda. Policy-makers are no longer able to get around religion's role in conflict and peace, and in particular in conflict prevention and peace-building. Although religion is often blamed for inciting conflict, it can also help to resolve conflict and decrease tensions. This study focuses on the possible positive role(s) of religion—that is, of faith-based organizations—in building peace.

This desk study analyses 27 Christian, Muslim and multi-faith organizations that are working on peace-building in conflict situations. By studying how they operate as peace-builders, the study aims to shed more light on the peace-building potential of faith-based organizations. It particularly aims to advise donors on how they can deal with faith-based peace-building in policy. Based on this first and limited analysis, the authors came to the following findings, donor recommendations and suggestions for follow-up study.

### Key Findings

Faith-based actors—to different extents, with varying levels of success and in various ways—have contributed positively to peace-building. For instance, they have provided emotional and spiritual support to war-affected communities, have mobilized their communities and others for peace, have mediated between conflicting parties, and have promoted reconciliation, dialogue, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

- Faith-based peace-building actors carry out their peace-building activities in 'religious' and 'non-religious' conflicts, thereby targeting not only beneficiaries that share their own religious convictions, but also beneficiaries from different religious communities and secular ones;
- Faith-based actors are involved in a wide range of peace-building activities, including advocacy, education, intra-faith and inter-faith dialogue, mediation, observation and transitional justice;
- Faith-based actors have shown a number of specific, although not unique, strengths and weaknesses. Strengths include strong faith-based motivation, long-term commitment, long-term presence on the ground, moral and spiritual authority, and a niche to mobilize others for peace. Weaknesses comprise the risk of proselytization, lack of focus on results and a possible lack of professionalism;
- As with other peace-building activities, it is a challenge to measure the specific impact of the work of faith-based actors.

Apart from these findings, the report also makes a number of important observations. A first observation is that Muslim peace-building organizations are relatively difficult to identify. This seems to result from a lack of institutionalization. Peace-building activities are mostly undertaken by individual actors (such as imams and sheikhs) in their personal capacity, often in an ad hoc and informal manner. As a result, the study 'only' identified six internationally operating Muslim peace-

building organizations. One should not conclude from this that there are hardly any Muslim-based peace-building activities.

A second observation is that faith-based peace-building does not necessarily take place in isolation from secular peace-building. The study suggests that the two could be interrelated and complementary in particular conflict settings. In addition, it was found that peace-building programmes can consist of single-religious or multi-religious activities. The findings of the report suggest that both types of activities have the potential to contribute to peace-building in specific situations.

A third observation in the report is that faith-based peace-building efforts tend to focus on ‘religious moderates’ and not on ‘religious conservatives’. The report, however, also shows that both groups can be drivers of change and can contribute to peace-building in their own special manner.

### **Donor Recommendations**

The findings and observations made in the report suggest a number of recommendations for donors—governmental and non-governmental—with regard to faith-based actors:

1. Policy-makers should address the peace-building potential of faith-based actors in policy;
2. Donors should explore whether they can cooperate more with faith-based actors on the theme of peace-building;
3. Donors should further examine the role of faith-based actors in the context of political analysis. For MoFA, this could mean highlighting the role of such actors in the Stability Assessment Framework (SAF);
4. Donors should consider demanding more attention for faith-based peace-builders in international discussions in the field of peace-building (such as in the EU, UN bodies, OSCE and OECD/DAC);
5. Donors should sensitize and train staff of the ministries of foreign affairs and defence that are involved in peace-building on the topic and role of faith-based approaches. It is in particular vital to train embassy staff, which are usually in direct contact with faith-based peace-building organizations. It could also be relevant to train peacekeepers in order to increase their cultural and religious sensitivity;
6. In relation to training embassy staff, embassies are encouraged to address structurally the relationship between religion and peace-building in their longer-term strategic plans;
7. Donors should try to regard ‘religious moderates’, but also ‘religious conservatives’, as possible drivers of change. They are encouraged to explore further the possibilities of establishing true dialogue with conservative, politicized, religious groups in order to engage them in peace-building;
8. Donors should make extra efforts to identify local Muslim peace-building actors. They are recommended to identify them through international Muslim peace-building actors, or through analysing whether local Muslim relief and humanitarian agencies, as well as Muslim women’s organizations, (could) operate as peace-building actors;
9. Donors are invited to develop a tailor-made approach for strengthening Muslim actors’ peace-building capacities. Such an approach should be aware that direct donor support to local Muslim peace-building actors may negatively influence their peace-building performance—given that

Western support can be a rather sensitive issue—and that Muslim peace-building actors may require some specific kinds of support (for example, basic institutional development, audio-visual materials and the establishment of national and regional networks).

### **Suggestions for Follow-Up Research**

This preliminary study is not exhaustive, and the authors are aware that it has only covered parts of the discussion on faith-based peace-building. Suggestions for follow-up study are to:

- Develop a more systematic and comprehensive database of faith-based peace-building actors;
- Compile case studies of successful faith-based peace-building initiatives;
- Carry out research among higher educational institutions in order to explore what they teach on the relationship between Islam (or Christianity) and peace, and what room there is for incorporating peace-building modules in their curricula;
- Conduct case studies on the added value of faith-based peace-builders in specific conflict settings;
- Explore through case studies the level of cooperation between, and complementary of, faith-based and secular peace-building programmes;
- Carry out field research on the strengths and weaknesses of single-religious and multi-religious peace-building efforts in specific conflict settings (for example, Sudan and northern Nigeria);
- Analyse the required strategies, partners and activities to deal with ‘religious moderates’ and ‘religious conservatives’ in peace-building (for example, Sri Lanka);
- Examine the peace-building role of mid-level and top-level religious leaders to explore in what conflicts it is more suitable to work with mid-level and/or top-level religious leaders;
- Explore viable options for measuring the impact of faith-based peace-building work.

# **I. Introduction: a Study on Faith-Based Peace-Building Actors**

## **1.1 Introduction**

International policy attention for religion is growing. While religion has never been really absent from public and political affairs in large parts of the world, its political leverage in the West has long been marginalized. Probably since the Enlightenment, most Western countries have tried to advocate some sort of separation between Church and State, between religion and politics. Various countries have regarded religion as a private matter to be enjoyed by individual citizens in their private life, and some (such as Communist countries) have even tried to suppress religious manifestations in all spheres of life. Despite all this, religion has often remained a key issue in politics, and currently seems even to have reconquered (inter)national policy agendas.

One of the events that contributed to a re-examination of the role of religion in politics was the seizure, in 1979, of the United States' embassy in Tehran by radical Islamic extremists. This unexpected development precipitated, within the United States Department of State, an assessment of the role of religion in the internal affairs of some states. Other recent developments, most notably the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre and the subsequent 'war on terror', have also made policy-makers recognize that religion plays a major role in today's world affairs. Increased sensitivity for the religious factor in international politics, and in war and peace, has among other things raised the question of whether there is a role for religion in other related domains, such as conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building. Religion is not only blamed for inciting conflicts, but is also regarded as a source of solutions to conflict. To what extent, then, could religious actors make a valuable contribution to increasing tolerance, resolving conflicts, and rebuilding peace? And how could religious actors be engaged in inter/intra-religious dialogue, as well as in numerous other peace-building activities before, during and after peace accords?

It is this current awareness of religious factors in international politics, war and peace that forms the background of this study, in which the positive contributions of faith-based actors towards peace-building are analysed. Through analysing the activities, results and outcomes of a number of faith-based peace-building organizations that work on conflicts in Africa and the Balkans, this study hopes to provide policy-makers with a clearer picture of the roles of faith-based actors in peace-building.

## **1.2 Relevance and Objectives**

This study has been carried out by the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' at the request of the Peace-Building and Good Governance Unit of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). In this project, the 'Clingendael' Institute has cooperated with the Washington DC-based *Salam* Institute for Peace and Justice.

MoFA has for a long time mainly regarded religion as an important ‘cultural’ background variable that is relevant to development cooperation. However, it has recently shown a more specific interest in the role of religion in development processes, as well as in conflict and peace settings (see policy references in Box 1).

**Box 1: MoFA’s References to Religion, Conflict and Peace**

[E]thnicity and religion are often given much of the blame for Africa's problems and conflicts. Neither are by definition contentious, but they can be swiftly mobilized in unstable situations. Leaders capitalize on ethnic and religious loyalties in their struggle for power. Religion can lead to conflict, but it can also make an invaluable contribution to increasing tolerance and resolving conflicts. In Africa, Christianity and Islam each have enormous social influence. Both are growing fast and in some regions this is creating potential for religious tension.<sup>1</sup>

[I]t unfortunately has to be remarked that the number of conflicts fought in the name of religion has not decreased but increased. [...] At the same time representatives of religions and convictions could play a role in conflict prevention and conflict resolution [...] In religious-orientated conflict the involvement of religions might well lead to conflict resolution.<sup>2</sup>

[P]ositive aspects of religion are prospect and hope [...] and reconciliation after conflicts. [...] Negative aspects may occur when religions carry out their message in terms of resignation, revenge, unequal treatment or justifying the ruling of one group or generation over the other, envy of success and while becoming superstitious if ‘black magic’ practices are applied.<sup>3</sup>

In 2004, MoFA commissioned the *Bureau Beleidsvorming Ontwikkelingssamenwerking* (BBO) to organize a series of workshops on the role of religion, one of them with regard to conflict and peace processes.<sup>4</sup> It also asked the Advisory Council of International Affairs (AIV) for advice on the question ‘[W]hat is the influence of cultural and religious values and norms on development processes, keeping in mind the continuous globalization of political, economic and cultural contextual factors’.<sup>5</sup> Recently, in September 2005, MoFA launched a ‘Knowledge Forum on Development Cooperation and Religion’ in close consultation with partner organizations the Inter-Church Cooperation for Development Cooperation, *Kerkeninactie*, PRISMA, BBO, Oikos and Cordaid. The Forum’s goals are to explore the role of religion and religious actors in development processes, and to provide input for policy development on this terrain, among other things.

This preliminary study attempts to shed more light on the interrelationship between religion and peace-building. In discussions around this topic, the following questions usually come to the fore: Is there a role to play for religious actors in peace-building? If so, what kind of peace-building roles

<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, paragraph 3.1.

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a.

<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Bureau Beleidsvorming Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 2004 and 2004a.

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a.

could they play? Can they play these peace-building roles in all sorts of conflict, or especially in religiously tainted conflicts such as in northern Nigeria or Sudan? How does the peace-building work of religious actors relate to that of other (secular) actors? In other words, is religious peace-building necessarily different from secular peace-building? What are possible differences, and what are possible similarities? Could faith-based and secular peace-building complement each other, or do they mainly overlap? More practically, do faith-based peace-building actors only target/assist religious communities that share their convictions? Or are they willing and able to assist a broad range of beneficiaries? And, if faith-based actors start to work on peace-building, is it assured that they do not utilize their peace-building work as a vehicle of proselytization? It is these kinds of questions that form the background of this preliminary study on faith-based peace-building actors.

The study's overall aim is to highlight the peace-building work of a number of faith-based actors, and to come to donor recommendations on how to deal in policy with the peace-building potential of faith-based actors. Hence, the study analyses a number of Christian, Muslim and multi-faith peace-building actors that work in/on conflict situations. For each of these actors it outlines one or two exemplary peace-building activities, and assesses the results and impact of these activities based on self-descriptions of the organizations. The report then draws a number of conclusions regarding the specific work of actors included in this report and regarding faith-based peace-building in general. Furthermore, it outlines some donor recommendations for addressing the topic of faith-based peace-building in policy. Finally, it lists a number of suggestions for follow-up research.

The authors initially tried to focus this study exclusively on internationally operating Christian, multi-faith and Muslim peace-building actors. They aimed at an exploratory study that would provide a general picture of the faith-based peace-building domain. Focusing on internationally operating faith-based peace-builders would fit this objective best, possibly followed up by more detailed and context-specific case studies at a later stage. However, when the authors began to select international actors for inclusion in this study, it soon turned out that it was relatively easy to find a number of internationally operating Christian and multi-faith actors, but that it would be more difficult to find a similar number of internationally operating Muslim peace-building actors. This raised the question of whether to persist with the focus on international actors only, or whether to complement the limited number of internationally operating Muslim peace-builders with more nationally and locally operating Muslim peace-building actors. The authors chose the latter option in the belief that it would enrich the analysis. Hence, the Muslim actors included in this report do not exclusively operate at the international level, but also at the national and local levels in Africa and the Balkans in particular. The authors opted to concentrate on these two regions because they match the focal areas for Dutch conflict policy, which include the Western Balkans, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

All in all, this study thus focuses on Christian and multi-faith actors that operate at the international level, and on Muslim actors that are active at the international level and at the national and local level in Africa and the Balkans. This implies that local Christian and multi-faith actors are not included in this report, and need to be analysed in possible follow-up studies. However, it mainly implies that a more general analysis of worldwide-operating Muslim, Christian and multi-faith peace-building actors is complemented and enriched by a more context-specific analysis of Muslim peace-building actors in Africa and the Balkans.

### 1.3 Methodology

The study is a **desk study**. On the basis of personal and phone interviews, information exchanges by email and fax, meetings, literature reviews, internet research, existing databases of peace-building organizations, and an examination of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are accredited to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the authors have identified 45 organizations that can be categorized as Muslim peace-building actors and 25 organizations that can be labelled as Christian and multi-faith peace-building actors (see overview in Annexe 1).<sup>6</sup> This report has analysed a number of them in more detail (see Box 2).

<b>Box 2: Overview of Actors Analysed in the Report</b>	
<b>Christian and Multi-Faith Actors</b>	<b>Muslim Actors:</b>
1. Life and Peace Institute (Sweden)	1. Wajir Peace and Development Committee (Kenya)
2. World Vision International (Germany/Kosovo/US)	2. Coalition for Peace in Africa (Kenya)
3. International Association for Religious Freedom (UK)	3. Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa (Kenya)
4. Community of Sant'Egidio (Italy)	4. Centre for Research and Dialogue (Somalia)
5. Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (US)	5. Inter-Faith Mediation Centre (Nigeria)
6. International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (US)	6. IQK (Holy Koran Radio) (Somalia)
7. World Conference of Religions for Peace (US)	7. Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone)
8. David Steele <sup>7</sup> (US)	8. Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace (Sudan)
9. International Fellowship of Reconciliation (Netherlands)	9. Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (Uganda)
10. Eastern Mennonite University's Center for Justice and Peace-Building (US)	10. Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
11. Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (US)	11. Women to Women (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
12. Mennonite Central Committee (US)	12. Faculty of Islamic Studies (Kosovo)
13. Religion and Peace-Making Initiative <sup>8</sup> (US)	13. <i>Salam</i> Institute for Peace and Justice (US)
	14. <i>Salam</i> Sudan Foundation (US)

<sup>6</sup> The overview should by no means be regarded as exhaustive and the only one of its kind, but does according to the authors give a good impression of Christian and multi-faith peace-building organizations operating at the international level as well as of Muslim peace-building actors operating at the international level, as well as at the national and sub-national level in Africa and the Balkans.

<sup>7</sup> Dr David Steele is a Christian theologian who has undertaken various faith-based peace-building programmes, especially in the Balkans, for different international organizations, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies (US) and the Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group (US). Because of his broad experience, he is included in this study as an individual actor.

<sup>8</sup> The Religion and Peacemaking Initiative (RPMI) does not concern a specific organization, but a specific programme that is headed by Dr David Smock working at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). There are clear pros and cons of including the RPMI in this analysis, particularly because USIP is an obvious secular and not a faith-based organization. The main reason for the authors including the RPMI is that it provides a rather good example of how international actors contribute to highlighting and strengthening the peace-building potential of local faith communities. For a further discussion on (the selection of) the RPMI, the authors refer to the analysis in Annexe II.

On the basis of semi-structured interview questions (see the example in Annexe II), the authors have collected information regarding the actors' link to religion, level of operation, geographical scope, type of beneficiaries, kind of peace-building work, one or two practical examples of peace-building activities, the results and outcomes of the peace-building activities carried out, the estimated impact of activities on the broader conflict and peace process, overall lessons learned in terms of faith-based peace-building, and the possible added value of faith-based peace-building actors as compared to secular peace-building actors. The authors contacted each organization for comments on the draft analysis and for agreement with the final analysis.<sup>9</sup>

The authors sent drafts of the study for comments to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as to the external reviewers: Dr David Steele of Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group; Mrs Rabia Harris of the Muslim Peace Fellowship; and Dr Hashim El-Tinay of the *Salam* Sudan Foundation. The comments received have as far as possible been incorporated in this final version of the report. Nevertheless, the way in which this report presents the information per organization—that is, in the form of tables—has been up to the authors and not to the organizations themselves, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the external commentators.

#### 1.4 Selection of the Actors

The selection of the faith-based actors included in this report has been subject to a number of considerations that are outlined here below. They include the choice for institutionalized actors, the distinction between faith-based and secular actors, and the separation of peace-building actors from actors working in other kinds of areas.

**Focus on Institutionalized Actors:** Obviously, there are numerous religious actors in the field of faith-based peace-building. Luttwak, for instance, speaks of religious leaders, religious institutions, and religiously motivated lay figures.<sup>10</sup> Johnston remarks that 'the range of religious actors spans a continuum, with the temporal power of religious institutions like the church on the one hand and the personal initiatives of spiritually motivated laypersons defining the other'.<sup>11</sup> Appleby confirms this perception, and adds that the field of faith-based peace-building consists of Christian ethicists, Muslim jurists and theologians, Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu scholars, courageous religious officials, trans-religious movements, and local religious leaders. In addition, it entails the numerous institutions within the major religions themselves that deal with issues of justice and peace. It also includes various secular and faith-based NGOs that engage with religious actors in order to build peace.<sup>12</sup> Because of the format of the study (that is, a desk study), the difficulty of selecting the numerous religious individuals involved in peace-building, and the fact that the peace-building work of individual religious actors is often rather invisible for outsiders, the authors decided that this preliminary study could best focus on a relatively small number of institutionalized faith-based actors that are relatively visible and accessible.

It should be noted that the focus on institutionalized actors raises some challenges for the selection of Muslim peace-building actors. One challenge, for instance, regards the organizational

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<sup>9</sup> It must be noted that all Muslim actors and one multi-faith actor—the World Conference of Religions for Peace—have not been able to send their comments in time.

<sup>10</sup> Luttwak, 1994, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> Johnston, 2003, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Adapted from Appleby, 2003, p. 254.

differences between Western and Muslim communities and institutions. The way that Muslim societies organize themselves and their institutions differs significantly from Western societies. Western societies are more individualistic, professional and bureaucratized. Many Islamic societies, on the other hand, are traditional societies, where kinship, tribalism and family ties are dominant. The organization of social institutions like NGOs reflects these differences. These differences have made it more difficult to identify Muslim peace-building organizations in the Western sense. Another challenge is the lack of special peace-building organizational capacities. Because many of these peace-building actors are not organized into stable bodies or NGOs, their work and contribution is much less visible and they are rarely included in internet databases. Their visibility seems to depend on the personal communication and language skills of the individuals involved in terms of connecting with non-Muslim groups, organizations, academic institutions and the media, their fund-raising skills and whether they are adopted or supported by non-Muslim, mostly Christian, groups. As many groups lack or do not have the time to develop these skills, it is difficult to identify Muslim peace-building actors without field research that includes interviews with various groups in these communities. A third challenge is the so-called missionary churches' factor. The interaction between Christian missionary churches and secular organizations with Christian groups in these communities, and the spread of mass communication and dissemination of information (such as via the internet) has contributed to the development of Christian peace-building actors. Generally speaking, the institutional development of Muslim actors lags behind that of Christian and multi-faith actors. Muslim peace-building actors are now beginning to establish their own centres for peacemaking and peace-building, in the process facing major challenges such as the difficulty of receiving training and experience, and finding the funding to create sustainable and effective institutions.

**Focus on Faith-Based Actors:** The study focuses on faith-based peace-building actors. The authors therefore faced the difficult challenge of making a proper distinction between faith-based and 'secular' peace-building actors, which to a large extent are involved in similar peace-building work, and both may cooperate with local religious actors in the field. The selection of Muslim peace-building actors has been a particular challenge, because of the inseparability of Islam and other aspects of life. Islam influences all aspects of life in Muslim communities, and it is not possible to separate the religious from the non-religious. Islamic values and traditions underpin peace-building and the conflict-resolution activities of Muslims as well as all other aspects of their lives. Most of the time Muslims do not therefore feel the need or do not see it a necessity to emphasize the role of Islam in their work or put 'Islamic/Muslim' in the title of their work or organizations, as the presence of Islam in their work is usually assumed both by their communities and Muslim peace-building actors. For that reason it is difficult to find actors that define themselves as Muslim actors. However, the study has categorized the actors as Muslim if the actor:

- Identifies itself as Muslim or Islamic (for example, Muslim Women's League—Southern Sudan), and/or;
- Operates in a community where Muslims form the majority (for example, Kisima Peace and Development Organization, in Somalia, where Islam is the state religion and 90 per cent of the population is Muslim),<sup>13</sup> and/or;

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<sup>13</sup> <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/somalia.htm>

- Is led by a Muslim Religious Actor (for example, Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa, led by Sheikh Mbacke), and/or;
- Includes Muslim religious leaders as equal partners (for example, Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, Nigeria), and/or;
- Uses Islamic values, teachings and practices to transform conflicts (for example, Coalition for Peace in Africa, which uses the Islamic conflict resolution mechanism of *Suluh*), and/or;
- Is led by, or established by, Muslims inspired by Islamic values (such as Merhamet in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Similarly, the study has labelled the actors as Christian or multi-faith actors on the basis of:

- Religious affiliation and resource base (such as the Life and Peace Institute, Mennonite Central Committee and Eastern Mennonite University's Center for Justice and Peace-Building);
- Religious values that inspire their peace-building work (for example, Sant'Egidio, Kroc Institute, Mennonite Central Committee, Eastern Mennonite University's Center for Justice and Peace-Building, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, World Vision International and David Steele);
- Use of religious resources in their peace-building work (for example, the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, and David Steele);
- The deliberate—and sometimes exclusive—cooperation with religious actors as counterparts (for example, the Life and Peace Institute, International Association for Religious Freedom, World Conference of Religions for Peace, David Steele and Religion and Peace-Making Initiative);
- The presence of religious clerics and/or laymen among their staff (for example, the World Conference of Religions for Peace, International Association for Religious Freedom, David Steele and the Religion and Peace-Making Initiative).

**Focus on Faith-Based Peace-Building Actors :** A third way to narrow down the scope of the study has been to distinguish peace-building actors from non-peace-building actors.<sup>14</sup> All of the organizations included in this report have identified conflict resolution and peace-building as a critical aspect of their work and/or have at least been practically involved for a longer period of time in some of the activities here below towards resolving conflicts and establishing peace:

- *Advocacy:* Religiously motivated advocacy is primarily concerned with empowering the weaker party(ies) in a conflict situation, restructuring relationships, and transforming unjust social structures. It aims at strengthening the representativeness and in particular the inclusiveness of governance;
- *Intermediary/Mediation:* These activities relate to the task of peacemaking, and focus on bringing the parties together to resolve their differences and reach a settlement. Intermediary activities

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<sup>14</sup> To give one of the many definitions of peace-building, Boutros-Ghali, 1992, described it as a range of (preventative or post-conflict) activities that aim to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.

played by faith-based actors have focused on good offices, facilitation, conciliation, and mediation, usually in some combination;

- *Observing:* In a conflict situation, religious observers provide a watchful, compelling physical presence that is intended to discourage violence, corruption, human rights' violations, or other behaviour that is deemed threatening and undesirable. Observers can be engaged in passive activities such as fact-finding, enquiry, investigation, or research. Or observers can be more actively involved in monitoring and verifying the legitimacy of elections, or forming 'peace teams' or 'living walls' between sides that are active in conflict situations;
- *Education:* Education and training activities aim to sensitize a society to inequities in the system, to foster an understanding of and build the advocacy skills, conflict resolution, pluralism and democracy, or to promote healing and reconciliation;
- *Transitional Justice:*<sup>15</sup> Especially in the post-conflict phase, activities have been undertaken to pursue accountability for war atrocities or human rights' abuses. While faith-based actors may have been less involved in prosecuting individual perpetrators or providing reparations to conflict survivors, they have been active in truth-seeking initiatives to address past abuse. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for example, chaired the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa after the apartheid period;
- *Intra-Faith and Inter-Faith Dialogue:* While some dialogues take place in conflict settings and relate to peace, many other dialogues do not. Only those faith-based actors that organize dialogues in conflict settings with the aim of contributing to the local, national or international peace process are mentioned in this category.

In selecting actors on the basis of their involvement in one of these six sets of peace-building activities, the authors faced the challenge of how to exclude actors that are only marginally involved in peace-building and include actors that regard peace-building as part of their core business. In this connection, the authors continuously had to distinguish 'real' peace-building actors from relief and development organizations, women's rights' movements, and human rights' advocacy agencies by looking at their mission statements and the nature of the projects undertaken. For instance, although they work in conflict-stricken areas such as Sudan, Kenya, Mauritania and Somalia, among other places, organizations such as the Islamic Relief Organization, International Muslim Relief Network and International Islamic Youth League of Sierra Leone were not included as Muslim peace-building actors because they solely focus on the alleviation of suffering related to hunger and disease, etc., and engage in humanitarian aid and projects related to development and agricultural assistance. Organizations such as the World Council of Muslim Women's Foundation of Canada, Karamah, and Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights of the United States, which focus only on women's issues or human rights' issues, were not included as Muslim peace-building actors. Political parties such as the Umma Party of Sudan, even though they identify conflict resolution and peace-building as one of their areas of work, were also not included. Finally, organizations such as Kosovo Transition Initiative, which defines itself as a secular organization and does not employ Islamic values, principles or mechanisms in promoting peace and conflict resolution, as well as organizations that focus on the promotion of Islam, such as the Kankalay Islamic Mission of Sierra Leone, were not included as

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<sup>15</sup> The authors have added this set of transitional justice activities to the other four sets identified by Sampson, 2004.

Muslim peace-building actors. The authors applied the same considerations in selecting Christian and multi-faith actors.

## 1.5 Limitations

The study primarily concentrates on the link between religion (religious actors) and peace-building, and not on the relationship between religion and conflict. It recognizes that religions and beliefs have been misused to cause conflict, intolerance, discrimination and prejudice, but does not elaborate on this connection. Instead, it emphasizes the relationship between religion and peace, and analyses the potential that, in this case, Christianity and Islam hold for peace and reconciliation.

Another limitation is that the study has focused on faith-based actors outside the Netherlands and not on Dutch faith-based organizations such as Cordaid, Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), ICCO and Pax Christi in the Netherlands. The rationale was that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the authors felt that this information on Dutch peace-building actors is already partly known or could be obtained relatively easily. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to analyse the performance of Dutch actors engaged in faith-based peace-building more structurally, and to compare their performance with that of the actors included in this report. The recently established Knowledge Forum on Development Cooperation and Religion could well play a role in such a follow-up study.

An additional limitation is that this study has only focused on a small number of Christian, multi-faith and Muslim peace-building actors. Moreover, because of the structure and timeframe of the study, the authors have not collected as much information per actor as they had hoped, partly because of the difficulties of contacting local actors in Africa and the Balkans. In this connection, the authors would like to flag that they collected most of the information via email surveys and telephone interviews. Such reporting based on self-description via email surveys and telephone interviews may limit a more detailed analysis, as many of the participants are reluctant to mention failures, what did not work, unsuccessful practices and projects because of the fear that it might affect their chances for future grants and funding. The authors therefore believe that follow-up study on faith-based peace-building actors is welcome, should involve more time, and should include field visits to interview personally the actors where they work. Field research is critical for more thorough information-gathering, and reaching to less visible groups and individuals that have no access to internet or other resources as such, but have great credibility and have been doing critical peace-building work in their communities. The danger with relying too much on information from self-assessments, donor reports and web searches, etc., is that other, smaller groups, which can be very effective in their communities, go unnoticed.

The focus and scope of the study concentrates on non-governmental actors, and not on governmental. This is not to say that the report favours non-governmental over governmental actors, or that it uncritically analyses the performance of these faith-based peace-building actors. The authors realize that governmental actors may be knowledgeable, enthusiastic and involved for longer periods of time, but that they may also be partial, elite-based groups, and conflict protagonists.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the authors agree here with Appleby, that 'it would be a misnomer [...] to believe that religious actors

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<sup>16</sup> Douma and Klem, 2004.

were able to transform dimensions of modern conflict by functioning independently of government and other secular and religious actors'.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, it remains a challenge to measure the impact of peace-building programmes in general. This also applies to faith-based peace-building efforts in specific. As policy discussions on how to measure the impact of peace-building programmes are still ongoing, and as no clear-cut solutions have yet evolved, this report has been subject to this same challenge. The author had to depend on organizations' self-assessments gathered through interviews by email and telephone. Nevertheless, these self-assessments do provide useful information about the perceived impact of the peace-building activities undertaken. At the same time, they also demonstrate the need for a follow-up study to develop more effective means of measuring the impact of (faith-based) peace-building initiatives.

## **1.6 Reading Outline**

The report consists of seven chapters. The next chapter provides a number of concepts and values that feed Christian and Muslim peace-building principles and practices. Chapter 3 describes a number of key Christian, Muslim and multi-faith peace-building actors. For each of these actors, chapter 4 analyses their activities, results and outcomes, impact, and overall experiences with faith-based peace-building. Chapter 5 draws a number of conclusions. Chapter 6 provides a number of donor recommendations regarding the peace-building potential of faith-based peace-building actors. Finally, chapter 7 lists suggestions for follow-up research on the theme of faith-based peace-building.

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<sup>17</sup> Appleby, 2000.

## II. Core Values Underpinning Christian and Muslim Peace-Building

### 2.1 Key Concepts in Islam and Christianity

Religion ‘as a powerful constituent of cultural norms and values’ is deeply implicated in individual and social conceptions of peace, because it addresses some of the most profound existential issues of human life, such as freedom/inevitability, fear/security, right/wrong and sacred/profane.<sup>18</sup> Gopin remarks that it is probably true for all religions that religion has developed laws and ideas that provide civilization with cultural commitments to critical peace-related values, including empathy, an openness to and even love for strangers, the suppression of unbridled ego and acquisitiveness, human rights, unilateral gestures of forgiveness and humility, interpersonal repentance and the acceptance of responsibility of past errors as a means of reconciliation, and the drive for social justice.<sup>19</sup>

Vendley and Little argue that understanding the religious community’s laws and ideas—that is, the religious community’s primary language—is fundamental for understanding that community’s potential for peace-building. Primary language discloses the depth of dimension of a religious community’s experience. It creates a shared ethical space for a community of believers and provides norms and principles for a moral stance in life. Primary language also provides moral warrants for resistance against unjust conditions, including those conditions that give rise to conflict. It offers normative symbols of the religious meaning of peace and of human responsibility to strive for peace.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the religious laws and ideas developed on peace and security often appeal more to religious communities than universal sets of guidelines, such as expressed in the United Nations’ declarations on political, civil and individual rights. They may better encourage religious communities to work for peace than other guidelines. Yet one must take care that they do not replace these universal rights.

With regard to Islam, Islam has a direct impact on the way that peace is conceptualized and the way that conflicts are resolved in Islamic societies, as it embodies and elaborates upon its highest morals, ethical principles and ideals of social harmony. Irrespective of the Islamic tradition to which they adhere, Muslims agree that Islam is a religion of peace and that the application of Islamic principles will bring justice, harmony, order, and thus peace.<sup>21</sup> In short, key Islamic principles related to peace and peace-building include:

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<sup>18</sup> Said and Funk, 2002, pp. 37-38.

<sup>19</sup> Gopin, 2000, p. 13.

<sup>20</sup> Vendley and Little, 1994, p. 307; they also speak of second-order religious language, which Appleby, 2000, later defined as a common cross-cultural vocabulary that facilitates dialogue while remaining true to the primary theological claims of each participating community.

<sup>21</sup> Kadayifci-Orellana, *Islamic Non-Violence Paradigm*, forthcoming, p. 101.

- *Salam/silm* (peace): Koranic discourse suggests that peace is a central theme in Islamic precepts.<sup>22</sup> According to Koranic discourse, peace in Islam begins with God, but also encompasses peace with oneself, with fellow human beings, and with nature;
- *Tawhid* ('the principle of unity of God and all beings'): This principle urges Muslims to recognize the connectedness of all beings, and particularly all human communities, and calls to work towards establishing peace and harmony among them;
- *Rahmah* (compassion) and *Rahim* (mercy): Closely related to each other, these words invoke Muslims to be merciful and compassionate to all human beings, irrespective of their ethnic, religious origins, or gender. They connote that a true Muslim cannot be insensitive to the suffering of other beings, nor can he/she be cruel to any creature;
- *Fitrah*: Individual responsibility to uphold peace emerges out of the original constitution of human beings (*fitrah*).<sup>23</sup> *Fitrah* recognizes that each individual is furnished with reason and has the potential to be good and choose to work for the establishment of harmony;
- Justice, forgiveness, vicegerency and social responsibility are other concepts in Islam that play a key role in relation to peace and peace-building.<sup>24</sup>

It should be noted that these concepts do not form the only basis for Muslim peace-builders. Additionally, Muslim societies across the globe have developed different traditional and cultural dispute-resolution mechanisms over the centuries. These local mechanisms are referred to as *sulha* (in the Middle East), *sulh* (in Bosnia) or *suluh* (as in Kenya and Indonesia) because of the references to *sulh* (reconciliation/peace-building) in the Koran, and are based on the Islamic principles of peacemaking and dispute resolution stated above. These traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms become internal sources for resolving conflicts and peacemaking in these regions. Conflict resolution and peacemaking mechanisms are legitimized and guaranteed by communal leaders, such as elders and religious leaders, who know the Koran, the *Sunna*, the *Hadith* and the history of the community well.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Kadayifci-Orellana, 2003, p. 43.

<sup>23</sup> Said and Funk, 2001.

<sup>24</sup> The Islamic values and principles of peacemaking are not only limited to relations with Muslims, but extend to other religious traditions, especially Jews and Christians as the 'People of the Book'. For example, the principle of *Tawhid* recognizes the unity of all human beings irrespective of religious, ethnic or racial origin, or gender, and asks Muslims to establish harmony between all of mankind. Islam therefore urges Muslims to go beyond mere coexistence and to actively seek mutual understanding and relationships of cooperation with one another. The idea of *fitrah* recognizes the good and perfection in every human being and that all humans are related and are from the same origin (K4: 1; 6: 98). Thus 'human dignity deserves absolute protection regardless of the person's religion, ethnicity, and intellectual opinion orientation' (K17: 70); see Abu-Nimer, 2000/2001, p. 261. The Koranic conception of justice, which is universal, asks each and every Muslim to treat others equally, declares that all human beings, as children of Adam, have been honoured equally (K17: 70), and states 'O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety; and fear Allah. For Allah is well acquainted with all that ye do' (K5: 8). Koranic emphasis on forgiveness suggests Muslims forgive those who have committed acts of violence and aggression towards Muslims. The Prophet's example, where he forgave the Meccans who persecuted and attacked him and his followers, is strongly supportive of this position (see Troger, 1990, pp. 12-124). And the Koranic conception of compassion calls for Muslims to show mercy and compassion to all of God's creatures, especially all human beings.

<sup>25</sup> For more elaborate information on Islam, peace, peace-building and non-violence, see, for instance, Abu-Nimer 1996, 2001 and 2003; Said, Funk and Kadayifci, 2001 and 2002; Irani, 1999; Irani and Funk 1998, 2001; Sa'id, 1997 and 2000/2001; and Satha-Anand, 1987, 1994, 1996 and 2001.

With regard to Christianity, it is possible to distinguish a similar set of peace-related concepts. Obviously, in Christianity it is particularly the Bible that motivates Christians to work on peace. The basis of Christian peace-building is formed by Biblical teachings that refer to peace (*shalom*); peacemakers ('Blessed are the peacemakers, they shall be called the children of God'); being created in the image of God; the unconditional love (*agape*) towards God and people ('You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and with all your mind. [...] You shall love your neighbour as yourself'); lamenting, which helps people to grieve; confession and repentance (that is, the willingness to evaluate oneself and assume responsibility for one's own contribution to the conflict, coupled with the willingness to change one's behaviour or to repent); and reconciliation and forgiveness ('for if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if you do not forgive men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses').

## 2.2. Observations

Five observations regarding the Biblical or Koranic basis for peace and peace-building can be made. First, the Bible and the Koran provide a wide array of concepts that encourage religious followers to strive for peace and work at peace-building. As Muslims and Christians are both 'People of the Book', they share a number of similar concepts such as peace/*salam*, forgiveness/*afu*, compassion/*rahmah*, and human beings in the eyes of God/*fitrah*. Although these concepts are not fully the same, they may to a certain extent form the basis for dialogue between Christians and Muslims, and even for joint peace-building efforts.

Second, however, it should be realized that the transformation from Christian/Muslim actor to Christian/Muslim peace-builder should not be taken for granted. It applies only to a certain number of actors, the so-called 'compassionate core' or 'religious change agents'. However, various Christian/Muslim actors will never be engaged in active peace-building. Some will be indifferent to peace-building, and will at the most side against extremist religious actors and against the use of violence in the name of religion. Some, however, will also remain against peace-building and in support of religious violence in situations of oppression and injustice.<sup>26</sup>

Third, there is not one Christian or Islamic interpretation of peace and peace-building. Within Christianity different perceptions on peace and peace-building exist. Christians have not arrived at a universal set of values and priorities in pursuing peace. Even within a certain Christian denomination, people may not fully agree on fundamental matters, such as the proper relationship between peace and justice or the philosophical and practical meaning of basis concepts such as reconciliation.<sup>27</sup> The same is true in Islam. Many of the Koranic verses and *Hadiths* refer to particular historical events and at times they seem to contradict each other. Furthermore, they are written in medieval Arabic, which is different than the Arabic used by many Arabs today, and also a majority of the Muslims are from non-Arabic-speaking societies. For these reasons, it has not been possible to develop a single Islamic tradition of peace and peacemaking traditions. Local traditions and geopolitical conditions have also impacted upon the evolution of the Islamic traditions of peace and peacemaking. Consequently, and similar to secular discourses, there are various different approaches to peace and the resolution of conflicts in the Muslim world. Still, there are certain fundamental ethical principles and moral values

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<sup>26</sup> Adapted from Appleby, 2001.

<sup>27</sup> Adapted from Appleby, 2001.

that unite Muslim peacemaking traditions across cultures and historical periods, as they are all derived from the Koran, *Hadith*, and the *Sunna*.

Fourth, a key question is to what extent the Biblical/Koranic principles are applied—that is, how do Christians/Muslims implement these principles towards others. In this connection, it is especially important to consider the way in which Christians/Muslims, and other believers as well, handle the tension between ‘truth’ and ‘love’. On the one hand, each religious tradition, and especially the conservatives within it, believes that it has been entrusted with fundamental truths that are beneficial for all people and that must be defended and sometimes propagated. On the other hand, each tradition also calls upon its believers to have compassion for all people, including those who are different. The task confronting each faith community is to find a creative way to affirm its roles as both the custodian of truth and a channel of love. At the heart of this issue, then, is the need to affirm one’s own identity in a way that does not negate the identity of the other. How Christian and other believers approach these basic questions of identity will determine their ability to act as agents of reconciliation rather than divisiveness.<sup>28</sup>

A final observation regards the limited access of various Muslim communities to different interpretations of the Koran, and as such to Islamic values that underpin peace and peace-building. Many of the Muslim communities today do not speak Arabic. Because of high illiteracy rates, especially among women, many Muslims have limited access to the wide range of religious interpretations of Islam, which limits their access to the Koran and increases their dependence on certain clergy. Many Islamic educational institutions, such as *madrasas*, however, are outdated and the quality of education is quite low. The experience of colonization, imperialism and underdevelopment has impacted upon the way that Islamic texts are understood and interpreted.<sup>29</sup> Many Muslims are resentful towards the West and thus easily influenced by aggressive and radicalized interpretations of the Islamic beliefs and core values. Texts used in Islamic educational institutions do not emphasize Islam’s peacemaking values, tolerance and dialogue. Many imams or religious leaders also lack the proper education and training to engage with religious texts. All of these factors contribute to a lack of knowledge as well as misunderstanding of religious texts by Muslims. Ways to address these issues are to support programmes of general literacy, education and training of religious leaders in Koranic sciences, the preparation and distribution of textbooks and handbooks on Islamic values of peace-building and tolerance, curriculum development to include these peace- and tolerance-oriented books into the *madrasa* systems, and supporting radio programmes that address Islamic values of peace and tolerance.

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<sup>28</sup> Text, except footnote 27, provided by Dr David Steele, Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group.

<sup>29</sup> For a more detailed analysis regarding the impact of social, cultural, political and economic contexts on how religious texts are understood and interpreted, see Kadayifci-Orellana, *Standing on the Isthmus: Islamic Narratives of War and Peace in Palestine*, forthcoming.

## III. Mapping Christian, Multi-Faith and Muslim Peace-Building Actors

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a **description** of thirteen Christian and multi-faith peace-building actors and of fourteen Muslim peace-building actors. Each description attempts to highlight the following characteristics per organization:

- *Type of organization:* The phrasing used to describe the type of organization has been discussed with and agreed upon by the organizations themselves;
- *Staff and annual budget:* The figures apply to the organization as a whole. Only where available are more specific figures on the number of staff and size of budget per specific faith-based programme within the organization mentioned;
- *Focus on conflict with/without a religious overtone:* This characteristic refers to the ongoing discussion about whether faith-based peace-building is especially suitable for religious or non-religious conflicts. The terminology in this discussion can be misleading, because as Smock argues, ‘while religion plays a role throughout most contemporary conflicts, describing them as religious conflicts would be misleading, because this tends to ignore the fact that other factors than religious ones, for instance ethnic, age, geographical ones, also contribute to conflict. So while religion plays a role in contemporary conflict, it has often been used as a surrogate for a cluster of other factors’.<sup>30</sup> In this report the authors use the concept of religious conflict to indicate conflicts where religion is an important factor: because religious actors become active proponents on one side of the conflict; because religion becomes instrumentalized—that is, used by political actors to legitimize their policies; or because religion is perceived as one of the important ‘identity markers’ by which people define themselves and distinguish themselves from any outsiders. As will be shown in this report, faith-based peace-building actors have been involved—to varying degrees and at different levels—in both religious and non-religious conflicts;
- *Geographical scope:* Region(s) where most of the actor’s peace-building work takes place;
- *Main level of operation:* This characteristic indicates whether the organization works more top-down or bottom-up, and whether it concentrates its peace-building efforts at a specific level;
- *Primary beneficiaries:* This category specifies whether the actors target their peace-building efforts exclusively to religious actors and organizations or not;
- *Core peace-building business:* This category defines each actor’s core peace-building business in terms of advocacy, intermediary, observation, education, transitional justice, and intra-faith/inter-faith dialogue, as explained in the previous paragraph. For the sake of analytical clarity, the

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<sup>30</sup> Smock, 2001.

different peace-building areas are separated from each other, but—unsurprisingly—in real life they are not always easy to distinguish from each other as they are usually combined.

### **3.2 Description of the Actors**

This paragraph summarizes the key characteristics per organization (Tables 1 and 2). A detailed description per organization can be found in Annexe III. The authors would like to stress that the information in Tables 1 and 2 should be utilized in combination with the detailed descriptions per actor in Annexe III.

For the sake of clarity, the authors remark that the fourteen Muslim organizations were selected not only because they matched the selection criteria as defined in chapter 1, but also because of the relatively easy access to information about their work, their visibility towards outsiders (that is, having a website, or having contacts with international organizations), and because of their responsiveness to the authors' survey questions. The organizations included thus constitute the most visible actors, which utilize English, have the capacity to internationalize their work by electronic media, and have the means to respond to the authors' survey questions via electronic mail. Organizations that did not match these standards have not been included in this chapter. It is thus hard to state that organizations recorded in this study are fully representative of Muslim peace-building actors in Africa and the Balkans. Nevertheless, these organizations certainly do represent a segment of Muslim peace-building actors operating in these regions.

Moreover, it should be noted that the authors have made an analytical distinction between different types of peace-building activities, between so-called different peace-building domains. In practice, however, it will not always be so easy to distinguish these peace-building areas from each other, as they are usually combined. The authors have also identified only one or a few core areas of activity for each actor. In practice, however, many of the actors registered here assume different peace-building roles (for example, as advocate, intermediary, educator, or observer, etc.) as particular needs emerge. For example, although Table 2 indicates that mediation is the core activity of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Wajir also engages in activities such as peace education, observation, advocacy and transitional justice. Similarly, Table 2 also identifies the main beneficiaries of these activities, although in fact others may also benefit from these activities.

Lastly, it must be noted that the authors have not managed to obtain data on staff size, budget and focus on religious or non-religious conflict for the Muslim peace-building actors outlined in Table 2, mainly because of lack of time. A follow-up study may possibly collect this missing information.

### **3.3 Observations**

The actors' descriptions in Annexe III and Tables 1 and 2 show that a large variety of Christian, multi-faith and Muslim actors are involved in peace-building. Key observations in this chapter are that their peace-building activities:

- Are not limited to conflict situations where religion plays an important role, but also include conflict situations where religion is not a major factor;
- Take place in conflict countries all over the world;

- Cover all levels of operation, ranging from the grassroots to the international level;
- Do not exclusively focus on religious beneficiaries, but in many cases target different kinds of secular beneficiaries as well;
- Relate to multiple peace-building areas such as advocacy, education, inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue, intermediary/mediation, observation and transitional justice.

**Table 1: Mapping Christian and Multi-Faith Peace-Building Actors**

No	Christian or Multi-faith Actor	Type of Organization	Staff and Annual Budget (US\$)	Focus on (non)-religious conflict	Geographical Focus	Main Level of Operation	Primary Beneficiaries	Core Peace-Building Business
1	Life and Peace Institute	International and ecumenical centre for peace research and action	Staff: 30 Budget: 28-30 million	Both	Great Lakes Horn of Africa	Grassroots and community level <sup>31</sup>	Churches and ecumenical bodies are natural counterparts	Education Dialogue
2	World Vision International	Christian relief and development organization	Staff: 22,500 Budget: 1,546 billion	Both	Worldwide	Community and household level	Religious and secular community-based organizations (CBOs)	Intermediary Education Dialogue Advocacy <sup>32</sup>
3	International Association for Religious Freedom <sup>33</sup>	Multi-faith NGO	Staff: 8 Budget: 680,000	Does not work on conflict	Worldwide	Local level	Religious member groups at the national level	(Advocacy) Promotion of religious freedom
4	Community of Sant'Egidio	International Catholic NGO engaged in peacemaking	-	Both	Worldwide	International level	Religious and secular, governmental and non-governmental counterparts	Intermediary Dialogue
5	Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution	Multi-faith education and research centre	Staff: 5	Conflict with religious overtone	Middle East	Different levels	Religious and secular local counterparts, policy-makers,	Education (Research and direct action) <sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> See Annexe III for more detailed information on the level of operations.

<sup>32</sup> See Annexe III for more detailed information on core peace-building businesses.

<sup>33</sup> See Annexe III for the pros and cons of including this actor in this mapping of faith-based peace-building actors.

<sup>34</sup> See Annexe III for more detailed information on core peace-building businesses.

No	Christian or Multi-faith Actor	Type of Organization	Staff and Annual Budget (US\$)	Focus on (non)-religious conflict	Geographical Focus	Main Level of Operation	Primary Beneficiaries	Core Peace-Building Business
							diplomats	
6	International Center for Religion and Diplomacy	Multi-faith NGO specializing in faith-based diplomacy	Staff: 7 Budget: 588,000	Both	Sudan, Kashmir, Pakistan, Iran	Different levels	Both religious and secular local counterparts	Intermediary Education Dialogue
7	World Conference of Religions for Peace	Multi-faith NGO, among other things working on conflict transformation	Budget: 4-5 million	More on non-religious than religious conflict	Worldwide	National level	(Inter-)religious national bodies	Dialogue Education Intermediary
8	David Steele <sup>35</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	International Fellowship of Reconciliation	Spiritually-based movement committed to active non-violence	Staff: 8 Budget: 1 million	Both	Worldwide	Grassroots and community level	Spiritually-based actors committed to non-violence	Different peace-building areas, especially (non-violence) Education
10	Mennonite Central Committee	Christian relief, development and peace-building agency	Staff: 1,200 Budget: 85 million	Both	Worldwide	Grassroots and community level	Religious and secular local counterparts	Education Advocacy Intermediary

<sup>35</sup> As David Steele is included as an individual that carried out a number of faith-based peace-building programmes for different organizations, an institutional description is not applicable here.

No	Christian or Multi-faith Actor	Type of Organization	Staff and Annual Budget (US\$)	Focus on (non)-religious conflict	Geographical Focus	Main Level of Operation	Primary Beneficiaries	Core Peace-Building Business
11	Center for Justice and Peace-Building, Eastern Mennonite University	Faith-based university centre specializing in conflict transformation and peace-building	Staff: 29 Budget: 1.8 million	Both	West Africa, Middle East (plus Central America and Sudan) <sup>36</sup>	Grassroots and community level <sup>37</sup>	Religious counterparts and practitioners	Education
12	Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies	Catholic-based, inter-faith research and education institute	Staff: 20 <sup>38</sup> Budget: 2.1 million	Religious conflict	Middle East, Eastern and Southern Africa, South Asia, South-East Asia	Different levels	Catholic and other religious actors, as well as secular actors	Education (and Research)
13	Religion and Peace-Making Initiative <sup>39</sup>	Not applicable	Budget: 823,000	Religious conflict	Indonesia, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Nigeria, Sudan	(Inter)national level	Mostly religious local counterparts	Education Inter-faith Dialogue

<sup>36</sup> The Practice Institute of the Center for Justice and Peace-Building is currently applying for funds to organize Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience workshops in Sudan and Central America.

<sup>37</sup> See the paragraph in Annexe III for more detailed information on the level of operations.

<sup>38</sup> Kroc's staff comprises ten core faculty and ten institute staff. In addition, the Institute has 39 faculty fellows and six visiting fellows.

<sup>39</sup> The Religion and Peacemaking Initiative (RPMI) does not concern a specific organization, but a specific programme that is headed by Dr David Smock, who is working at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). For a further discussion on (the selection of) the RPMI, the authors refer to the analysis in Annexe III.

**Table 2: Mapping Muslim Peace-Building Actors**

No	Muslim Actor	Geographical Focus	Main Level of Operation	Primary Beneficiaries	Core Peace-Building Business
1	Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Kenya	Kenya, Somalia, Uganda	Local, national and international	Muslim and non-Muslim communities	Intermediary
2	Coalition for Peace in Africa, Kenya	All of Africa, particularly anglophone, lusophone and francophone countries	Local, national, and international	Different religious and ethnic communities	Intermediary
3	Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa, Kenya	All of Africa	International	Different religious and ethnic communities	Inter-faith
4	Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, Nigeria	Mostly Nigeria	Local, national and international	Muslim and Christian communities	Inter-faith Mediation
5	Centre for Research and Dialogue, Somalia	Somalia	Local, national and international	Mostly Muslim communities	Advocacy
6	<i>Idaacadda Quránka Kariimka</i> (IQK) [Holy Koran Radio], Somalia	Somalia	Local and national	Muslim communities	Advocacy
7	Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	National and international	Different religious and ethnic communi.	Inter-faith Mediation
8	Sudanese Women's Initiative for Peace, Sudan	Sudan	National	Mostly Muslim women	Advocacy
9	Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative, Uganda	Mostly Uganda and Sudan	Local, national and international	Different religious and ethnic communities	Intermediary
10	Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Bosnia	National	Muslim community	Advocacy
11	Women to Women, Bosnia-Herzegovina	Bosnia	Local and national	Different religious and ethnic communities, both secular and religious groups	Advocacy (also transitional justice)
12	Faculty of Islamic Studies, Kosovo	Kosovo	National	Muslims	Education
13	<i>Salam</i> Institute for Peace and Justice, US	Global	International	Different religious and ethnic groups	Education
14	<i>Salam</i> Sudan Foundation, US	US, France and Sudan	International	Different religious and ethnic groups	Advocacy

## **IV. Analysis of Christian, Multi-Faith and Muslim Peace-Building Actors**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides an **analysis** of thirteen Christian and multi-faith peace-building actors, and of fourteen Muslim peace-building actors. The analysis per actor comprises:

- One or two examples of their peace-building work;
- Outcomes and results of this peace-building work;
- Assessment of the impact of their peace-building activities—that is, a self-assessment of their contribution to peace;
- General lessons learned with regard to faith-based peace-building (where available).

The results, outcomes and impact of each actor's peace-building work are based on self-descriptions, obtained by the authors through telephone and emails, and thus not through field visits or interviews with stakeholders involved in these activities.

### **4.2 Analysis of the Actors**

This paragraph summarizes the activities that have been analysed, their perceived results and outcomes, their overall impact on the peace process, as well as some lessons learned with regard to faith-based peace-building (Tables 3 and 4). A detailed analysis of each actor can be found in Annexe III. The authors would like to stress that the information in Tables 3 and 4 should be utilized in combination with the detailed analysis per actor in Annexe III. The categorization presented in Tables 3 and 4 mainly serves the purpose of listing what activities a number of faith-based actors have undertaken, what results and outcomes they have achieved, how their activities have contributed to peace-building, and what some of their experiences are with faith-based peace-building.

**Table 3: Summary of the Analysis of Christian and Multi-Faith Peace-Building Actors**

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	Selected Lessons Learned
Life and Peace Institute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support of peace-building capacity of churches in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</li> <li>- Facilitation of cooperation between Protestant and Catholic media in Congo Brazzaville</li> </ul>	<p>Less conflictive, more reconciliatory message of churches</p> <p>/</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Altering behaviour</li> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Encouraging reconciliation</li> </ul>	<p>Strengths of local religious peace-builders are long-term presence, widespreadness, and mandate to build peace</p> <p>Possible weakness of churches and other religious actors is their fear of being perceived as political actors</p> <p>Build peace with both religious and other community leaders</p>
World Vision International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community Council for Peace and Tolerance, Mitrovica, Kosovo</li> <li>- Trauma counselling module for religious leaders in Maluku, Indonesia</li> </ul>	<p>Increased interaction between Albanian and Serbian Kosovars</p> <p>/</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Ability to draft people</li> <li>Encouraging reconciliation</li> <li>Healing</li> </ul>	<p>Religious leaders mobilize their constituencies both for conflict and peace</p> <p>Faith-based peace-building has the risk of (being accused of) proselytizing</p>
International Association of Religious Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Religious Freedom Youth Programme</li> <li>- Programmes on the prevention of religious intolerance</li> </ul>	<p>/</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Ability to draft people</li> <li>Encouraging reconciliation</li> <li>Healing</li> </ul>	<p>/</p>

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	Selected Lessons Learned
World Conference of Religions for Peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establishment of Inter-Religious Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina</li> <li>- Support to joint action of religious leaders in Iraq</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased awareness about inter-religious cooperation</li> <li>Draft law on religious freedom in Bosnia-Herzegovina</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encouraging dialogue, reconciliation, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</li> <li>Challenging traditional structures (gender)</li> <li>Ability to draft people</li> <li>Connecting actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Multi-religious peace-building has advantages over single-religious peace-building</li> <li>National actors are prime actors but not always prime movers of the peace process</li> <li>Local religious leaders in international faith-based organizations provide the latter with a unique entry point into conflict situations (as in, for example, Iraq)</li> </ul>
International Fellowship of Reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Multi-faith peace efforts in Northern Uganda, especially the Acholi leadership retreat</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Honest dialogue among leaders</li> <li>Reconciliation among leaders who were not able to work together</li> <li>Consensus on the Paraa declaration among the leaders and government</li> <li>President Museveni's approval of the Paraa Declaration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Challenging structures</li> <li>Connecting actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Long-term relationships with local actors enable international actors to assume a peace-building role in the conflict at hand</li> </ul>
Mennonite Central Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Peace mediations in Nicaragua</li> <li>- Peace-building workshops in Northern Nigeria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contribution to settlement between Sandinistas and Indian/Creole leaders</li> <li>Facilitated the return home of Indian refugees</li> <li>Changed attitudes of individual Christians and Muslims towards conflict</li> <li>Organizational changes (such as the establishment of inter-faith peace teams and peace office for the Ecumenical Council of Churches in northern Nigeria)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Healing</li> <li>Encouraging dialogue and reconciliation</li> <li>Mediation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selection of credible local religious counterparts is of crucial importance to international peace-builders</li> </ul>

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	General Lessons Learned
Community of Sant'Egidio	<p>-Mediator in peace process in Mozambique</p> <p>-Broker in peace talks in Guatemala</p> <p>-Mediator in school agreement in Kosovo</p> <p>-Mediator between the DRC's transitional government and FDLR (ex-FAR/Interahamwe) in the DRC</p>	<p>Contribution to Peace Accords of 1992</p> <p>Contributor to Peace Agreement in 1996</p> <p>Contributor to Schools Agreement in 1998</p> <p>/</p>	<p>Mediation</p> <p>Encouraging inter-faith dialogue and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</p>	<p>Success factors in Sant'Egidio's work include: a) long-term record for integrity in society it comes to serve; b) not seeking economic or political power; c) intimate knowledge of the conflict situation; d) strong faith-based motivation to build peace</p>
Center for World Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution	<p>- 'Religion, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution Initiative' Project</p>	<p>CRDC hopes to raise awareness among policy-makers on religious dimensions of conflict and peace</p>	<p>Dissemination of Ideas</p>	<p>/</p>
International Center for Religion and Diplomacy	<p>-Projects between Christian and Muslim leaders in Sudan</p>	<p>Establishment of Sudan Inter-Religious Council</p> <p>Payment of compensation by government of Sudan to Catholic Church</p>	<p>Meditation</p> <p>Encouraging dialogue and reconciliation</p> <p>Dissemination of ideas</p>	<p>Faith-based peace-building can create the transcendent environment that is conducive to overcoming personal and religious differences</p> <p>International peace-builders must build up credibility with local conflicting parties, often through long-term presence or through partnering with local actors that command respect</p> <p>Religious leaders may bring moral authority to the peace process</p>

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	Selected Lessons Learned
Center for Justice and Peace-Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR) Workshops in Sierra Leone</li> </ul>	<p>Establishment of STAR-Net by former workshop participants, whose activities include: a) local radio broadcasts on trauma and healing; b) STAR-based course at the Evangelical College of Theology (TECT) in Freetown; c) development of materials for care-givers of children; and d) inter-faith memorials/healing rituals and massacre sites</p>	<p>Dissemination of ideas Healing</p>	<p>Strength of faith-based peace-builders: long-term commitment to peace</p> <p>Weakness: some faith-based peace-builders seem to be less focused on results than secular peace-builders</p>
Kroc Institute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institute's teaching and research programmes</li> <li>- Faith-based reconciliation seminars in Kashmir</li> <li>- Coordination of Catholic Peace-Building Network</li> <li>- Summer Institute on Peace-Building for staff and counterparts of Catholic Relief Services</li> </ul>	<p>Scott Appleby's nuanced analysis of religious militancy and religious peace-building in <i>The Ambivalence of the Sacred</i> (2000)</p> <p>Transformation of civil society leaders at both sides of Line of Control</p> <p>Increased 'connectivity' among civil society leaders committed to peace</p> <p>/</p> <p>/</p>	<p>Dissemination of ideas Connecting actors Encouraging dialogue and reconciliation</p>	/

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	Selected Lessons Learned
Religion and Peace-Making Initiative <sup>40</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue</li> <li>- Peace mediations of Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in northern Nigeria</li> </ul>	<p>/</p> <p>Contribution to peace agreement with Muslims and Christians in Yelwa-Nshar and Jos</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Encouraging dialogue</li> <li>Mediation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selection of credible local religious counterparts is of crucial importance to international peace-builders</li> <li>Secular and faith-based peace-building are complementary and should go hand in hand</li> <li>Faith-based peace-building is sometimes more to discuss emotionally sensitive political issues</li> </ul>

<sup>40</sup> The Religion and Peacemaking Initiative (RPMI) does not concern a specific organization, but a specific programme that is headed by Dr David Smock, who is working at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). For a further discussion on (the selection of) the RPMI, the authors refer to the analysis in Annexe III.

**Table 4: Summary of the Analysis of Muslim Peace-Building Actors**

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	Selected Lessons Learned
Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mediator in local conflicts in Wajir Region, Kenya</li> <li>- Awarding police chiefs as peacemakers</li> <li>- Lobby for peace education in schools</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased recognition of women as peacemakers</li> <li>Change in attitude among police chiefs</li> <li>Incorporation peace education in schools</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Altering behaviour</li> <li>Ability to draft people</li> <li>Challenging structures</li> <li>Encouraging reconciliation</li> </ul>	/
Coalition for Peace in Africa, Kenya	-Producing videos of community-based peace-building work	Various (see text)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Altering behaviour</li> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Policy Change</li> <li>Encouraging reconciliation</li> </ul>	In Islamic contexts (such as Somalia), peace-building based on Islamic values seems more effective than peace-building based on non-Islamic, secular models
Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa, Kenya	- Organized regional inter-faith summits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Summit resulted in Inter-Faith Peace Declaration and Plan of Action</li> <li>Follow-up to the summit took place in the form of inter-faith summits in sub-regions; establishment of national inter-faith peace networks and forums; solidarity visits to Liberia to promote peace; a visit of a high-level inter-faith delegation to the Democratic Republic of Congo; and various inter-faith peace missions in conflict-affected areas across Africa (Liberia, the DRC, southern Sudan)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Ability to draft people</li> <li>Encourage reconciliation</li> </ul>	/
Centre for Research and Dialogue, Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Youth peace-building programme in Somalia</li> <li>- Dialogue for peace project, involving national reconciliation issues in Somalia</li> </ul>	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Altering behaviour</li> <li>Dissemination of ideas</li> <li>Encouraging reconciliation</li> </ul>	/

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	Selected Lessons Learned
Inter-Faith Mediation Centre	<p>- Mediator in various conflicts in Nigeria</p> <p>- Published <i>The Pastor and the Imam: Responding to Conflict</i></p>	<p>Peace agreement between religious Muslim and Christian bodies of Kaduna State</p> <p>Facilitated the outcome of the peaceful coexistence within the warring communities of the Birom and Fulani communities in Plateau</p> <p>/</p>	<p>Altering behaviour</p> <p>Healing</p> <p>Mediation</p> <p>Encouraging reconciliation</p>	<p>Funds from donor agencies may compromise the peace-building efforts of local religious actors</p>
Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative, Uganda	<p>Mediator between government of Uganda and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA)</p> <p>Organizer of Community Mediation and Peace-Building Programme</p>	<p>Some rebel officers laid down their arms and took advantage of the government amnesty</p> <p>/</p>	<p>Altering behaviour</p> <p>Policy change</p> <p>Mediation</p> <p>Encouraging reconciliation</p> <p>Connecting actors</p>	/
Holy Koran Radio, Somalia	<p>The radio station airs a daily peace message, as well as programmes in which listeners can discuss topics in their community with the aim of getting them used to listening to each other</p>	/	<p>Altering behaviour</p> <p>Dissemination of ideas</p> <p>Challenging structures</p> <p>Encouraging reconciliation</p> <p>Connecting actors</p>	/
Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone	<p>Active peace broker in peace processes in Sierra Leone</p>	<p>Contributed as broker to Lome Peace Accord</p> <p>Brokered the release of 52 hostages</p> <p>Contributed to the establishment of the West-Africa Inter-Religious Coordinating Committee</p>	<p>Mediation</p> <p>Encouraging reconciliation</p> <p>Connecting actors</p>	<p>Religious leaders should try to avoid taking sides on national political matters</p>
Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina	<p>- Facilitated imams to link up with international peace-building organizations and activities</p>	<p>Increased peace-building capacity of imams</p> <p>Encouraged peace-building and dialogue among the Muslim community</p>	<p>Altering behaviour</p> <p>Ability to draft people</p> <p>Encouraging reconciliation</p>	/

Actor	Examples Described	Specific Results and Outcomes	Contribution to Peace	Selected Lessons Learned
Sudanese Women's Initiative for Peace	- Advocacy for peace and women's rights in Sudan	Contributed to the orientation of the Sudanese peace agenda towards all civil society groups and other community members Managed to include women's perspectives and issues in the peace process	Altering behaviour Challenging structures	Women's negative perception in the public and political domain may hinder their peace-building work  Sensitive communication between Western donors and local (religious) aid recipients is crucial
Women to Women, Bosnia-Herzegovina	- Various peace-building projects	/	Dissemination of ideas Policy Change Encouraging reconciliation	/
Faculty of Islamic Studies, Kosovo	- Participation in ten-day seminar on peace-building in Caux, Switzerland	/	Dissemination of ideas Ability to draft people Encouraging reconciliation	/
<i>Salam Institute for Peace and Justice, US</i>	- Author of report entitled <i>Implementing Approaches to Improved Quality of Islamic Education in Developing Nations</i> - Organizer of inter-faith dialogue between Muslims and evangelical Christians in the United States	/	Dissemination of ideas Policy Change Encouraging reconciliation	/
<i>Salam Sudan Foundation, US</i>	- Peace lobby, especially in Sudan	<i>Salam Sudan</i> is credited with having played a positive role by lobbying both the US administration and the Sudan government, which led to a strategic shift towards peacemaking	Dissemination of ideas Policy Change Encouraging reconciliation	/

### 4.3 Observations

On the basis of the analysis provided in Tables 3 and 4, and in Annexe III, three important observations can be made: a) faith-based peace-builders have contributed substantially to peace-building in various ways; b) various faith-based peace-builders are struggling to measure the impact of their work, making it difficult sometimes to assess the actual effect of their peace-building efforts; and c) faith-based peace-building seems to have a number of specific strengths and weaknesses.

#### 4.3.1 Multiple Contributions to Peace-Building

The authors observe that the faith-based actors included in this report have contributed to peace-building in multiple ways. The particular contributions of each actor can be found in Tables 3 and 4. However, the authors would like to caution against oversimplification and would like to state that the contributions registered here are based on the examples provided in this report. Through interviews by email and telephone, the authors asked the participating actors to provide two concrete examples of their work, and then analysed the contribution of these actors based on the particular examples provided in the interviews. The authors also analysed the documented activities of the organizations' work on internet resources, wherever available. In fact, many of these organizations have been engaged in many other projects or activities, and analysing their contribution based on a limited number of examples only gives a limited view on the capacity, capability and quality of these actors' work, as it does not take into account other projects in which these actors have been involved. The authors hence stress that the multiple contributions of faith-based actors to peace-building are not necessarily limited to those outlined below.

Additionally, many of these organizations provided the authors with successful projects and probably did not include projects that were not as successful, with the idea that this might affect their chances for future funding. The authors hence do not claim that the assessment is complete in the sense of undertaking a real evaluation. However, they believe that this first assessment provides a good impression of the work, scope and potential of the faith-based actors included in this report.

Given these limitations, the authors still feel that the following observations can be made with regard to the contributions of Christian, multi-faith and Muslim actors to peace-building. They have succeeded in:

1. Altering behaviours, attitudes, negative stereotypes and mind frames of Christian, Muslim and non-faith-based participants;
2. Healing of trauma and injuries as well as rehumanizing the 'other';
3. Contributing to more effective dissemination of ideas such as democracy, human rights, justice, development and peace-building;
4. Drafting committed people from a wide pool because of their wide presence in society and broad community base;
5. Challenging traditional structures, such as the perceived role of women in society;
6. Reaching out to governments, effecting policy changes, and reaching out to youth;
7. Mediating between conflicting parties;
8. Encouraging reconciliation, inter-faith dialogue, disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration;

9. Connecting—via international faith-based networks—like-minded faith-based communities in other countries, but also not-like-minded faith-based actors for support, and in convening large meetings of them.

*Altering behaviour, attitudes and negative stereotypes, and rehumanizing the ‘other’:* Willingness, commitment to peace and motivation are critical for resolving conflicts and building peace. Religion still plays a critical role in the lives of many people in the world today. In many cases, faith-based actors are greatly respected, have greater legitimacy and credibility than other actors, and thus play a prominent role in building peace. They may well have a unique leverage to reconcile conflicting parties and rehumanize the opponents. As a result they can mobilize and motivate their faith-based communities to change their behaviour and attitudes much more effectively than secular organizations. Many of the actors analysed in this report seem to have contributed in small or large ways to altering behaviour. For example, the Life and Peace Institute, David Steele, Wajir, Coalition for Peace in Africa, Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative, Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, Faculty of Islamic Studies in Pristina and the *Salam* Institute for Peace and Justice have all contributed to altering behaviour, reducing violence and rehumanizing the ‘other’ as a result of their involvement.

*Healing of trauma and injuries:* Because of gross violations of human rights and excessive violence, communities involved in conflict are usually traumatized and have deep injuries. Painful memories of conflict, loss of loved ones and injuries suffered causes deep emotional and psychological stress. Healing these injuries and trauma becomes a major component of peace-building efforts, especially for reconciliation at grassroots’ level. Religion can provide emotional, psychological and spiritual resources for healing trauma and injuries. Islam, Christianity and other religious traditions are usually an important source of healing in such cases. Among the peace-building actors analysed in this report, World Vision International, the International Association of Religious Freedom, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Center for Justice and Peace-Building, and the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in particular have been working on healing and reconciliation from a religious perspective.

*Contributing to more effective dissemination of ideas such as human rights, justice, development and peace-building:* The moral and spiritual legitimacy of faith-based actors often provides them with a certain leverage to disseminate ideas among their constituents. The deep understanding that they usually have of religious texts, values and principles, as well as the role of religion in conflict and peace, places them in a position to share ideas on religion, human rights, justice, development, and peace-building. On the one hand this applies to religious leaders like sheikhs, imams and pastors who through sermons and lectures can connect various issues to religious values and principles and thus influence their constituents. For example, the involvement of Muslim religious leaders by Coalition for Peace in Africa seems to have contributed to the dissemination of democracy and human rights among the Muslim community. On the other hand, this also applies to local and international faith-based actors, who are not run by religious leaders per se. For instance, actors such as *Salam* Institute for Peace and Justice and Women to Women also contribute to disseminating these ideas through education and by basing their claims on religious texts, values and principles, thus legitimizing these ideas from a religious perspective. Being Muslim and having the necessary training and background is crucial for their effectiveness. Moreover, Christians and multi-faith actors like the Center for World Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, the Center for Justice and Peace-Building and the Kroc

Institute—through research, education and training—also disseminate ideas on issues related to religion, conflict and peace.

*Ability to draft committed people from a wide pool because of their wide presence in society and broad community base:* Because religion is deeply rooted in most societies and religious institutions are widely present, local religious leaders but also international faith-based actors cooperating with them are provided with entry points to reach out to people. Local religious leaders usually have a broad community base, which provides a wide pool for drafting committed and unwavering staff. Staff can devote the necessary time to mediation, reconciliation or peace education as part of service to God. They also have access to community members through mosques, churches, community centres and educational institutions such as Koran schools. This allows them to reach out to larger numbers of individuals than secular groups, and increase their effectiveness. The Inter-Religious Councils of Sierra Leone and of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Kosovo, as well as the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Pristina, among others, have been able to utilize their broad base for peace-building work. This also counts for more international actors, such as the World Conference of Religions for Peace.

*Challenging traditional structures:* With their moral authority, knowledge of sacred texts, and by providing successful examples, faith-based peace-building actors can reinterpret religious texts and challenge traditional structures. For example, by providing successful examples of reducing violence and conflict resolution and by involving religious leaders and elders, Wajir and the Sudanese Women's Initiative for Peace Network were able to challenge and change traditional perceptions of women's role in society in general and of peacemaking in particular. The International Fellowship of Reconciliation and the World Conference of Religions for Peace, among others, also aim to strengthen the position of women in religion, as well as in conflict and peace processes.

*Reaching out to governments, effecting policy changes, and reaching out to youth:* Because of the legitimacy and moral authority they hold, but probably also because of the specific knowledge they may have on the role of religion in conflict and peace processes, faith-based actors could reach out to government authorities and contribute to policy changes at higher levels. This aspect of their contribution can be observed in Wajir's success in convincing the government to include peace-building in schools, as well as the efforts of the Coalition for Peace in Africa to identify and impact upon policy changes.

*Mediating between conflicting parties:* Their moral and spiritual authority, and their reputation as honest and even-handed people of God, may also place faith-based actors in a good position to mediate between conflicting parties. With regard to the Muslim actors described in this report, by employing traditional conflict resolution methods like *suluh*, as was the case of Wajir, Coalition for Peace in Africa, Center for Research and Dialogue, Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative and the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, Muslim actors can contribute significantly to reducing violence and encouraging disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration. Islamic practices of conflict resolution like *suluh* are important for the Muslim community because they are familiar with it, it is local, and thus is considered authentic and legitimate. In more general terms, several of the faith-based actors analysed have engaged in mediation among conflicting parties. For instance, Sant'Egidio was involved as a mediator in Guatemala, Kosovo and Mozambique; the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy in Sudan; and the Mennonite Central Committee in Nicaragua.

*Encouraging reconciliation, inter-faith dialogue, disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration:* The involvement of faith-based actors in peacemaking can contribute to changing attitudes and encouraging inter-faith dialogue and reconciliation, as was the case with the Islamic

community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Pristina, Kosovo, Wajir, Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa, Center for Research and Dialogue, Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, the Mennonite Central Committee and the Community of Sant'Egidio. Outside the realm of the official peacemaking process, however, various faith-based actors have also promoted reconciliation and inter-faith dialogue, such as World Vision International through supporting the Community Council for Peace and Tolerance in Kosovo, the Life and Peace Institute through strengthening the peace-building capacity of churches in the DRC, and the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy and the Kroc Institute through organizing faith-based reconciliation seminars in Kashmir.

*Ability to connect faith-based communities and others worldwide, and convene large meetings among them:* Being part of a global network of like-minded faith-based actors is both advantageous for local actors as well as for international actors. For instance, local Muslim peace-building actors who are part of an international Muslim network, can connect to/with this network for support. Being part of such as network gives them also the capacity to mobilize the community, as well as national and international support for the peace process. Through their networking potential, they can also help spread peace work to wider communities, and, as it is the case with Inter-faith Action for Africa, Islamic community of Bosnia Herzegovina, Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone, for example, they can organize large meetings, conferences, and initiate inter-faith dialogue and reconciliation at a larger scale. For international faith-based actors being part of an international network may provide them quick access to conflicts on the ground. For instance, as the World Conference of Religions for Peace had some Iraqi religious leaders on its board, it managed to quickly enter Iraq after the war was over to prepare for an inter-faith meeting among key religious leaders inside and outside Iraq.

#### *4.3.2 Ongoing Challenge of Measuring Impact*

The authors also observe that assessing the impact of peace-building initiatives continues to be a challenge. As indicated this chapter, various organizations are struggling how to grasp the impact of their peace-building work. Some organizations tend to assess the impact through narrative evaluations in which the activities at stake are described along with events or processes that followed on the activity (e.g. International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy, United States Institute for Peace, Mennonite Central Committee). Other organizations are more inclined to strategically integrate their peace-building activities into relief and development programs, to which relatively common monitoring and evaluation tools could be applied (e.g. World Vision International)(see Annex IV). Again other organizations are in the process of developing impact indicators in order to check whether their peace-building efforts actually contributed to the objectives set. One such organization is Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group, where David Steele is currently working, which is trying to develop a logical framework to monitor and evaluate the effect of peace-building activities like for it project in Macedonia called 'improving relations between ethnic groups at the municipal level in Macedonia'. Annex IV also gives an illustration of this attempt. Judging how a number of Muslim actors have described the results and impact of their peace-building work, measuring impact remains a challenge for some of them too. Faith-based actors and donors are more keen to know the specific results of their peace-building work, and if they want state with some more certainty that faith-based peace-builders contribute to peace, it is necessary to find better ways of impact measurement. The attempts of organizations like World Vision International and Mercy Corps Conflict Management

Group could be useful starting points for donors and other faith-based peace-builders to further explore adequate ways for measuring impact of peace-building programs.

#### 4.3.3 Strengths and Pitfalls of Faith-Based Peace-Building

Based on the experiences of local and international actors included in this report, the authors observe that faith-based peace-building has a number of potential strengths and weaknesses, which are not unique but nonetheless typical for faith-based actors. The authors would like to warn against over-generalization, as the observation is largely based on anecdotal evidence; is not exhaustive; and needs to be verified on an actor-by-actor basis. Notwithstanding these limitations, a number of actors included in this study indicated some of the following strengths of faith-based peace-building (actors).

*Strong faith-based motivation for peace-building.*<sup>41</sup> Religious values and principles seem to provide a mandate to various faith-based actors to build peace and prevent violent conflict. They inspire them to reach out to victims of conflict, and to strive for peace through creating understanding and dialogue. They encourage the actors to remain committed to peace in situations where other actors (that is, political actors) tend to give up.

*Long-term presence of local religious actors:* Local religious actors are widely present and deeply rooted in the majority of societies all over the world. This may provide them with a kind of logistical advantage and potential to work on peace-building. They are present in their communities and societies before, during and after conflict, hence enabling engagement in conflict prevention and conflict-resolution activities over a longer period of time.

*Long-term commitment of international faith-based actors:* Their long-term presence on the ground and long-term commitment to their local counterparts have enabled a number of international faith-based actors to assume an active peace-building role. The Mennonite Central Committee argues that it was the MCC's relief and development workers, with their reputation for integrity, disinterested service and long-term commitment, that inadvertently prepared the way for international Mennonite peace-building efforts.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, the Community of Sant'Egidio usually builds up a long track record of humanitarian and other forms of assistance in a country before it becomes engaged in peace-building work. This was, for instance, the case in Mozambique, where the Community had been involved with Christian churches since 1976, before it took on a more proactive mediation role in 1990.

*Moral and spiritual authority:* Both local and international faith-based actors often enjoy a certain authority that enables them to mitigate religious tensions in religious conflict or act as a platform for common understanding in non-religious conflicts. Local religious actors like imams and pastors often have a moral and spiritual legitimacy to influence the opinions of people. They usually know the history and traditions of the conflict stakeholders well and know the needs (physical and emotional) of their communities well, and may possess the authority and reputation as even-handed people of God that places them in a good position to mediate between conflicting parties. In religious conflicts, international faith-based actors may also bring a certain moral authority to, for instance, peace deliberations, which may be missing, and with it an enhanced capability for dealing with the kinds of religious issues that often arise in such peace negotiations. As Douglas Johnston argues, the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords that brought an end to Sudan's first civil war were brokered by the combined

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<sup>41</sup> For a similar observation, see Smock, 2001b.

<sup>42</sup> Adapted from Appleby, 2000, p. 145.

efforts of the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Council of Churches. When asked why they permitted two Christian organizations to serve as the mediators, the Muslims involved replied that it was because of the moral authority that they brought to the deliberations. In non-religious conflicts, such as in the DRC, they may play a role in decreasing ethnic tensions or in efforts towards reconciliation.

*Niche to mobilize (religious) communities for peace:* Faith-based actors may have a potential to mobilize others for peace, both in religious and non-religious conflicts. Various local religious change agents seem to have the networks, contacts and trust to mobilize large numbers of people, even in the face of strong resistance. In certain cases, they could be more effective than local political actors, because they frequently have greater credibility among the local population. International faith-based peace-builders possibly have a good niche to connect with and inspire these local religious drivers of change. For instance, the World Conference of Religion for Peace managed to meet with religious leaders from Iraq immediately after the American invasion of Iraq, at a moment when the Iraqi population hardly trusted any intervening agency, mainly because some of the religious leaders on its Board were closely related to some of the religious leaders in Iraq.

*Faith-based peace-building can create a transcendental environment that encourages overcoming personal and religious differences:* A more general advantage of faith-based peace-building is that it may well create a transcendental environment that encourages actors to overcome personal and religious differences, and that can be conducive to expressions of apology, repentance and forgiveness. For instance, the success of a meeting between Muslim and Christian leaders in Sudan, facilitated by the International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), was largely attributable to the faith-based nature of the undertaking. Each day the proceedings began with prayer and readings from the Bible and the Koran. This was preceded earlier in the morning by an informal prayer breakfast for the international participants and local Muslim and Christian religious leaders (on a rotating basis). Perhaps most important, ICRD brought with it a prayer team from California whose sole purpose was to pray and fast during the four days of the meeting, praying for the success of the deliberations. These elements, coupled with appropriate breaks in the proceedings to accommodate Muslim prayers, provided a transcendent environment that inspired the participants to rise above their personal and religious differences and work together for the common good.<sup>43</sup> The ICRD has had similar experiences with faith-based reconciliation seminars in Kashmir.

Finally, the actors also raised a number of potential weaknesses of faith-based peace-building, including.

*Accusations of proselytizing:* Faith-based peace-builders appear to run the risk of (being accused of) proselytization, which can negatively influence its ability to conduct peace-building activities. For instance, in countries where Christians are a relative small minority, some Christian organizations' (perceived) proselytization activities can hinder other Christian organizations' peace-building activities, because the beneficiaries may not always be able to distinguish between the two sets of organizations. In peace-building activities such as trauma-counselling, beneficiaries may find it difficult to see where professional psychological assistance stops and proselytization activities start.

*Less result-oriented:* Although not substantiated by any in-depth research, one actor remarked that some faith-based peace-building actors may be less result-oriented than secular peace-builders, arguing that they tend to focus more than secular peace-builders on long-term peace-building efforts,

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<sup>43</sup> Johnston, 2003, p. 10.

with the possible disadvantage that they focus more on establishing long-term relationships than on the shorter-term results/outcomes of these relationships in terms of peace-building. This is not to say that faith-based peace-builders should remain focused on long-term peace-building efforts, but that they need to develop more attention to the outcomes of their peace-building efforts as well, admitting that these are not likely to be measurable in the short term.

*Potential lack of professionalism:* One of the actors included in this study noted that some—and only some—ecumenical peace-building organizations appear to lack the capacity to operate as professionally as their secular counterparts. Some of these ecumenical peace-building actors seem to focus more on their faith-based motivation for peace-building, or on maintaining deep and long-term relationships with local counterparts, than on the fact that peace-building is a profession for which an organization and its local counterparts require specific skills and experiences.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> For additional (dis)advantages as raised in the literature on faith-based peace-building, see Annexe V: Factors Shaping Faith-Based Peace-Building.

## V. Conclusions

This report highlights the potentially constructive role of faith-based actors in the domain of peace-building. It includes a preliminary list with institutionalized faith-based peace-building actors, mainly including internationally operating Christian and multi-faith actors, and nationally operating Muslim actors working in/on the Balkans and Africa. 13 Christian and multi-faith and 14 Muslim peace-building actors have been scrutinized in more detail, analysing a number of their peace-building activities, results, outcomes and larger contribution to peace-building. Based on this analysis, the authors draw the following tentative conclusions.

### Strengths and Weaknesses

Faith-based peace-builders have a number of strengths and weaknesses. These are not, however, necessarily unique to faith-based peace-builders and should not be over-generalized. The authors therefore encourage interested stakeholders to verify on an actor-by-actor basis which strengths and weaknesses apply to each actor. Possible *strengths* include:

- Strong faith-based motivation for peace-building (local and international actors);
- Long-term history/involvement in the societies they serve. A number of international faith-based peace-builders have—often through development assistance and relief aid—worked for decades in countries before getting involved in peace-building (international actors);
- Ability to engage in long-term peace-building work before, during and after conflict (local actors);
- Moral and spiritual authority, providing faith-based actors with a certain leverage to mitigate religious tensions in religious conflict or to act as platforms for common understanding in non-religious conflicts (local and international actors);
- Niche to mobilize (religious) communities for peace. Faith-based actors tend to have the networks, contacts and trust—both locally and internationally—to mobilize large numbers of people (local and international).

Likely *weaknesses* of faith-based actors comprise:

- Risk (and often accusation) of proselytization, especially if they do not properly separate their religious mission work from their religious peace-building work;
- Lack of focus on results, because some faith-based peace-building actors are inclined to concentrate on long-term peace-building efforts, which the possible disadvantage that they pay more attention to establishing long-term relationships than to shorter-term peace-building deliverables;

- Lack of professionalism compared to other peace-building organizations, because some—and only some—faith-based actors seem to engage in peace-building because their religious mandate urges them to do so, and not because their specific skills and experiences necessarily enable them to do so.

The authors remark that only one actor in this study indicated these last two weaknesses, and they thus call for further research.

### **Challenge of Identifying Institutionalized Muslim Peace-Building Actors**

The authors have found it more difficult to identify institutionalized Muslim faith-based peace-building actors than Christian and multi-faith actors. Muslim societies and their institutions differ in terms of their organization. Although social services, community assistance, and charitable work have been integral to Islamic communities, Muslim organizations and bodies have less experience with formally constituted bodies and (stable) institutions. Not as many organizations are therefore organized into stable institutions. For that reason, it is quite difficult to find Muslim peace-building NGOs or other institutions similar to those in the West. Most of the time, the local imam or sheikh, or other religious leaders and elders, undertake peace-building activities in their personal capacity. Peace-building activities in this context are not viewed as a separate job, but as a social/religious responsibility of the individual, part of their life and leadership role. Consequently, peace-building activities are usually ad hoc and informal. Moreover, because many Muslims do not separate Islam from everyday aspects of their lives, they do not explicitly refer to their organization or work as specifically ‘Muslim or Islamic’. As they do not refer to themselves as such, it becomes hard for an outside observer to distinguish Muslim peace-building organizations. Identification, analysis and possible support of Muslim peace-building actors therefore requires a tailor-made approach.

### **Limited Number of Internationally Operating Muslim Peace-Building Actors**

The authors note that the institutional development of international Muslim peace-builders lags behind that of international Christian and multi-faith peace-builders. This preliminary analysis has only found six international Muslim peace-builders. This imbalance may call for additional support.

### **Faith-Based Peace-Building is Not Limited to Religious Conflicts**

The authors conclude that the activities of the faith-based actors included in this report cover a wide range of conflicts, levels of operation, beneficiaries and peace-building areas/domains. The authors conclude that the faith-based actors in this report have:

- Attempted to build and prevent conflict in a wide variety of conflict settings, irrespective of whether religion is one of the key factors for conflict or not. They are active both in situations of religious conflict and non-religious conflict;
- Carried out peace-building activities at different levels of operation, ranging from the grassroots to the international level;

- Targeted not only beneficiaries that share their own religious conviction, but also beneficiaries from different religious communities and secular ones;
- Been involved in all sorts of peace-building activities, including advocacy, education, inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue, mediation, observation and transitional justice.

### **Impact Measurement Remains a Challenge**

Measuring the impact of faith-based peace-building activities is still complicated. Although the authors could in some cases have assessed the impact better if they had collected more information (for example, through field visits), they believe that measuring impact remains a challenge. They suggest donors and faith-based peace-builders further explore the issue and among others address the so-called ‘attribution problem’, the intangibility of peace, and the fact that insecure situations may prevent impact assessment and evaluation on the ground.<sup>45</sup>

### **Multiple Contributions to Peace-Building**

Despite the room for improving impact assessments, the authors conclude that the faith-based peace-builders included in this report have—to different extents, with varying levels of success and in their own specific manner—contributed to peace-building through:

- Encouraging their faith communities and others to change their behaviour, reduce violence, and rehumanize the ‘other’;
- Providing emotional, psychological and spiritual support to war-affected communities;
- Disseminating ideas on peace, peace-building, justice and development among their communities;
- Mobilizing their communities and other people for peace-building;
- Challenging traditional perceptions (such as the role of women in society);
- Reaching out to governments, effecting policy changes and policies (for example, incorporation of peace modules in school curricula), and reaching out to youth;
- Mediating between conflicting parties;
- Promoting reconciliation, inter-faith dialogue, disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration;
- Connecting faith-based communities and others worldwide, including through convening large inter-faith meetings among them;
- While warning against over-generalization, the authors refer to the analysis in Chapter 4 and Annexe 2 for more details on how the different actors have specifically contributed to peace-building.

### **Secular and Faith-Based Peace-Building: Related and Complementary**

Various cases in this report have shown how secular and faith-based peace-building work can be inter-related and complementary. For instance, the report shows how the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in Nigeria could initiate and facilitate mediations in Yelwa-Nshar, and the Governor of Plateau State and

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<sup>45</sup> Douma and Klem, 2004, pp. 36-37.

many other dignitaries in the end were forced to ratify the peace settlement. Another clear example is that of Sant'Egidio's contribution to the peace process in Mozambique in the early 1990s. While it could establish the first contact between the RENAMO leadership (*Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana*—Mozambican National Resistance) and the FRELIMO government (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*—Liberation Front of Mozambique) at its headquarters in Rome, it had to call upon the Italian government, advisers of the United States, and the United Nations to participate in the peace negotiation process and to sign the General Peace Accord in 1992. As this report exclusively focused on faith-based peace-builders, follow-up study is needed to substantiate the relationship between and (un)complementarity of faith-based and secular peace-builders.

### **Single -Religious Versus Multi-Religious Efforts**

The authors conclude that both single-religious and multi-religious peace-building efforts have the potential to contribute to peace-building in specific situations. For instance, the single-religious peace-making efforts of the Community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique and Guatemala, *inter alia*, show the peace-building potential of single-religious efforts. The work of the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in Nigeria, the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative, or of the Inter-Religious Councils in Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrate the peace-building potential of multi-religious efforts. As it has been largely outside the scope of this study, follow-up research is needed to examine what factors (for example, religious versus non-religious conflict) make specific conflict situations more suitable for single-religious and/or multi-religious peace-building work.

### **Role for Both 'Religious Moderates' and 'Religious Conservatives'**

Finally, the authors conclude that most faith-based peace-building work in this report focuses on 'religious moderates', and hardly any on 'religious conservatives'. The authors observe, however, that both groups of religious actors can be drivers of change, and could have a role to play in peace-building. For instance, as Steele's reconciliation seminars with religious communities in the Balkans illustrate, creating dialogue between moderate and nationalistic elements within a given religious tradition can potentially confront the latter with perspectives within their own theological tradition that question their nationalistic orientation. When handled well, such an intra-party dialogue over issues of essential identity can lead to recognition, for the first time, of cognitive dissonance between values espoused and values acted. Bosnian Franciscans, for example, were able in a mono-ethnic/religious seminar to speak more openly and thoroughly to other Catholics about their theological rationale for reconciliation efforts, thus building a better case against religious extremism, especially among undecided Catholics. Moreover, through constant dialogue with conservative Serbian Orthodox leaders, Steele gained their trust, and enabled the participation of Serbian priests in the reconciliation seminars and even the sponsorship of seminars by some bishops.

## **VI. Donor Recommendations**

This report on faith-based peace-building actors was conducted at the request of MoFA. The recommendations here below, however, aim not only at MOFA's policy-makers, but at other countries' ministries of foreign affairs and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the Netherlands and abroad.

### **Take Notice of Faith-Based Peace-Building in Policy**

The main recommendation is that policy-makers should take into account the potential of faith-based peace-building actors to contribute positively to peace-building. As this report shows, there is every reason to believe that faith-based peace-builders have a role to play in promoting peace, security and stability through conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

### **Increase Cooperation with Faith-Based Actors in the Domain of Peace-Building**

The authors have the impression that donors could cooperate more with faith-based actors on peace-building. They specifically suggest that MoFA prepares an overview of the faith-based peace-building actors with which it is already cooperating, and further analyses how cooperation with (and support of) these and other faith-based peace-building actors could be increased. The recently established Knowledge Forum on Development Cooperation and Religion may well play a role in such an effort.

### **Examine the Role of Faith-Based Peace-Building Actors in Stability Assessment Frameworks**

The authors specifically encourage MoFA to examine the role of faith-based actors in the context of the political actor analysis carried out within the framework of Stability Assessment Frameworks (SAF),<sup>46</sup> which is a tool that MoFA uses to help practitioners and decision-makers develop an integrated strategy for stabilizing a country and provide a basis for sustainable development. The authors also invite MoFA to give special attention to the role of faith-based peace-builders in (upcoming) regional policy documents, such as the Africa Memorandum, the Memorandum on the Great Lakes or the Memorandum on the Horn of Africa.

### **Demand International Attention for the Contributions of Faith-Based Actors**

The authors suggest tabling the peace-building potential of faith-based peace-builders in international discussions in the field of peace-building. They invite policy-makers to explore the possibilities of

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<sup>46</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005a.

doing so in discussions with the EU, OECD-DAC, OSCE and the UN (for example, the Committee on Peace-Building, Department of Peacekeeping Operations).

### **Sensitize and Train Embassy, MoFA and MoD Staff**

The authors believe that embassies have a crucial role to play in the area of faith-based peace-building. In most cases, embassy staff have contacts with faith-based peace-building actors in the field. In the case of the Netherlands, they also have the decision-making power and funds to support faith-based peace-building activities, or not. In the framework of training embassy staff—especially, but not exclusively, staff working in conflict-affected countries—it is therefore vital to give special attention to the potential of faith-based actors in peace-building. Specific training opportunities for the Netherlands include the so-called *Terugkomdagen* (refreshment courses), workshops, on-site training, as well as online courses. The Knowledge Forum on Development Cooperation and Religion may well play a role in facilitating such training. Besides training embassy staff, other MoFA staff working in/on peace-building in conflict-affected countries will be trained, such as staff attached to the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. On a more general level, MoFA—in consultation with the MoD—should also consider addressing the topic of faith-based peace-building in the pre-deployment training of peacekeepers, this within the framework of increasing the peacekeeping forces’ cultural and religious sensitivity.<sup>47</sup>

### **Address Faith-Based Peace-Building in Embassies’ Multi-Annual Strategic Plans**

The authors encourage embassies to address structurally the relationship between religion and peace-building in their longer-term strategic plans (that is, in the case of the Netherlands, in their so-called *Meerjaren Strategische Plannen* (MJSP)). This recommendation is in line with the advice of the Advisory Council on International Affairs.<sup>48</sup>

### **Pay Attention to ‘Religious Moderates’ and ‘Religious Conservatives’**

The authors call upon donors not only to regard ‘religious moderates’ as possible drivers of change, but also ‘religious conservatives’. Further exploration should be made of the possibilities for establishing true dialogue with conservative, politicised and religious groups in order to engage them in peace-building. As it will probably be difficult as a donor to engage directly with these religious conservatives, the authors advise approaching them via third parties, such as the international Christian, Muslim and inter-faith peace-building actors identified in this study.

### **Develop Tailor-Made Approaches for Identifying Muslim Peace-Building Actors**

The authors advise donors to undertake extra efforts in identifying Muslim peace-building actors. As Muslim peace-building actors are often not organized in the form of NGOs or other institutions, and

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<sup>47</sup> Little and Appleby, 2004, p. 9, referring to Shawcross, 2000.

<sup>48</sup> Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2005.

often consist of individuals in the community, they are relatively invisible. Identifying them could include the following:

- Work through international Muslim peace-building actors, who can help to identify and recommend local actors and organizations involved in peace-building;
- Ask local communities to recommend Muslim individuals and organizations engaged in peace-building work;
- Regard Muslim relief and humanitarian agencies as possible entry points. In conflict-affected regions, many of these organizations extend their efforts to include activities such as peace-building, pursuing justice and reconciliation. Donors could approach these agencies as possible entry points, and consider strengthening their peace-building efforts;
- Approach Muslim women's organizations as possible entry points for peace-building. As the report observed, women are relatively well institutionalized, mainly because of the support they receive through international networks of women's organizations. Although women's peace-building organizations do face significant challenges because women's participation in the public and political domains is not recognized in various societies, they have also been seen as having the support of sympathetic religious and community leaders, challenging traditional gender divisions, and putting women's concerns on the agenda of peace talks. Donors could therefore consider them as one of the entry points for Muslim peace-building.

### **Develop Tailor-Made Approaches for Strengthening Muslim Actors**

Finally, the authors suggest that donors develop a tailor-made approach for strengthening Muslim actors' peace-building capacities, which should address the following issues:

- Direct donor support to local Muslim peace-building actors may negatively influence their peace-building performance. At times, Muslim peace-building actors that receive Western donor support have been accused of promoting the West's agenda, and thereby not representing the real Islam, which complicated their peace-building work substantially. Although local communities might hold connections with Western organizations against these Muslim peace-builders, in the end supporting these actors is of importance. The authors therefore suggest that donors do not support these local actors directly, but indirectly through relevant international faith-based peace-building actors;
- Western support can be perceived as a rather sensitive issue. In some cases and by some Muslim actors and communities, Western support may be perceived as a form of neo-imperialism, undermining Islam and colonizing Muslims. In such a sensitive setting, it is critical that donors that aim to support Muslim peace-builders do so without dictating or imposing upon the work that these Muslim actors do. Hence, the authors advise against developing a set of performance criteria beforehand and expecting these Muslim peace-builders to comply with them, but advise openly discussing how they best could be held accountable for their peace-building programmes, and their results and impact. The authors thus suggest finding the right balance between ownership and accountability;

- Muslim peace-building actors may require some specific kinds of support. Several of the actors included in this study are seriously under-funded. They have no or very limited access to basic resources (for example, electricity, telephone, email and fax) and often travel to remote parts of their country with limited resources and under difficult conditions. This lack of resources not only hinders their communication with the international community, but also their organizational capacity and effectiveness within their communities. Some sort of basic funding seems crucial. Moreover, given the low levels of literacy in which some of the Muslim actors included in this study are working, support for visual and audio (for example, radio programmes) seems a productive way to educate larger portions of the population in peace-building. Besides, as the level of institutional development of Muslim actors is relatively low, support for NGO development and management is crucial for expanding the effectiveness and success of Muslim peace-building actors. Additionally, as various of the Muslim actors analysed operate in relative isolation of each other, support for the creation of regional or national umbrella networks that can encourage meetings between Muslim peace-builders is important. Finally, various Muslim peace-building actors lack educational resources in terms of peace-building and conflict resolution. Support for purchasing books and other educational tools, translating articles and books—especially on Islam, peace-building and conflict resolution—and investing in developing materials such as a manual on Islamic peace-building could therefore also be an invaluable contribution to the peace-building capacity of Muslim actors.

## **VII. Suggestions for Follow-Up Research**

This has been a preliminary study on the topic of faith-based peace-building. Because of the length, scope and set-up (desk study instead of field analysis), the study has only been able to address certain parts of the discussion on faith-based peace-building. The authors therefore make the following suggestions for follow-up research:

### **Develop a More Systematic and Comprehensive Database**

The time devoted to mapping Muslim peace-building actors in Africa and the Balkans has not been sufficient. Many of the Muslim actors were not able to respond to the authors on time, and some of them asked for more time to respond. The authors consequently suggest conducting a more thorough research over a longer period (for example, one year). Such follow-up study should also include mapping Muslim actors in the Middle East and South Asia. It should include field research, which would contribute to more comprehensive information-gathering and would allow the inclusion of other critical and competent groups that are less visible but that contribute significantly to peace-building in their regions. It would also give the opportunity to meet with various leaders, their community members and other local authorities that have no access to internet, phone or fax. Each field trip could include short training sessions as part of the data-gathering to respond to the pressing needs of Muslim NGOs for training in Islamic methods of peace-building. The suggested follow-up study may not only focus on mapping Muslim peace-building actors, but also on mapping nationally/locally operating Christian and multi-faith peace-building actors that have not been covered in this preliminary study at all.

### **Evaluate Faith-Based Peace-Building Initiatives**

Other follow-up studies should compile detailed case studies of successful Christian, Muslim and inter-faith peace-building stories to disseminate among the communities to encourage peace work. As was stated in the analysis of the Coalition for Peace in Africa's video case studies project, case studies serve as critical learning tools for communities involved in conflict. They connect with other groups that are faced with similar challenges, and enable them to learn from each other's experiences regarding how their conflict was resolved, what worked and what did not work. Preparing detailed case studies, and translating and disseminating them among various communities would therefore contribute to peace-building in the region. Studying and analysing these case studies would require a longer period of time, approximately one year, and would include field trips to projects.

### **Conduct Research among Higher Educational Institutions in (Muslim) Countries**

It is critical to conduct research among educational institutions in conflict-affected regions to explore to what extent peace and Islam are integrated into their curricula and to develop strategies to include peace education from an Islamic perspective. Educational institutions, such as government schools or *madrasas*, are effective in shaping the ideas of young students. They can be used to incite hatred, stereotyping and violence, or they can be venues to teach peace, conflict-resolution skills and peace-building. Exploring what is being taught at these institutions in regards to Islam and peace, and developing strategies on how to integrate peace-building and conflict-resolution skills would contribute to peace-building efforts in the region tremendously. Similar research should analyse how educational systems in Christian communities deal with the linkage between Christianity and peace, and how peace-building modules are integrated into their curricula.

### **Critical Analysis of Faith-Based Peace-Builders' Added Value in Specific Conflict Settings**

Although this desk study has shown that faith-based peace-building actors are active in all kinds of conflict settings, it has not clarified in what conflicts faith-based peace-building has an added value over secular peace-building, or vice versa. In the analysis of the Muslim peace-building actor Coalition for Peace in Africa, the authors argued that in situations/communities where Islam plays an important role and Muslim leaders have legitimacy, Muslim peace-builders that utilize Islam are possibly more effective than secular peace-builders that do not base their work on Islamic values and concepts. However, follow-up study should further substantiate such assumptions. It should also address the more general question of whether faith-based peace-builders are more effective in religious or in non-religious conflict settings. Some assert that 'religious peace-building particularly makes sense where religion is seen to be a genuine and in some cases a decisive factor in the conflict, rather than a dispensable sidebar, artefact, or instrument of propaganda, but can also play a role in certain conflicts where there is no religious involvement, normally in a third-party mediating capacity',<sup>49</sup> while others argue that 'religiously motivated peacemaking efforts had their greatest impact in conflicts in which religion was not an important defining characteristic'.<sup>50</sup> In this connection, the study should collect more data on the assumed weaknesses of faith-based peace-builders, namely their lack of focus on results and their lack of professionalism. It should clarify how the terms of professionalism and effectiveness are perceived, and whether these are somehow related to measuring quantitatively or qualitatively the outcomes and impact of peace-building. This is because of the tendency to regard peace-building programmes with measurable, quantitative outputs, which are more successful/professional than those with qualitative outputs, which are harder to measure (see above under impact measurement). The key question that this study should answer is what sorts of conflict require what sorts of peace-building. The main deliverable will be a list of conflict indicators that donors can use to decide whether conflict situations require faith-based peace-building programmes or not. The authors propose selecting two conflict situations (a religious and a non-religious conflict), identifying a number of faith-based and secular peace-building activities, interviewing stakeholders involved in these various activities during a field visit, and, on the basis of the information collected, developing a list with indicators.

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<sup>49</sup> Appleby, 2003, pp. 238-239.

<sup>50</sup> See, for instance, Sampson, 2004.

### **Conduct Case Studies on Levels of Cooperation and Complementarity between Faith-Based and Secular Peace-Builders**

While this desk study has shown that both faith-based and secular actors have a role to play in peace-building, it has not analysed whether and to what extent they actually cooperate in the field. In more general terms, the study should look into the role of secular actors in the domain of faith-based peace-building, and address the question of to what extent secular international actors should share the faith of their local faith-based actors and constituents—that is, is it possible that secular actors have a religious agenda? Detailed case studies should shed more light on these questions of how faith-based and secular peace-building programmes overlap or complement each other. In terms of policy output, the analysis should clarify to donors and other funding agencies the (im)possibilities of playing a coordinating role, and the options of achieving some form of division of labour between faith-based and secular peace-builders in a specific conflict setting.

### **Case Studies on Strengths and Weaknesses of Single-Religious and Multi-Religious Peace Efforts**

It has been outside this study's scope to analyse what conflict settings are more suitable for single-religious peace-building actions based on Christian, Muslim or other religious values, and what other conflict situations are more appropriate for multi-religious peace efforts. Specific case studies should not only analyse the outcomes and results of diverse types of faith-based peace-building efforts, but must particularly result in a set of criteria that help faith-based peace-builders and donors decide whether to opt for single-religious and/or multi-religious peace-building programmes. For instance, in the cases of Sudan and Nigeria, it would be interesting to analyse the need for peace-building programmes that only target Muslims, that only target Christians, and that target them both.

### **Conduct Research on the Required Strategies, Partners and Activities to Deal with 'Religious Moderates' and 'Religious Conservatives' in Peace-Building**

This study has tentatively concluded that both 'religious conservatives' and 'religious moderates' can be drivers of change, and can have the potential to contribute to peace in their own specific ways. It would be interesting to analyse a number of cases further to see the possibilities of targeting both groups, what strategies this would require from faith-based peace-building actors, and what local counterparts are best suited for the job. A key issue to be addressed is the tremendous difficulty that Western pluralists (religious or secular) have in creating dialogue with conservative religious communities that see their particular brand of faith as the ultimate expression of truth and their pursuit of its dominance within their culture, or beyond, as part of a divine initiative that will, by definition, bring good to all people. Most moderate Western organizations, irrespective of being faith-based or secular, are associated with Western humanistic value systems, and their very presence is therefore perceived as a threat to conservative religious communities. The Western pluralist approach, with its emphasis on tolerance towards the other, is seen as destructive and opposed to the values the conservatives hold dear. The key challenge this raises, in the context of many flash points around the world, is how to establish true dialogue with conservative politicized religious groups. An interesting first case could be Sri Lanka.

### **Closer Analysis of the Peace-Building Role of Mid-Level and Top-Level (Religious) Leaders**

According to John Paul Lederach, ‘mid-range leaders have greater flexibility of movement and are more numerous than top-level leaders. They are connected to a wide range of individuals in the conflict setting through their networks and professional associations. Within the religious communities the mid-level leaders are the highly respected monks, priests, ministers, ulema, rabbis, and others who serve as heads of the [sub-national] religious bodies (for example, synods or dioceses); as representatives to ecumenical, inter-religious, or civic bodies; or as pastors of prominent local congregations’.<sup>51</sup> Various actors in this report (including the Mennonite Central Committee, Center for Justice and Peace-Building, and Steele) have deliberately aimed at strengthening the peace-building skills of mid-level (religious) leaders. Other actors, such as the World Conference of Religions for Peace, tend to concentrate on top-level religious leaders, for instance through bringing them together in national inter-religious councils. Additional research should clarify the pros and cons of working with mid-level or top-level religious leaders, and assess whether certain (conflict) situations are more suitable for working with which group of leaders. Case studies on a conflict country in which both groups of religious leaders are involved in the peace process could shed more light on this question.

### **Develop More Effective Means for Measuring Impact of Programmes**

As shown throughout the report, the impact measurement of (faith-based) peace-building programmes remains a challenge. It is insufficiently clear in what qualitative and/or quantitative ways the impact can best be assessed. Options to be analysed include:

- a. Narrative evaluations in which the activities at stake are described along with events or processes that followed on from the activity;
- b. Some sort of impact indicators, which could be quite hard to develop, however, given the ‘intangibility’ of peace;
- c. Process indicators that focus on the approach taken in a project rather than on an attempted measurement of impact. It may include criteria for ‘success’ such as appropriateness, coherence, gender equality and flexibility. Rather than benchmarks for assessing actual outcomes, these are thus parameters for describing and assessing an organization’s approach;<sup>52</sup>
- d. Combine peace-building more with relief and development activities, of which the impact is possibly less difficult to assess. Follow-up research could either take the form of a desk study or a field study. A desk study could include more in-depth interviews and meetings with various actors included in this report in order to develop satisfactory, and above all realistic, options for measuring impact. A field study could include a visit to various faith-based peace-building projects, analyse their results and outputs, and discuss the issue of measuring impact with a much wider range of stakeholders (such as project planners, direct beneficiaries and community members).

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<sup>51</sup> Appleby 2001, p. 827, quoting Lederach, 1997.

<sup>52</sup> For more detailed discussion on assessing the impact of peace-building activities, see Douma and Klem, 2004, pp. 36-39.

## Annexe I: Contact Information for Key Faith-Based Peace-Building Actors

### International Christian and Multi-Faith Peace-Building Actors

**Life and Peace Institute**, PO Box 1520, SE-751 45 Uppsala, Sweden, Tel: +46 18 169500, Fax: +46 18 693059, E-mail: [info@life-peace.org](mailto:info@life-peace.org), Website: [www.life-peace.org](http://www.life-peace.org). Contact: Mrs Claudette Weirleigh, Coordinator for Conflict Transformation Programme, [Claudette.Werleigh@life-peace.org](mailto:Claudette.Werleigh@life-peace.org).

**World Vision International**, 800 West Chestnut Avenue, Monrovia CA 91016-3198, United States, Email: [newvision@wvi.org](mailto:newvision@wvi.org), Website: [www.wvi.org](http://www.wvi.org). Contact: Mr Ekkehart Forberg, Peace-Building Coordinator, World Vision Germany, Email: [ekkehard\\_forberg@wvi.org](mailto:ekkehard_forberg@wvi.org); Mr Bill Lowrey, Director for Reconciliation and Peace-Building, World Vision International, Email: [Bill\\_Lowrey@wvi.org](mailto:Bill_Lowrey@wvi.org).

**International Association for Religious Freedom**, 2 Market Street, Oxford OX1 3ET, United Kingdom, Tel. +44 1865 202744, Fax. +44 1865 202746, Email: [hq@iarf.net](mailto:hq@iarf.net), Website: [www.iarf.net](http://www.iarf.net). Contact: Mr Eimert van Herwijnen, former President of the International Association for Religious Freedom, Email: [eimert@xs4all.nl](mailto:eimert@xs4all.nl).

**Community of Sant'Egidio**, Piazza Sant'Egidio 3/a, 00153 Rome, Italy, Tel: +39 06 585661, Fax: +39 06 5883625, Email: [info@santegidio.org](mailto:info@santegidio.org), Website: [www.santegidio.org](http://www.santegidio.org). Contact: Mr Jan de Volder, Volunteer with Sant'Egidio Belgium, Email: [info@santegidio.be](mailto:info@santegidio.be); Mario Giro, Staff Member with Sant'Egidio Italy, Email: [mariogiro@tiscali.it](mailto:mariogiro@tiscali.it).

**Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution** at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 3330 Washington Boulevard, 'Truland Building', 5th Floor, Arlington VA 22201, United States, Tel: +1 703 9934473, Fax: +1 703 9931302, Email: [crdc@gmu.edu](mailto:crdc@gmu.edu), Website: [www.gmu.edu/departments/crdc/](http://www.gmu.edu/departments/crdc/). Contact: Mrs Dena Hawes, Administrator, Email: [dhawes@gmu.edu](mailto:dhawes@gmu.edu).

**International Center for Religion and Diplomacy**, 1156 Fifteenth Street NW, Suite 910, Washington DC 20005, United States, Tel: +1 202 3319404, Fax: +1 202 8729137, Email: [postmaster@icrd.org](mailto:postmaster@icrd.org), Website: [www.icrd.org](http://www.icrd.org). Contact: Mr Douglas Johnston, Founder and Director, Email: [dmj@icrd.org](mailto:dmj@icrd.org).

**World Conference of Religions for Peace**, Church Center to the United Nations, 777 United Nations Plaza, 9th Floor, New York NY 10017, United States, Tel: +1 212 6872163, Fax: +1 212 9830566, Email: [info@wcrp.org](mailto:info@wcrp.org), Website: [www.wcrp.org](http://www.wcrp.org). Contact: Mr William Vendley, Secretary-General, Email: [wwendley@wcrp.org](mailto:wwendley@wcrp.org).

**Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group (Dr David Steele)**, The Roger Fisher House, 9 Waterhouse Street, Cambridge MA 02138, United States, Tel: +1 617 3545444, Fax: +1 617 3548467, Website: [www.mercycorps.org/items/2454/](http://www.mercycorps.org/items/2454/). Contact: Dr David Steele, Programme Manager, Email: [dsteale@cmgroup.org](mailto:dsteale@cmgroup.org).

- International Fellowship of Reconciliation**, Spoorstraat 38, 1815 BK Alkmaar, the Netherlands, Tel: +31 72 5123014, Fax: +31 72 5151102, [office@ifor.org](mailto:office@ifor.org), Website: [www.ifor.org](http://www.ifor.org), Contact: David Mumford, International Director, Email: [d.mumford@ifor.org](mailto:d.mumford@ifor.org); Rev. Ocan Ali Onono Onweng, Founder and President of IFOR's Ugandan branch (JYAK), Email: [jyak@africaonline.co.ug](mailto:jyak@africaonline.co.ug).
- Mennonite Central Committee**, 21 South 12th Street, PO Box 500, Akron PA 17501, United States, Tel: +1 717 8591151, Email: [mailbox@mcc.org](mailto:mailbox@mcc.org), Website: [www.mcc.org](http://www.mcc.org), Contact: Mrs Judy Zimmerman Herr, Co-Director of the International Peace Office, Email: [jzh@mcc.org](mailto:jzh@mcc.org).
- Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies** (Program in Religion, Conflict and Peace-building), 100 Hesburgh, Center for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, PO Box 639, Notre Dame IN 46556-0639, United States, Tel: +1 574 6316970, Fax: +1 574 6316973, Email: [krocinst@nd.edu](mailto:krocinst@nd.edu), Website: <http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/index.html>, Contact: Mr Hal Culbertson, Associate Director, Email: [hal.r.Culbertson.1@nd.edu](mailto:hal.r.Culbertson.1@nd.edu).
- Religion and Peace-Making Initiative**, c/o United States Institute of Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Washington DC 20036, United States, Tel: +1 202 4571700, Fax: +1 202 4296063, Email: [usiprequests@usip.org](mailto:usiprequests@usip.org), Website: [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org), Contact: Dr David Smock, Director Religion and Peace-Making Initiative, Email: [dsmock@usip.org](mailto:dsmock@usip.org).
- Eastern Mennonite University, Center for Justice and Peace-Building**, 1200 Park Road, Harrisonburg VA 22802, United States, Tel: +1 540 4324490, Fax: +1 540 4324449, Email: [cjp@emu.edu](mailto:cjp@emu.edu), Website: [www.emu.edu/ctp/](http://www.emu.edu/ctp/), Contact: Mrs Janice Jenner, Director of the Practice Institute, Email: [jennerjm@emu.edu](mailto:jennerjm@emu.edu).
- Caritas Internationalis**, Caritas Internationalis, General Secretariat, Palazzo San Calisto, 00120 Vatican City, Tel: +39 06 69879799, Fax: +39 06 69887237, E-mail: [caritas.internationalis@caritas.va](mailto:caritas.internationalis@caritas.va), Website: [www.caritas.org](http://www.caritas.org).
- Catholic Relief Services**, 209 West Fayette Street, Baltimore MD 21201-3443, United States, Tel: +1 410 6252220, Website: [www.crs.org](http://www.crs.org).<sup>53</sup>
- World Council of Churches**, 150 route de Ferney, PO Box 2100, CH-1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland, Tel: +41 22 7916111, Fax: +41 22 7910361, Website: <http://wcc-coe.org/wcc/english.html>.
- Lutheran World Federation**, 150 route de Ferney, PO Box 2100, CH-1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland, Tel: +41 22 7916111, Fax: +41 22 7916630, Email: [info@lutheranworld.org](mailto:info@lutheranworld.org), Website: [www.lutheranworld.org](http://www.lutheranworld.org).
- Pax Christi International**, Rue du Vieux Marché aux Grains 21, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium, Tel: +32 2 5025550, Fax: +32 2 5024626, Email: [info@paxchristi.net](mailto:info@paxchristi.net), Website: [www.paxchristi.net](http://www.paxchristi.net).
- American Friends Service Committee**, National Office, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia PA 19102, United States, Tel: +1 215 2417000, Fax: +1 215 2417275, Email: [afscinfo@afsc.org](mailto:afscinfo@afsc.org), Website: [www.afsc.org](http://www.afsc.org).
- Quaker Peace and Social Witness**, Friends House, 173 Euston Road, London NW1 2BJ, United Kingdom, Tel: +44 20 76631000, Fax: +44 20 76631001, Website: [www.quaker.org.uk](http://www.quaker.org.uk).
- International Centre for Reconciliation at Coventry Cathedral**, 1 Hill Top, Coventry CV1 5AB, United Kingdom, Tel: +44 24 76521200, Fax: +44 24 76521220, Email: [justin.welby@coventrycathedral.org.uk](mailto:justin.welby@coventrycathedral.org.uk), Website: [www.coventrycathedral.org.uk](http://www.coventrycathedral.org.uk).

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<sup>53</sup> For a detailed analysis of this well-known international faith-based peace-building organization, please refer to Appleby, 2000, and Smock, 2001a.

**International Peace Research Institute Oslo**, Fuglehauggata 11, NO-0260 Oslo, Norway, Tel: +47 22 547700, Fax: +47 22 547701, Email: [info@prio.no](mailto:info@prio.no), Website: [www.prio.no](http://www.prio.no).

**Norwegian Church Aid**, PO Box 4544, Nydalen, NO-0404 Oslo, Norway, Tel: + 47 22 092700, Fax: + 47 22 092720, Email: [nca-oslo@nca.no](mailto:nca-oslo@nca.no), Website: <http://english.nca.no/>.

**United Religions Initiative**, PO Box 29242, San Francisco CA 94129, United States, Tel: +1 415 5612300, Fax: +1 415 5612313, Email: [office@uri.org](mailto:office@uri.org), Website: [www.uri.org](http://www.uri.org).

**Jesuit Refugee Services**, C.P. 6139, 00195 Roma-Prati, Italy, Tel: +39 06 68977386, Fax: +39 06 68806418, Website: [www.jrs.net](http://www.jrs.net).

### **International Muslim Peace-Building Actors**

**Salam Institute for Peace and Justice**, 4000 Cathedral Avenue NW, Suite 3B, Washington DC 20016, United States, Email: [info@salaminstitute.org](mailto:info@salaminstitute.org), Website: [www.salaminstitute.org](http://www.salaminstitute.org). Contact: Dr Ayse Kadayifci, Email: [ayse@salaminstitute.org](mailto:ayse@salaminstitute.org).

**Salam Sudan Foundation**, 1615 L Street NW, Suite 340, Washington DC 20036, United States, Tel: +1 202 4290222, Fax: +1 202 8292055, E-mail: [salamsudan@aol.com](mailto:salamsudan@aol.com), Website: [www.salamsudan.org](http://www.salamsudan.org). Contact: Dr Hashim El-Tinay.

**Dialogues, Islamic World: The US and the West**, New York University, Remarque Institute, 194 Mercer Street, 4th floor, New York NY 10012, United States, Tel: +1 212 9983656, Fax: +1 212 9954091, Email: [tlili@islamwest.org](mailto:tlili@islamwest.org); [shaanti@islamwest.org](mailto:shaanti@islamwest.org).

**Muslim Peace Fellowship**, PO Box 271, Nyack, New York NY 10960, United States, Tel: +1 845 3584601, Fax: +1 845 3584924, Email: [mpf@mpfweb.org](mailto:mpf@mpfweb.org). Contact: Mrs Rabia Harris, Coordinator and Associate Editor, *Fellowship Magazine*, Email: [coordinator@mpfweb.org](mailto:coordinator@mpfweb.org).

**The Islamic Human Rights Commission**, United Kingdom, Email: [info@ihrc.org](mailto:info@ihrc.org), Website: <http://www.ihrc.org.uk/index.php>.

**World Council of Muslim Women Foundation**, PO Box 128, Seba Beach, Alberta T0E 2B0, Canada, Tel/Fax: +1 780 4395088, Email: [wcomwf@connect.ab.ca](mailto:wcomwf@connect.ab.ca).

### **Muslim Peace-Building Actors in Africa**

**Addis Ababa Muslim Women's Council**, PO Box 26197-1000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Tel: + 254 1 779595 or + 251 1 779594, Fax: + 251 1 779594. Contact: Mrs Bedria Mohammed.

**Ethiopian Peace and Development Committee**, PO Box 41879, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Tel + 251 1 511966, Fax + 251 1 515714. Contact: Yusuf Hassen Noah.

**Federation of Muslim Women's Association in Ghana or Women's Association in Ghana**, PO Box MS 156, Achimota Accra, Ghana, Tel: + 233 21 403256, Fax: + 233 21 772764, Email: [fomwag@yahoo.com](mailto:fomwag@yahoo.com). Contact: Mrs Katumi Mahama, President.

**Wajir Peace and Development Committee**, PO Box 444, Wajir, Kenya, Tel/Fax: + 254 46 421359, Email: [dekha@swiftmombasa.com](mailto:dekha@swiftmombasa.com). Contact: Dekha Ibrahim Abdi.

**Coalition for Peace in Africa / Coalition Pour La Paix en Afrique**, PO Box 61753, 00200 City Square, Nairobi, Kenya, Tel: + 254 2 577557/8, Fax: +254 2 577557, Email: [copa@copafrica.org](mailto:copa@copafrica.org), Website: [www.copafrica.org/](http://www.copafrica.org/)

**Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa**, PO Box 40870, 00100 Nairobi, Kenya, Tel: + 254 20 577777/ 578181, Fax: +254 20 574577, Email: [info@africa-faithforpeace.org](mailto:info@africa-faithforpeace.org), Website: [africa-faithforpeace.org](http://africa-faithforpeace.org). Contact: Sheikh Saliou Mbacke.

**Inter-Faith Peace Initiative**, c/o Youth Muslim Association, PO Box 48509, Nairobi, Kenya.

**Muslim Association of Malawi**, PO Box 497, Blantyre, Malawi, Tel: + 265 1 526002, Fax: + 265 1 524046, Email: [ismahomed@chanco.unima.mw](mailto:ismahomed@chanco.unima.mw). Contact: Sheikh Imuran Sharif.

**Bureau of Religious Affairs, Governor's Office**, Kaduna State, Religious Affairs - Government Service, Permanent Secretary: Christian Matters, Tel: + 234 62 212242. Contact: Elisha Buba Yero.

**Inter-Faith Mediation Centre**, East Wing 6th Floor, NNIL Building No. 4, Muhammad Buhari Way, (Waff Road), Kaduna, Nigeria, Tel: + 234 62 243816, Email: [mcdf2002@yahoo.com](mailto:mcdf2002@yahoo.com). Contact: Imam Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa.

**Intergovernmental Authority on Development**, PO Box 2653, Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti, Tel: +253 354050, Fax: +253 356994/284, Email: [IGAD@intnet.dj](mailto:IGAD@intnet.dj), Website: [www.igad.org](http://www.igad.org). Contact: Tekeste Ghebray, Executive Secretary.

**Federation des Femmes Musulmanes au Rwanda**, PO Box 352 M.U.K., Kigali, Rwanda, Tel: +250 08306542 or +250 08501223, Mobile: + 250 08300917 or +250 08306542, Email: [kimsaidat@yahoo.fr](mailto:kimsaidat@yahoo.fr). Contact: Mrs Mukonohali Saidat, President.

**Kisima Peace and Development Organization**, Kismayu, Somalia, Tel: + 252 3 494645. Contact: Mr Isse Abdi and Abdirashid Haji Elmi.

**Centre for Research and Dialogue Somalia**, PO Box 28832, Nairobi – Kenya, Tel: + 252 5 932497 or + 252 1 658666, Fax: + 252 5 932355, Email: [info@crdsomalia.org](mailto:info@crdsomalia.org), [crd@crdsomalia.org](mailto:crd@crdsomalia.org). Contact: Abril Abdule, Co-Director, Email: [jabril@crdsomalia.org](mailto:jabril@crdsomalia.org); Abdulkadir Yahya, Co-Director, Email: [yahya@crdsomalia.org](mailto:yahya@crdsomalia.org).

**Somalia Peace Line**, S.B. 195 – BC Mogadishu, Somalia; c/o PO Box 3313, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Tel: + 252 1 658325, Fax: + 252 1 657600. Contact: Abdullahi M. Shirwa, Deputy Chairman.

**Idaacadda Qur'anka Kariimka (Holy Koran Radio)**, Somalia. Contact: Dahir Mahamud Gel, Director Radio Station, Email: [igksom@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:igksom@yahoo.co.uk).

**Federation of Muslim Women's Association in Sierra Leone**, c/o PO Box 491, Freetown, Sierra Leone, Email: [ramsy@sierratel.sl](mailto:ramsy@sierratel.sl). Contact: President: Ajah Simatu Kassim.

**United Council of Imam Women's Organization**, 17 Rawdon Street, Freetown, Sierra Leone, Tel: + 232 22 22155 or +252 232 7607815, Email: [tawals@sierratel.sl](mailto:tawals@sierratel.sl). Contact: Haja Hawa Turay, President.

**Hanafiyat Muslim Youth Organization**, PO Box 3, May Street, Kingtom City, Freetown 1909, Sierra Leone, Tel: + 232 22 241578, Fax: + 232 22 223349. Contact: Abu Johnson and Hussainatu M Bah.

**Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone**, c/o Peter Raven, Programme Manager, Sierra Leone, Christian Aid, Tel: + 232 20 75232267, Fax: +232 20 75232254, E-mail: [praven@christian-aid.org](mailto:praven@christian-aid.org). Contact: Mrs Haja Mariatu Mahdi, Founding Member, President of the Federation of the Muslim Women's Association Sierra Leone, Member of IRC's Council of Presidents, Honorary President of the World Conference on Religions for Peace.

**Muslim Women's League - Southern Sudan, Aziza Rajab Saeed (1990)**, Federal Ministry of Education, PO Box 248, Khartoum, Sudan, Tel: + 249 11 774823 / 770846, Fax: + 249 11 785705.

**Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace**, c/o Dr Amina A. Rahana Ahfad, University for Women, PO Box 167, Khartoum, Sudan, Tel: + 249 11 467957. Contact: Ms Rabab Baldo, Email: [baldorabab@hotmail.com](mailto:baldorabab@hotmail.com).

**Dar es Salaam Islamic Club**, Tanzania, Tel: +255 744 271677 or +255 744 400804, Email: [wcrptz@cats-net.com](mailto:wcrptz@cats-net.com), President Justice Raymond Mwaikasu, c/o PO Box 70193, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Tel: +255 51 112900, Fax: +255 91 112899, [gatsby@cals.net.co](mailto:gatsby@cals.net.co), Secretary-General Mr Salim Abdallah Zagar, PO Box 70193, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Tel: +255 2862504, Fax: +255 5112899, [wcrptz@cats-net.com](mailto:wcrptz@cats-net.com). Contact: Mr Ramadhan Madabida or Mrs Jitto Ram.

**Tanzania Muslim Women's Association - National Muslim Council of Tanzania**, Tanzania, Email: gramet7@yahoo.com. Contact: Mr Suleman Lolila, Mobile: +255 744 289100.

**Uganda Muslim Supreme Council**, PO Box 474, Arua, Uganda. Contact: H.E. Sheikh Shaban Mubajje, Mufti.

**Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative**, PO Box 104, Gulu, Uganda, Email: [arlpi@africaonline.co.ug](mailto:arlpi@africaonline.co.ug). Contact: Sheikh Al Haji Musa Khalil, Secretary, Mobile: +256 77 317391.

**Uganda Muslim Women's Vision**, PO Box 1211, Kampala, Uganda, Tel: + 256 41 530862, Email: [womenvision@yahoo.com](mailto:womenvision@yahoo.com), Website: [www.geocities.com/ugwomenvision/](http://www.geocities.com/ugwomenvision/). Contact: Mrs Zam Zam Nakamatte or Mrs Hadijah Kibira.

**Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly**, Makerere University, Uganda. Contact: Abasi Kiyimba, National Chairman and Senior Lecturer, Email: akiyimba@yahoo.com.

### **Muslim Peace-Building Actors in the Balkans**

**Albanian Foundation for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Disputes**, Him Kolli, Nr 23/1, Tirana, Albania, Tel: +355 42 48681, Fax: +355 42 32739, Email: [gjoka@albaniaonline.net](mailto:gjoka@albaniaonline.net).

**Centre for Peace and Multi-Ethnic Cooperation**, Rade Bitange 13, 88 000 Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tel: + 387 36 556280 or + 387 36 556281.

**Imam from Fojnica**, Mr Mensur Pasalic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tel/Fax: + 387 30 837626.

**Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina**, Isa-bega Ishakovica 2, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tel: + 387 33 239404, Fax: + 387 33 441573, Email: [ifetion@yahoo.com](mailto:ifetion@yahoo.com). Contact: H.E. Dr Mustafa Ceric, Reisu-l-Ulema.

**Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Women to Women**, Memnuna Zvizdic Kuca ljudskih prava, Ante Fijamenga 14b, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tel: +387 33 613589 or + 387 33 645234, Email: [zene2000@megatel.ba](mailto:zene2000@megatel.ba).

**Centre for Religious Dialogue**, Antuna Hangija 75, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mobile: + 387 33 666516 or + 387 33 666518, Fax: + 387 61 165109, Email: [sajecrd@bih.net.ba](mailto:sajecrd@bih.net.ba). Contact: Vjekoslav Saje, Project Field Coordinator and Director.

**Association Fatma**, Marsala Tita 9, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tel: + 387 33 442985, Fax: +387 33 663970. Contact: Fatima Hukovic, Director.

**Merhamet**, Zmaja od Bosne 13, Tel: +387 32 402510, Fax: + 387 32 402797, Email: [merh.zdk@bih.net.ba](mailto:merh.zdk@bih.net.ba), Website: [www.merhamet.co.ba](http://www.merhamet.co.ba).

**Sumejja (Citizens' Association of Bosnian Women 'Sumejja'),**<sup>54</sup> Zlatnih Ljiljana 4, Bugojno, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tel: + 387 30 251038 or + 387 30 251595, Fax: + 387 30 251038, Email: [sumejja@bih.net.ba](mailto:sumejja@bih.net.ba).

**Faculty of Islamic Studies**, Pristina, Kosovo, Tel: + 377 44 120651, Email: hamitixh@hotmail.com.  
Contact: Xhabir Hamiti.

**Kosovo Transition International Organization**, Ramiz Sadiku Street 2/15, Gjilan 38250, Kosovo, Email: [adela\\_ks@yahoo.com](mailto:adela_ks@yahoo.com). Contact: Adelina Sylaj.

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<sup>54</sup> Sumejja promotes the development of civil society, human rights, the protection of women and families and the affirmation of women in civil society.

## **Annexe II: Example of Survey Questions Selected**

1. What is the mission or goal of your organization / institution?;
2. How do Islamic values and principles influence and shape your work towards peace?;
3. What kind of peace-building activities do you engage in your region or community: education at schools, community centres for peace-building, practical, training in conflict resolution, intervention to resolve a conflict, mediation between conflicting parties, addressing root causes of conflict and working for the re-establishment of social, political, economic and environmental justice?;
4. What kinds of projects or issues do you deal with in particular?;
5. Who do you work with and who are your partners: other religious community leaders, local, regional or national government, international organizations, the UN?;
6. Please give two practical examples of your involvement in peace-building activities;
7. How are your activities and involvement viewed by your community and other parties?;
8. How would you evaluate your contribution to peace-building and establishment of justice in your community or region?;
9. What are the main difficulties and challenges facing you in building peace in your community in general?;
10. Do you work on effecting policy and how? Give an example of your success;
11. What kinds of assistance, interaction or collaboration would you like to receive from other Islamic and international organizations to enhance your ability to intervene successfully in conflicts and strengthen your peace-building capacity in your community or region?

## Annexe III: Description and Analysis of Muslim, Christian and Multi-Faith Peace-Building Actors

### Life and Peace Institute (LPI)

#### *Description*

The LPI is an international and ecumenical centre for peace research and action. Founded in 1985 by the Swedish Ecumenical Council, LPI aims to further the causes of justice, peace and reconciliation through a combination of research, seminars, publications and action on the ground. The Institute's headquarters are located in Uppsala, Sweden. There is a regional office in Nairobi, Kenya, a national office in Congo Brazzaville and another national office in Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). LPI has about ten full-time staff at its headquarters and 20 in its three field offices. Its annual working budget is US\$ 28-30 million.

LPI combines research on the role of religion in conflict and peace, with action programmes for conflict transformation. The Conflict Transformation Programme (CTP) builds upon LPI's experience in the Horn of Africa and Croatia, but is also present in, *inter alia*, Congo Brazzaville and the DRC. As such, it is both active in conflicts with a religious overtone and conflicts with a religious undertone.

The LPI aims to involve people maximally at the grassroots and community level in peace-building activities. LPI's experiences from close cooperation with different actors at the local level indicate that sustainable peace has to be rooted within the local social and cultural context. Although it has a strong grassroots communities' focus, it also operates at other levels, for instance through cooperating with (inter)national research institutes.

Being an ecumenical centre, churches and other ecumenical bodies such as synods and councils of churches constitute LPI's natural counterparts. LPI regards it as the churches' mission to build peace and to prevent violent conflict, and aims to strengthen their peace-building potential in conflict situations. Depending on the situation, LPI involves Muslim organizations and other religious actors too, as is for instance the case in Sri Lanka, Sudan and Somalia. Besides cooperating with religious partners, it works together with a wide variety of structures, including intergovernmental organizations, governments, NGOs and community leaders.

LPI has undertaken various research projects, among others on the role of religion in conflict and peace.<sup>55</sup> These research initiatives, which are not further elaborated in this report, cannot be separated from LPI's other core business, namely its CTP. The CTP actively uses LPI's research findings and attempts to translate them into practical activities on the ground. The CTP's activities not only entail education and training, but also 'facilitating dialogue and cooperation across borders'.

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<sup>55</sup> To date, LPI's research has been concentrated on three areas, namely the role of religion in conflict and peace, human rights and economic justice, and non-violent conflict transformation. Over the years, LPI has researched various topics and produced over 60 book and research reports. For more details on LPI's research activities, see <http://www.life-peace.org/research/index.htm>.

### Activities

LPI has carried out various education and training activities in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region. It organized workshops and seminars on peace-building and conflict resolution for church leaders in Sudan (with New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in the south, and with the Sudan Council of Churches in the north), for various church leaders in Eritrea from the Eritrean Orthodox Church, the Eritrean Catholic Church, the Evangelical Church of Eritrea and the Lutheran Church of Eritrea, and for church leaders in Ethiopia in cooperation with the Ethiopian Evangelical Church of Mekane Yesus (EECMY). In Eritrea, it also separately organized a workshop with Muslim leaders. The topics addressed in these workshops usually include concepts of peace and conflict, causes of conflict, conflict dynamics, the notion of conflict transformation, ethical basis and common values for peace-building, and strategic peace-building options going forward.

To highlight one education and training activity in more detail, the conflict transformation programme in the DRC started in April/May 2002. The programme consists of various capacity-building activities and focuses on peace education, peaceful cohabitation, and exploring the role of the church in the peace process. One of the project objectives is to encourage and support churches in North and South Kivu, to develop their capacity in order to play a role in the peace reconstruction process. Their contribution should be in line with their position in society. Expected results are that churches are going to play a constructive peace-building role at the community-level and in terms of coordination; that an important part of the Protestant and Catholic clergy will have benefited from various capacity-building programmes; that a reduction in intra- and inter-religious conflicts will take place; and that the level of cooperation among churches and between churches and the rest of civil society will be enhanced.<sup>56</sup>

An example of ‘facilitating dialogue and cooperation across borders’ may be derived from Congo Brazzaville, where LPI fulfilled a bridge function between various Congolese newspaper agencies, encouraging them to undertake joint actions for peace. When the LPI in Congo Brazzaville in 2001 was approached by the Catholic Weekly newspaper *La Semaine Africaine* to facilitate a seminar on media, it suggested that the newspaper discuss the issue with the Protestant monthly newspaper *Le Chemin*. Representatives of the two media met to plan the seminar. They soon agreed on a more inclusive approach. The seminar was held with the participation of public and private media (from radio, newspaper and TV). The first seminar led to a second. A Code of Conduct for journalists was discussed and agreed upon. Later on, a further step was taken when the journalists created an institution—the *Observatoire Congolais des Medias* (OCM)—to monitor their work. LPI continued cooperating with the OCM during the following years in order to strengthen its capacities. It assisted OCM in defining its final status, internal rule and organic texts, which in the end were registered at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that it became a state-approved civil organization. It organized a visit to Sweden for the chairman of OCM. And it supported OCM in organizing a workshop for 40 Congolese journalists to educate them in conflict analysis, and to discuss the role of journalists during past armed conflicts. Much time was devoted in the end to the issue of mediation, the choice of a mediator and the political implications of such a choice.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> See the Life and Peace Institute’s website: <http://www.life-peace.org/ctp/resumedrc.htm>

<sup>57</sup> Life and Peace Institute, 2003.

### *Impact*

Although the programme in the DRC is still ongoing and its results are not yet established, and although it is always a challenge to assess which factors contributed to what results, it has been observed that there is a difference in message between what the churches preached a few years ago and now. While in the beginning various churches preached a more ethnic-tainted, conflict-feeding message, their message has now become more constructive and reconciliatory in nature. In sum, the LPI's described activities seem to have mainly contributed to peace in the areas of dissemination, ideas on justice and peace-building, encouraging reconciliation, and altering behaviour, attitudes and negative stereotypes.

### *General Observations on Faith-Based Peace-Building*

In more general terms, LPI thinks that churches and ecumenical bodies in Africa have an important peace-building potential, because they are:

- Widespread and thus have a natural opportunity to harness their peace-building potential;
- Present for a long period of time, this in contrast to time-limited peace interventions by LPI;
- Committed to peace. According to LPI, most churches and ecumenical bodies think they can indeed contribute to peace, particularly in terms of reconciliation and forgiveness. LPI and other agencies can utilize this entry point to explore jointly the broader meaning of reconciliation, to discuss why reconciliation not only includes a relatively simple pardon, but also entails the acknowledgment of injustices of the past, and an active role in providing (restorative) justice for victims in the future;
- Mandated to build peace and prevent violent conflict, irrespective of whether religion is one of the key factors for conflict or not. That is why LPI cooperates with religious counterparts in countries like Sudan and Somalia, but also in Congo Brazzaville and the DRC.

A factor that may limit the peace-building role of churches and ecumenical actors, according to LPI, is that most of them are afraid of being perceived as political actors. While they may not be at all political actors, others can still view them as such, making some of them reluctant to engage actively in peace-building activities.

Finally, at a more generic level, LPI has found that in its efforts to work broadly with entire communities, it is not only important to work with churches, but also with religious and spiritual leaders, elders, women's groups, and so on—in short, all those who are committed to working for peace.<sup>58</sup> Cooperation with churches and other ecumenical partners is an adequate starting point, but needs to be complemented with other partnerships at the communal level.

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<sup>58</sup> Thurfjell, 2002, p. 7.

## World Vision International (WVI)

### *Description*

WVI is an international Christian relief and development organization working to promote the well-being of all people—especially children—worldwide. It serves 100 million people, works in 96 nations, raises US\$ 1.546 billion in cash and goods for its work, and employs 22,500 staff members.<sup>59</sup> Its headquarters are in Monrovia, California, in the United States.

WVI intentionally deals with peace-building issues in situations of conflict, because it believes that development brings peace, forgiveness heals societies, and justice and peace belong together.<sup>60</sup> Preferably, it integrates peace-building activities into its transformational development programmes, which aim to enhance families' and communities' capacities to cope, mitigate and respond to conflicts.<sup>61</sup>

WVI has a theological commitment to peace-building and reconciliation. Its Christian identity is the key motivation to address people's internal brokenness and the brokenness of *inter alia* family relations, community ties, institutions and organizations, as well as the environment. Whenever possible, World Vision seeks opportunities to reduce the level of conflict and to contribute to peaceful resolution and reconciliation, irrespective of whether religious factors play a major or minor role in the conflict.

It has developed expertise in building community- and household-level conflict management capacity. The strength of WVI is its focus on local and communal rather than national conflicts and its concentration on grassroots' projects. However, WVI recognizes that the macro context greatly impacts upon the local context and tries to address this through public policy and advocacy.

As a Christian organization, WVI shares a faith-based relationship with local churches of all Christian traditions, and invites Christian leaders to participate in conferences, consultations, training programmes and various educational opportunities. However, in many situations it cooperates with partners such as community-based organizations and partner agencies of secular or non-Christian religious origins. It also employs staff members of different religious backgrounds, but then only as programme staff in the field and not as WVI management staff. For instance, in Aceh, World Vision has 200 Acehnese programme staff that are Muslim. Generally speaking, it works on peace-building activities with those that share WVI's goals and values, including a broad set of secular and religious, non-governmental and governmental actors. Its peace-building services, like its relief and development work, are available to all people regardless of race, ethnic background, gender or religion.

WVI works more *in* conflict than *on* conflict. Its core peace-building business is difficult to pinpoint, as it works on a broad range of community-level peace-building activities, ranging from mediation efforts between agriculturalists and pastoralists in Kenya, to peace education and trauma-counselling workshops in *inter alia* Rwanda, the DRC and Maluku. Besides, it is also engaged in peace advocacy at global institutions such as the UN and EU.

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<sup>59</sup> Figures of 2004.

<sup>60</sup> See World Vision International's website: <http://www.wvi.org/>.

<sup>61</sup> World Vision International, 2002, p. 1.

### *Activities*

Whenever possible, WVI strategically integrates its peace-building efforts into its transformational development (TD) programmes. It uses indicators to assess the integration of peace-building measures into TD programmes. Additionally, it has developed guidelines to assist World Vision staff integrate peace-building into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and phasing out of the TD programmes (see Annexe IV).<sup>62</sup> Although the majority of World Vision's peace-building efforts are thus integrated in TD programmes, the following two examples highlight two peace-building activities that World Vision has done as 'stand-alone' peace-building sector programmes, which are only indirectly linked to other relief and development efforts.

In Kosovo, World Vision has supported inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue between Albanian and Serbian Kosovars. It has cultivated close professional and personal relationships with community figureheads of divided communities, including religious leaders, in the city of Rahovec (southern Kosovo). These projects have focused on engaging members of civil society to advocate for peace and justice within their communities. In 2001, World Vision founded the first multi-ethnic Community Council for Peace and Tolerance (CPT) in the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica. The 20-member Council consists of local political and religious leaders, lawyers, and various other community leaders including the head imam of Mitrovica and the mother superior of the Serbian Orthodox monastery in Mitrovica. It earned high recognition with the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the communities it serves. In October 2001, CPT members committed to a shared mission of 'building a peaceful and tolerant multi-ethnic community'. Since then the Council has undertaken various activities to promote a culture of peace by increasing contact and battling stereotypes among Serbs, Albanians and other ethnic groups living in Mitrovica such as Roma, Bosnians and Turks. For instance, culminating with the International Day of Peace on the 21 September, CPT organizes the annual Mitrovica week of peace events. This involves forums and round-table discussions between representatives of Albanians, Serbs and other minority groups of Mitrovica. The aim is to celebrate the town's ethnic diversity through folklore, dance, poetry, traditional arts and sports activities. After enduring a difficult period of heightened local tensions in 2004, in which CPT meetings were not productive and the Mitrovica week of peace events did not attract many people, the CPT has again increased its membership and ethnic representation. Focus in 2005 has been on revamping its organizational aims and raising its public profile, while planning a number of projects to promote dialogue and inter-ethnic understanding in Mitrovica before the year's end.<sup>63</sup>

In Maluku, Indonesia, World Vision developed a trauma-counselling module for religious leaders to train them in how to provide counselling to members of their constituency. After years of relief work and relationship-building with the Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku, World Vision was asked in 2003 to assist in developing a module on trauma counselling to train religious leaders in providing counselling to their constituencies. The idea behind the proposal was twofold. First, active participation by religious leaders in the preparation of the module would help them process their own traumas. It would also be a good means to bring them together and to restart dialogue between them. Second, training religious leaders in trauma counselling would enable them to counsel members in their own constituencies. So together with experienced staff from various psychological faculties in

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<sup>62</sup> World Vision International, 2002, pp. 1-5.

<sup>63</sup> Personal communication by Rick Spruyt, World Vision Kosovo's Peace-Building Coordinator.

Indonesia and together with various Muslim and Christian leaders, World Vision developed this training module in 2003. Unfortunately, it never managed to implement the training workshops, because tensions on Maluku increased again and led to a situation where it was not only too insecure to carry out the workshops, but where the religious leaders' commitment to the workshops decreased substantially as well.<sup>64</sup> World Vision remains hopeful of being able to carry out the training workshops in the near future.

### *Impact*

The two activities have so far not been evaluated externally. Therefore it is hard to say anything concrete about the impact. The main observation made by a staff member in Kosovo was that the Council's success is likely to be assessed in the frequency of contact between the Albanian and Serbian Kosovars, as well as in terms of information exchange regarding each other's background, culture and so on. The more interaction and the more information exchange, the more the Council contributes to a culture of peace in Mitrovica. To date, however, it is still too early to judge the Council's success.

More generally speaking, as World Vision—according to its director for reconciliation and peace-building—has not yet found a way to assess the impact of stand-alone peace-building activities, it usually combines peace-building efforts in a strategic manner with more tangible relief and development efforts that World Vision can better monitor and readjust where needed. Additional advantages of this approach are that (economic) development in itself may also reduce violent conflict, and that funding is better sustained if peace activities are combined with relief and development efforts.<sup>65</sup> Annexe IV provides an illustration of how WVI attempts to integrate peace-building elements into its relief and development programmes.

Despite this challenge to assess the impact of peace-building activities adequately, WVI's activities appear to have contributed to peace through the dissemination of ideas on justice and peace, drafting committed people to peace-building, encouraging reconciliation and inter-faith dialogue, and healing.

### *General Observations on Faith-Based Peace-Building*

Lessons learned from Kosovo include the following. The first concerns the different contributions of the imam and the mother superior to the peace process in Mitrovica. While the imam has been particularly active in organizing activities, the mother superior and her co-religionists have shown their commitment by underscoring the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation. Second, by participating in the Council they have given their consent to its activities. While they may not be in the position to exercise much influence on their constituencies, their approval is important as they provide moral legitimacy in peace-building work. Third, the added value of religious leaders is that they can reach their people at a deep emotional level. For example, at a time of tension when Serbs wanted to withdraw their commitment to the Council, it was the mother superior who encouraged them to go on with the initiative. Fourth, the moral conviction of the religious representative can make them more committed than some other Council members. At times of extreme tensions, community and local

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<sup>64</sup> Personal communication by Koos Koen, World Vision Netherlands' staff member; and Ekkehart Forberg, World Vision Germany's Peace-Building Coordinator.

<sup>65</sup> Personal communication by Dr William O. Lowrey, Director of Reconciliation and Peace-Building.

political leaders in Kosovo declined risking their reputation and career by publicly standing up for CPT values, while the moral conviction of religious leaders outweighed the political or personal risks.

One lesson that World Vision learned from its peace-building work in Maluku is that religious leaders can mobilize their constituencies for conflict and for peace. When the tensions between Muslim and Christian communities at Maluku escalated again, the religious leaders from both sides did not actively stop their communities from entering the conflict again. Their lack of commitment to peace, and as such to a joint training workshop on trauma counselling, meant that the workshop never took place. According to WVI, this example calls for a regular and updated conflict analysis. Such an analysis can first of all assess to what extent religious leaders and other stakeholders are committed to peace or conflict at that very moment. It can examine the leverage that the religious leaders and other stakeholders have within their constituencies. Depending on the outcome of the conflict analysis, NGOs such as World Vision may start initiatives to support those actors that are committed to peace, and may attempt to strengthen the position of these actors in their own communities and among their own supporters. On the other hand, they may avoid cooperating with religious actors and others that are more committed to conflict than to peace, and may even consider how to limit or reduce their influence within their communities and constituencies.

WVI also experienced that the Christian identity of an organization can either positively or negatively influence its ability to conduct peace-building activities. In countries where Christians are a relatively small minority, the activities of Christian organizations that are focused on proselytizing can create confusion in the minds of the public and can hinder the implementation of World Vision's activities in the country. Particularly when being engaged in peace-building efforts such as trauma counselling, faith-based organizations should be extremely alert about how to deal with one's own religious identity and that of one's beneficiaries. On the other hand, World Vision has found that its faith identity is greatly appreciated by many other faith communities, making it possible for World Vision to work closely with many Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and traditional religious groups as they share common commitments to values of peace and justice in the community.

A final remark about the possible difference between faith-based and secular organizations engaged in peace-building is that their activities from the outside are usually pretty much the same, and cannot easily be distinguished from each other. What probably makes the difference, according to World Vision's Director for Reconciliation and Peace-Building, is that World Vision—in contrast to non-faith-based organizations—has a theological approach and a Christian-inspired motivation for peace-building.

## **International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF)**

### *Description*

IARF is a registered charity based in the United Kingdom, with the aim of working for the freedom of religion and belief at a global level. It has a small secretariat in Oxford with three full-time and five part-time staff, and works with an annual budget of around US\$ 680,000.

IARF, which can best be labelled a multi-religious NGO, has over 104 affiliated member groups in approximately 33 countries from a wide range of faith traditions, including Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Shintoism, Hinduism and Sikhism. IARF is a world community of organizations, groups and individuals from diverse faith and belief traditions working together for religious freedom.

Upon its members' request, IARF carries out activities in countries all over the world, including countries in conflict. However, *IARF does not explicitly work on conflict and is not an expert in the area of peace-building*. According to IARF's former president, Mr Eimert van Herwijnen, IARF is an international key agency in the promotion for freedom of religion and belief, but not an important faith-based peace-building actor. As this report is about religious peace-building actors, it will not elaborate on IARF's work in detail.<sup>66</sup>

Already in 1969, IARF took the decision that the promotion of religious freedom would be its core business, and not the issue of religion and peace. In that year the Risho Kosei-kai, a lay Buddhist organization from Japan, became an IARF member. Being more rooted in the tradition of religion and peace, this new member challenged IARF to consider IARF's core business. After intensive consideration, it was decided that IARF would continue to focus on the issue of religious freedom, and that a new organization would be established to deal more with the topic of religion and peace: named the World Conference for Religion and Peace, this organization still exists and is also included in this report.

### *Activities*

Ever since its founding in 1900, IARF has focused on the promotion of religious freedom, and not on religious peace-building as such. In 1969 the term 'Liberal Christian' was dropped from IARF's name, thus making it possible for non-Christian organizations to join. One of the first to do so was Risho Kosei-Kai (RKK), a lay-Buddhist organization from Japan. The RKK felt that the issues of religion and peace should be covered by a separate organization and took the initiative to found the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP). Since then IARF and the WCRP have developed into complementary, though different, organizations. While WCRP works from the top-down and focuses on peace-building and intermediation in particularly conflict-affected countries, the IARF concentrates on inter-faith dialogue and tolerance in various countries all over the world and works bottom-up via its members at the grassroots.

To give some examples of IARF's activities, IARF works on freedom from oppressive interference or discrimination by the state; mutual understanding, respect and the promotion of harmony, or at least 'tolerance', between communities or individuals of different religions or beliefs; and on accountability by religious communities to ensure that their own practices uphold the fundamental dignity and human rights of their members and others. IARF also runs a Religious Freedom Youth Programme (RFYN) with the aim of creating a global network of young adults who are committed to addressing religious freedom issues and to promoting inter-faith harmony and understanding. Moreover, IARF develops programmes on the prevention of religious intolerance, which have an emphasis on the role of education. With funding from the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others, it has started to develop education materials such as videos on the impact of religious discrimination and the exclusion of religious minorities. The videos will be shown and discussed in four countries: India, Bangladesh, Philippines and South Africa.

It cannot be said that IARF deliberately works in conflict zones or is a peace-building specialist. Although it has not done so in practice, IARF can possibly make the following two contributions to the theme, according to Mr Eimert van Herwijnen, on the following two aspects. First, IARF can be involved in awareness-raising on the religious dimensions of conflict and peace. Second, IARF

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<sup>66</sup> For more detailed information, see IARF's website: <http://www.iarf.net/>.

members at the grassroots' level can gather information on religious factors that play a role in various local processes, including local conflicts and local peace initiatives.

### *Impact*

Asking IARF's former director about some successful results of IARF's activities, he provided the following example of a successful inter-religious cooperation effort in Gujarat, India. In the framework of its RFYN, IARF organized a work camp in Gujarat in 2002 for a group of 35 young adults from Asia, Europe and the United States, all committed to religious tolerance and inter-faith dialogue. During the work camp, the young adults repaired a mosque in a Muslim village and a temple in a Hindu village. At the final opening ceremony, the religious leaders from both villages were present, and established contact with each other. One year later, tensions in the district rose after a shooting attack on a train and fights broke out. However, no fights emerged in the respective two villages. According to the former director, this was due to the fact that the year before the religious leaders of both communities had met and established communication, and thus partly due to the inter-religious effort to rebuild religious buildings in the two communities. On a more general level, the authors think that IARF's activities mainly contribute to the dissemination of ideas (especially on the promotion of religious freedom), reaching out to governments to contribute to policy changes, and to encouraging inter-faith dialogue and cooperation.

## **Community of Sant'Egidio**

### *Description*

Sant'Egidio is a worldwide assembly of Christian communities involved in conflict resolution and unofficial diplomacy. The Community was founded in Italy in 1968 and its 50,000 members are gathered in small groups, based in 70 countries. Its headquarters are in Rome. Although it has a lay membership, Sant'Egidio's religious motivation is an important part of its negotiation activities.<sup>67</sup> It can best be labelled as an international Catholic NGO engaged in peacemaking.

Because of its presence in many regions of the world through the different Communities, Sant'Egidio feels very close to many difficult situations. Mainly starting off with charity, humanitarian action and development cooperation, since the beginning of the 1980s it became engaged in various international dialogues in order to prevent tension and at times even into direct interventions by mediation. The Community has played an active peace-building role in Algeria, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Its peace-building interventions seem to have focused more on 'non-religious' conflicts than on 'religious conflicts', and more on the international level than on the national or local level.

Being a 'Church public lay association', which is a church's movement formally recognized by the official Catholic Church but with an autonomous statute, the members of Sant'Egidio are not religious actors per se, but do share the same spirituality and principles which characterize the way of Sant'Egidio, including prayer, communicating the gospel, solidarity with the poor and dialogue. The Community cooperates with actors of other religions, and is open to ecumenical and inter-faith

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<sup>67</sup> Adapted from the description on the European Centre for Conflict Prevention's website: [www.euconflict.org](http://www.euconflict.org). See also Smock, 2001a, p. 3.

dialogue. Moreover, given its peace-building activities in various conflict-affected countries, it has worked together with a range of diplomatic, governmental and non-governmental, humanitarian and religious counterparts.

In terms of peace-building activities, Sant'Egidio's focus is on mediation and dialogue, bringing different parties together to resolve their differences and reach a settlement. When and where the Community intervenes is not arranged by a prescribed set of intervention criteria. Usually one or more stakeholders in the conflict invite the Community to facilitate and mediate in the peace process. Even then the Community carefully considers whether it is able to contribute anything to the peace process at all, and whether its contribution will be of any added value. Only if this is the case will the Community decide to intervene.

### *Activities*

Probably one of the best-described examples of faith-based actors engaged in peace mediation is Sant'Egidio's contribution to the mediation efforts in Mozambique.<sup>68</sup> Because of its long track record in Mozambique, and because of the perception on both the RENAMO and FRELIMO sides that Sant'Egidio could serve as an impartial moderator and facilitator of constructive dialogue, Sant'Egidio could establish the first contact between the RENAMO leadership and the FRELIMO government at its headquarters in Rome on 8 July 1990. This became the start of a two-year peace negotiation process in which Sant'Egidio became one of the key actors. In concert with the Italian government, advisers from the United States, the United Nations, and several other governmental and non-governmental organizations, the representatives of Sant'Egidio were able to maintain a momentum for peace among the two parties over the course of ten rounds of talks, which were held from 1990 to 1992 at Sant'Egidio's headquarters. Following two closing summits, the General Peace Accord was signed on 4 October 1992.<sup>69</sup>

Another well-known example is Sant'Egidio's peacemaking action in Guatemala, which consisted of breaking the impasse of the United Nations-led peace mediations between the government and the guerrilla movement, the *Union Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala* (URNG). The dialogue had come to a halt because of lack of trust between the parties, which had no direct contacts at the highest level: exponents of the government and the *comandancia* had never met. The Community saw the possibility of overcoming this impasse by creating informal and direct contact between the two interlocutors. It managed to arrange various meetings between the then candidate for the presidential elections, Alvaro Arzù, and the four leaders of the *comandancia*. Arzù, a right-wing candidate supported by part of the military in the elections that were to be held in Guatemala the next month, had expressed interest in a negotiated solution. In February 1996, the two parties finally decided to inform public opinion of their previous contacts and the continuation of official negotiations. In the meantime, Arzù had been elected president on 14 January 1996. After this intervention, the official negotiations with the UN as mediator were able to restart on a more solid basis and ended with the signing of a peace agreement in Mexico City in December 1996.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> For an excellent description of this case, see Appleby, 2000, pp. 158-165. See also the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999, pp. 374-377.

<sup>69</sup> Appleby, 2000, pp. 161-162.

<sup>70</sup> See [http://www.santegidio.org/news/rassegna/00000/19980703\\_spectator\\_EN.htm](http://www.santegidio.org/news/rassegna/00000/19980703_spectator_EN.htm)

In Kosovo, Sant'Egidio played a moderate though important role, and contributed to the signing of the Schools Agreement in 1998, which among other things allowed Albanian children to return to school. The Community had been present in Kosovo since 1996. The friendship established with the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, pushed Sant'Egidio to search for grounds reconciling Serbs and Albanians. The non-violent line of Rugova's politics appeared to be the only road that could be travelled in a high-tension situation, in part because of the conflict in Bosnia. The Dayton Accords of 1996 did not take into consideration the Kosovar situation from the point of view of the status of the region. This suggested a humanitarian accord, which would obtain tangible results for the Albanians and at the same time would allow a reduction in the level of tension by means of measures of mutual trust. The ground selected was education, because Albanian children were expelled from schools from every grade, and the students were forced to study in deplorable conditions. Sant'Egidio therefore opted to re-establish cohabitation, an objective concretely realizable in order to avoid the disaster of former Yugoslavia's other areas. By means of initially favourable contacts with the Serbian church, the Community established a line of communication between Rugova and the Belgrade regime. A negotiating table between the two parties was created, a unique event between the government of Belgrade and Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo. In 1996 the Education Accord was signed, with the support of the international community, in particular the Contact Group. By means of this accord, confirmed by the Rules of Implementation signed by the parties in March 1998, 13 universities and many secondary and primary schools were returned to the Albanians, until the war in 1999 when things turned worse.<sup>71</sup>

Currently, Sant'Egidio is actively involved behind the scenes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, aiming to bring together representatives of the DRC's transitional government and the FDLR (ex-FAR/Interahamwe) in order to arrange for the FDLR's return to Rwanda. Because of its good contacts with both the FDLR and Kinshasa, the DRC's transitional government deliberately invited Sant'Egidio as a neutral mediator. Following the discussions in Rome on 31 March 2005, the FDLR released a statement in it they renounced the armed struggle, condemned the 1994 genocide and offered to return to Rwanda where it wants to continue the political struggle with the Rwandan government. However, it remains to be seen whether the statement will actually receive practical follow-up.

As an aside, the Community is also actively involved in inter-faith dialogue.<sup>72</sup> While not always directly related to issues of conflict and peace, or taking place in conflict zones itself, Sant'Egidio has been organizing inter-religious international meetings since the mid-1980s, with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and dialogue among religions in a horizon of peace. The Community believes in genuine inter-religious dialogue on the basis of a strong religious identity. It also tries to avoid perceptions of syncretism, for instance by holding prayer sessions where religious leaders do not pray together or in each other's presence, but pray at the same time at different locations. Lastly, it aims to go beyond the religious dialogue for the sake of religious dialogue, and encourages religious and secular leaders to exchange information and visions on specific topics such as Aids or the future of Iraq.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> See [http://www.santegidio.org/news/rassegna/00000/19980530\\_peaceworks1\\_EN.htm](http://www.santegidio.org/news/rassegna/00000/19980530_peaceworks1_EN.htm)

<sup>72</sup> For more information, see <http://www.santegidio.org/en/ecumenismo/uer/index.htm>

<sup>73</sup> De Volder, 2005, pp. 99-100.

## *Impact*

The actual impact of Sant'Egidio's mediation and dialogue efforts in the various conflict situations seems to be rather clear, and, to say the least, rather impressive. In Mozambique, it contributed—together with various other stakeholders—to the Peace Accords in 1992. It had a similar contribution to the Guatemalan peace process, which resulted in the Peace Agreement in December 1996. In Kosovo, its actions shaped the possibility for Albanian children to return to school. The effect of its intervention in the DRC cannot yet be assessed, as the process is still ongoing. In general, Sant'Egidio has been especially successful in mediating between conflicting parties, but also in encouraging inter-faith dialogue and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

## *General Observations on Faith-Based Peace-Building*

When looking at the way in which the above-mentioned impacts were achieved, it is possible to discern a number of factors that shape Sant'Egidio's peace-building work.

Firstly, the Community builds an unimpeachable record for integrity and good offices in the society that it comes to serve. Through various initiatives, from orchestrating international humanitarian relief to providing direct services to the needy, Sant'Egidio practises non-partisan social action that underscores its equanimity and commitment to the common good.<sup>74</sup> The 'Diplomatic Sant'Egidio' besides the humanitarian one does not exist. That is, the Community understands and productively exploits the link between humanitarian assistance and political processes. This was also the case in Mozambique, where the Community had been involved with the Christian churches since 1976 before it took on a more proactive mediation role in 1990.

Moreover, the Community does not seek political or economic power for itself, but neither is it averse to drawing on its powerful friends for the cause of peace. It has a religious commitment to unconditional friendship, which enables it to establish contacts with both governmental and non-governmental actors, but also requires hard work in establishing and maintaining the 'networks of friendship' at all levels. In Mozambique, this enabled it to operate as a neutral mediator, while at the same time engaging its broad network of political, diplomatic and non-governmental actors, including the churches, into the peace negotiations as well.<sup>75</sup>

Furthermore, Sant'Egidio's mediators could be successful because (and to the extent that) they: exhibit an intimate knowledge of the language and culture of the peoples in conflict; enjoy access to first-hand information about the conflict as it evolves; possess or draw upon political expertise; and help to develop and embrace a long-term vision of peace for the society in conflict.<sup>76</sup> An organization such as Sant'Egidio can probably match these expectations, because it mainly drives on volunteers. The Community's volunteers can follow a certain conflict situation for a long period of time, building up an intimate knowledge of the situation. Sant'Egidio's undertakings are not influenced by time, deadlines and compulsory success in the short run.<sup>77</sup> In other words, they are not bothered by deadlines, deliverables and political flavours of the day. Once the momentum for the Community is there to intervene in the conflict, its Board can easily approach the members that have followed the conflict over the years and harness their information. Working with volunteers also has the advantage

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<sup>74</sup> Appleby, 2000, p. 162.

<sup>75</sup> Appleby, 2000, p. 163.

<sup>76</sup> Little and Appleby, 2004, p. 11.

<sup>77</sup> Giro, 2005, p. 1; de Volder, 2005, pp. 103-104.

that the Community is relatively independent in terms of finance. In contrast to many other NGOs, the lion's share of its employees are volunteers, so the Community does not cease to exist if subsidies stop. This also enables the Community to monitor conflicts over a long period of time, and to concentrate on conflicts and forgotten wars in which donors are not directly interested and not willing to invest. Once the conflict then (re)appears on the international agenda, the Community can usually count on the donors' renewed (financial) interest. From a donor perspective, it would be a challenge to fund an organization such as Sant'Egidio for the long term, as it will be able to monitor a conflict closely for a longer period of time, but cannot guarantee donors concrete deliverables as long as there is no momentum actually to intervene in the conflict situation.

Finally, these lessons learned do not exclusively apply to faith-based organizations like Sant'Egidio, but also to secular organizations. This subsequently brings up the question of to what extent faith-based peace-building then actually differs from secular peace-building. According to one staff member of the Community in Belgium, there is no difference in the peace-building activities as such. Explicitly stated, religion does not play a role in Sant'Egidio's peace mediation efforts, making Sant'Egidio's peace diplomacy in principle secular in nature. What can make a difference is that people grant Sant'Egidio a certain moral authority, and what can make a difference is that Sant'Egidio has access to a broad network of actors in the 'Christian world'. However, according to Sant'Egidio itself, the key difference and what makes its peace-building work so unique and effective is its faith-based motivation for engagement with peacemaking, referring to the strong sense of responsibility of Community members to those in pain and suffering and especially the poor. It is this caring attitude that provides Sant'Egidio with the opportunity for person-to-person contact. Beyond the commitment to personal relationships with those in need lies the strong conviction that peace comes through dialogue and understanding.<sup>78</sup>

### **Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (CRDC)**

#### *Description*

The CRDC is based at the George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia, in the United States. It engages in practice, research and education concerning the contribution of world religions to conflict and to peace. The Center mobilizes the resources of religion, diplomacy and conflict resolution to support more effective interventions in global problems involving religion. It seeks to support more effective collaboration between religious and secular grassroots' leaders and policy-makers.

The CRDC was endowed and established in 2003, and has at its core the James H. Laue Chair in World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, which is occupied by Dr Marc Gopin, who also acts as the CRDC's director. Currently, the Center has a staff of four, a director and a voluntary board.

Because of the various religious affiliations of the CRDC's director and board members, the Center may well be labelled as a multi-religious research and education centre. For the time being, its geographical focus is mainly on the Middle East, although it aims to expand its work to other regions, such as Central Asia, the Balkans and Northern Ireland. The CRDC mainly concentrates on conflicts with a religious overtone, stressing the importance of a cultural-religious approach to conflict and conflict resolution, in addition to, for instance, an institutional and economic reform approach.

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<sup>78</sup>See [http://www.santegidio.org/news/rassegna/00000/19980530\\_peaceworks1\\_EN.htm](http://www.santegidio.org/news/rassegna/00000/19980530_peaceworks1_EN.htm).

The CRDC's activities cover a range from community and grassroots' levels to engaging with diplomats, policy-makers and the business community. Most of the CRDC's activities consist of lectures, inter-faith dialogues, workshops and seminars, and take place on its own premises. The CRDC's director, Marc Gopin, and various board members have undertaken paid and unpaid research and education activities in several Middle Eastern countries, most recently in Syria.

The CRDC's core business is education, research and direct action. Education activities include media education, seminars for government leaders and decision-makers, and encouraging graduate-student study in religion and conflict. Research activities focus on topics such as religion and the state, coexistence in multi-religious states and positive models of religious moderates. Direct action consists, *inter alia*, of the promotion and empowerment of a network of religious peacemakers around the world, organizing dialogues between and among members of religious traditions, and conferences and retreats where policy-makers can learn from and interact with religious leaders.

### *Activities*

The CRDC's key objective is to go beyond academics and to offer policy-makers, diplomats and others in influential positions concrete suggestions for how to deal with the cultural-religious dimensions of conflict. It is important that these people who can design and make key interventions in conflicts understand the role of religion and religious actors in conflict well enough to treat them with respect, and to cooperate constructively with them for the sake of long-term conflict transformation.

One example of a CRDC activity is the current project: the Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution Initiative. This project involves mobilizing resources of religion, diplomacy and conflict resolution to support more effective interventions in global problems. Important citizens across different sectors of society can have a dramatic impact on conflict resolution, especially when these individuals are introduced to influential policy-makers and political leaders in the United States and abroad. Powerful changes can result when key citizens and policy-makers are able to learn from each other and together develop innovative strategies for conflict resolution. First, the project entails the promotion of networks of key citizens stemming from cultural, religious, academic, military and business sectors, who can be the principal change agents in conflict settings. Simultaneously, this builds networks and relationships between these citizens and policy-makers and diplomats in the United States and their own countries. Second, it includes training and seminars for mid-career and upper-level policy-makers, business leaders, diplomats and peacemakers, in new techniques of diplomacy utilizing appropriate cultural, religious, and value-based practices that can be adapted to specific conflicts.<sup>79</sup> The project is still ongoing and the outcomes cannot yet be assessed.

### *Impact*

The CRDC has been in operation since 2003, and cannot yet assess the impact of its activities. What it expects to add in terms of religious peace-building is to make policy-makers and diplomats more aware of the religious dimensions of conflict, a terminology in which they are normally not thinking. It seeks to influence them to realize that long-term conflict transformation requires working with the hearts and minds of individuals, including secular and religious leaders at the grassroots' levels. The CRDC's contributions to peace seem to be most visible in the domain of dissemination of ideas.

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<sup>79</sup> For more information on the various CRDC activities, see <http://www.gmu.edu/departments/crdc/about.html>.

## **International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD)**

### *Description*

The ICRD, based in Washington DC, serves as a bridge between religion and politics in preventing and resolving identity-based conflicts that exceed the reach of traditional diplomacy. It does this by incorporating religion as part of the solution. Through linking religious reconciliation with official and unofficial diplomacy, the Center is in effect creating a new synergy for peacemaking. The ICRD can best be described as a multi-faith NGO specializing in faith-based diplomacy.

With a lean staff of seven and an annual working budget of around US\$ 588,000, the ICRD uses four criteria to determine where it will get involved: 1) where it can do the most good for the most people; 2) where there are existing relationships of trust that can be brought to bear on the problem at hand; 3) where the situation is of strategic consequence to the United States; and 4) where governments or other NGOs are not already engaged, this to maximize opportunities for the Center to make a significant contribution wherever it is involved. The ICRD is active both in conflicts that have religious overtones and in those that do not.

The ICRD tailors each of its peacemaking initiatives to fit the situation at hand. It has been active in Sudan, Iran, Kashmir, Pakistan, among other places. In the Sudan, for example, it has pursued a top-down approach, working with high-level religious and political leaders from the Christian and Muslim communities to achieve its intended goals; whereas in Kashmir, its emphasis has been on achieving reconciliation between next-generation Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist leaders from both sides of the Line of Control. Generally speaking, it is fair to say that the Center operates at all levels of the organizational spectrum (local, district, national and international) depending on the need. This is out of recognition that every conflict situation is unique, driven every bit as much by personalities as circumstances.

The ICRD works in cooperation with indigenous and external partners on an as-needed basis. Once it has assessed the local religious and secular capabilities and determined the outside skills that will be needed to buttress indigenous talent, it calls upon partnering organizations (for example, the National Prayer Breakfast Fellowship, Initiatives of Change, the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy) or selected individuals to help meet those needs. It then deploys inter-religious action teams to trouble spots where conflict threatens or has already broken out. In addition to having the secular skills needed to deal with the problem at hand, these teams also reflect the same religious composition as the local population with whom they will be working. That way those who they are serving can feel reassured that someone on the team understands their religious sensitivities and sense of self-worth.

The Center's core peace-building business is mediation, education and inter-faith dialogue. According to its founder and President, Dr Douglas Johnston, the Center's core business is the practice of faith-based diplomacy, a form of intervention that brings the transcendent aspects of personal religious faith to bear in overcoming the secular obstacles to peace. Within this framework, the Center has developed a variety of programme initiatives.

### *Activities*

Within the framework of faith-based diplomacy, the ICRD has developed a variety of programme initiatives. In the Sudan, for instance, it has worked behind the scenes aiming to bring an end to the long-running civil war between the Islamic north and the Christian/African traditionalist south.

In Kashmir, the ICRD has been working for the past four years with next-generation leaders to promote 'peace from within'. Its principal vehicle for doing this has been through its conduct of faith-based reconciliation workshops that are designed to resolve differences at the personal and communal levels between Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs. In South Asia, the ICRD is in partnership with an Islamic policy studies institute in reforming religious schools, including the Wahabi-oriented *madrasas* that gave birth to the Taliban. Moreover, it is active in faith-based diplomacy efforts regarding Iran.<sup>80</sup>

### *Impact*

In assessing the potential contributions to peace of the various ICRD initiatives, the Center's Sudan project provides a helpful example. For the past five years, the ICRD has been working with Muslim and Christian political and religious leaders in moving toward a peaceful resolution of the north/south conflict. A watershed moment in this process took place in November 2000 when the Center convened a meeting in Khartoum of prominent Sudanese and international Muslim and Christian religious leaders and scholars to develop a plan of action for ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all Sudanese citizens. Not only was this meeting a valuable exercise in inter-faith dialogue, but it also resulted in a number of consensus recommendations. According to the ICRD's president, Dr Douglas Johnston, the meeting, which had incendiary potential (in light of the deep grievances involved), produced a genuine breakthrough in communications between the two faith communities and yielded seventeen action recommendations designed to support inter-religious cooperation in human rights, education, employment and humanitarian support (all areas in which religious minorities did not enjoy the same rights as Muslims).<sup>81</sup>

As one of the above follow-up actions, the ICRD—with the support of the Sudan Council of Churches and the International Peoples' Friendship Council—orchestrated the establishment of an independent Sudan Inter-religious Council (SIRC), which provides a forum where key Muslim and Christian religious leaders currently meet on a monthly basis to work out their problems. More recently, the ICRD also took the lead in establishing a Committee to Protect Religious Freedom (CPRF), which is now bringing accountability to this highly sensitive area.

In just the first few months of its existence, the SIRC was able to advance the interests of non-Muslims well beyond what the churches had been able to achieve acting by themselves over the previous ten years. For example, it facilitated the payment of compensation to the Catholic Church (from the government of Sudan) for church property that the government had unlawfully confiscated some years earlier. It also defused a highly charged political issue between the Episcopal Church and the Sudanese government. Furthermore, it secured increased national media time for Christian programming and facilitated a ban on commercial development adjacent to Christian cemeteries. It has

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<sup>80</sup> For more detailed information on the ICRD's programme initiatives, see <http://www.icrd.org/projects.html>.

<sup>81</sup> Johnston, 2003, pp. 9-12.

also conducted extensive workshops on religious freedom for next-generation Muslim and Christian leaders.

The increased trust that the SIRC has created and the positive actions that are taking place as a result augur well for Sudan's future. Indeed, the Council convened a major conference in November 2004 on Darfur (an intra-Muslim conflict that some would say is beyond its purview) and did so against the wishes of the Sudanese government. And that is one of the more remarkable aspects of this ICRD initiative. These independent bodies (that is, the Council and the Committee) were formed within a totalitarian context. Not only did the Islamic regime permit their establishment, but it also agreed to treat their recommendations seriously. To date the government has honoured that commitment, even though doing so has required significant expenditure of funds in compensating the Catholic Church.

In sum, the ICRD's contributions to peace not only include mediation between conflicting parties, but also encouraging reconciliation and inter-faith dialogue and the dissemination of ideas.

#### *General Observations on Faith-Based Peace-Building*

In terms of religious factors that have made a difference, the successful outcome of the November 2000 meeting, according to Johnston,<sup>82</sup> was largely attributable to the faith-based nature of the undertaking. AS mentioned earlier in chapter 4 of this report, each day the proceedings began with prayer and readings from the Bible and the Koran. This was preceded earlier in the morning by an informal prayer breakfast for the international participants and local Muslim and Christian religious leaders (on a rotating basis). Finally, and perhaps most important, the ICRD brought with it a prayer team from California whose sole purpose was to pray and fast during the four days of the meeting, praying for the success of the deliberations. These elements coupled with appropriate breaks in the proceedings to accommodate Muslim prayers and provided a transcendent environment that inspired the participants to rise above their personal and religious differences and work together for the common good.

The ICRD indicates three other key issues with regard to faith-based peace-building, namely: trust; resourcefulness; and coordination with other stakeholders. With regard to trust, religious peacemakers must above all have credibility with the conflicting parties, and this is most often gained through a long-term local presence or by partnering local individuals or institutions that command local respect. More often than not, successful conflict prevention or peace-building requires a long-term commitment that is based on trust.

Regarding resourcefulness, Johnston strongly recommends the inclusion of religious leaders in formal peace negotiations. Because of their unrivalled influence at the grassroots' level, he feels it is important that they feel a genuine sense of ownership in whatever political settlement emerges. Furthermore, their presence brings a moral authority to the deliberations that is often missing and, with it, an enhanced capability for dealing with the kinds of religious issues that often arise in such negotiations. A case in point, according to Dr Johnston, is the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords that brought an end to Sudan's first civil war. These accords were brokered by the combined efforts of the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Council of Churches. Then, as now, the Muslims were far more powerful than the Christians. When asked why they permitted two Christian organizations to serve as the mediators, the Muslims involved replied that it was because of the moral authority that

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<sup>82</sup> Johnston, 2003, p. 10.

they brought to the deliberations.

Finally, when pursuing a top-down strategy, it is important to focus one's efforts on the second and third-tier decision-makers as well as those at higher levels. Otherwise, the former may feel inclined to sabotage the peacemaking initiative if they either misunderstand it or conclude that it is going to work to their disadvantage. Johnston estimates that if the ICRD had been more mindful of this need, the time required to establish the SIRC could have been considerably shortened.

## **World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP)**

### *Description*

The WCRP, founded in 1970 and based in New York, is an international coalition of representatives from the world's great religions who are dedicated to achieving peace. It is led by Dr William Vendley. The WCRP works through affiliated inter religious councils (IRCs) in over 55 countries, and has an annual budget of US\$ 4-5 million. It is funded by a number of donors, including the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Although the WCRP is a secular NGO by legal definition, all of its constituents are religious actors. It can therefore best be characterized as a multi-religious NGO focusing on advocacy and service delivery, including in the area of conflict transformation.

The WCRP is organized on several levels. At the international level, there is the governing board comprising senior representatives of the world's major religious communities, and the international secretariat in New York. At the regional level, the WCRP has inter-religious bodies that represent different communities in Africa, Asia and Europe. The regional inter-religious bodies are built on different religious communities' existing regional structures. For instance, in June 2003 the WCRP inaugurated a new pan-African multi-religious structure called the African Council of Religious Leaders (AFRC). Its members include already existing regional structures, such as the Symposium of Episcopal Catholic Bishops in Africa, the All-Africa Conference of Churches, the Muslim Councils and the Hindu Council of Africa. The WCRP's regional structures mostly deal with peace advocacy. At the national level, the WCRP is organized via affiliates that include chapters (such as Religions for Peace Netherlands, Religions for Peace China) as well as inter-religious councils (such as the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone). The national affiliates usually consist of representatives of the country's different religious communities, but may also comprise women's religious organizations and/or religious youth groups. The national affiliates are mostly involved in service delivery. Additionally, major decisions concerning the WCRP's mission, its operations and activities, and its governing board membership are made during the World Assemblies convened every five years and gathering hundreds of leaders representing the world's great religions. Finally, the WCRP also enjoys consultative status with ECOSOC, UNESCO, and with UNICEF.

Geographically, the WCRP is active on every continent and works in over 55 countries. Its Conflict Transformation Programme has focused on south-eastern Europe (for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo), West Africa (for example, Sierra Leone and Liberia), the Great Lakes' region of Africa (including Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC), but also on countries such as Iraq. A substantial share of the WCRP's activities concentrates on conflict and post-conflict countries. Most of these conflict situations are not directly labelled as religious conflicts compared to non-religious

conflicts, which may justify the observation that the WCRP largely focuses on non-religious conflicts—that is, on conflicts without any particular religious overtone.

The focus of the WCRP's activities is on the national level. Although the WCRP has a strong international dimension, as seen for example in its World Assemblies, the national level is most important, according to the WCRP's director, Dr William Vendley. It is the WCRP's national chapters and inter-religious councils that act as the agents for advocacy and especially service delivery. They take the lead in activities in their own country and reach out to the grassroots' community level. However, the national affiliates do have the possibility of calling upon the assistance of the WCRP's regional bodies and its international secretariat. In joint consultation, the WCRP's regional and international bodies could then encourage national affiliates to play a more active peace-building role, could strengthen their peace-building capacity, and could further support peace-building efforts that they have already initiated. So the WCRP's strength is at the national level, and not so much at the local community level.

The WCRP exclusively supports and funds its affiliates' initiatives—the religious communities all over the world. In terms of funding and implementation, it thus completely works with religious actors, and not with secular ones. However, in terms of cooperation, meaning working together with partners for the sake of conflict transformation and reconciliation, it works with a wide network of organizations, including non-religious ones such as UNICEF and other UN bodies.

The WCRP is active in the areas of the child and family, disarmament and security, development and ecology, human rights and responsibilities, peace education, and conflict transformation and reconciliation. The WCRP's Conflict Transformation Programme, which was established during the mid-1990s, works around the world in areas engaged in armed conflict to mobilize and equip religious communities to serve as effective agents for peaceful change. The programme works with a special method that involves assisting religious communities to correlate, or work out, a connection between their capacities for action and specific challenges related to stages of conflict. Importantly, the method also makes clear what kinds of capacity building are needed to equip religious communities better for more effective engagement in conflict transformation. This challenge of equipping the religious communities is at the heart of the relationship of the WCRP's international secretariat and its national and regional affiliates.<sup>83</sup>

The WCRP has facilitated various multi-religious collaborations that have helped to mediate peace negotiations among warring parties, and to rebuild peaceful societies in the aftermath of violence. These multi-religious collaborations have often materialized into inter-religious councils (IRCs) that continue to engage in peace-building activities within their societies through the WCRP's support. The overall objectives of the WCRP's Conflict Transformation Programme therefore include: a) to deepen inter-faith commitments to dialogue and cooperation for promoting peace; b) to equip existing IRCs with relevant knowledge and skills in order to prevent and mediate violent conflicts; c) to strengthen the delivery capacity of the IRCs in the implementation of concrete responses to conflict situations; and d) to mobilize and equip religious communities to build new IRCs in conflict areas to serve as a mechanism for peaceful change.<sup>84</sup> In other words, the WCRP's core peace-building business in conflict and post-conflict countries centres around the IRCs, and mainly consists of promoting inter-faith dialogue and cooperation, of educating and capacity-building the IRC, and to a lesser extent of

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<sup>83</sup> World Conference of Religions for Peace, 2005, p. 2; Vendley, 2004, pp. 1-5.

<sup>84</sup> World Conference of Religions for Peace, 2005, p. 3.

encouraging the IRCs to participate as mediators in Track-I but especially in Track-II peace negotiation processes.<sup>85</sup>

### *Activities*

The WCRP's Conflict Transformation Programme (CTP) works around the world in areas engaged in armed conflict to mobilize and equip religious communities to serve as effective agents for peaceful change, thereby explicitly considering the gender dimensions of both religion and conflict. The following examples of the IRC in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq may shed some more light on the WCRP's peace-building efforts. For more information on the IRC in Sierra Leone, please see the separate section on the IRCSL.

Since 1996, the WCRP has worked with senior religious leaders and officials in south-east Europe's main religious communities—Islamic, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Jewish—to facilitate and support their efforts in cooperation and peace-building through establishing IRCs. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the WCRP's secretariat established a field office in Sarajevo in 1996, just months after the signing of the Dayton Accords and the cessation of armed hostilities. In late 1996, the WCRP successfully sponsored a meeting where Bosnia's four most senior religious leaders (Roman Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, Islamic and Jewish) came together for the first time since the outbreak of war. After various follow-up meetings, the four religious leaders publicly issued a Statement of Shared Moral Commitment in June 1997 and later that year officially established the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina (IRC-BiH), hoping to develop more communication between their religious communities.

The IRC-BiH provides a forum for confronting a range of institutional issues creating a multi-ethnic society in Bosnia. These include the reconstruction of religious monuments in ethnically cleansed areas and the restitution of expropriated property; the return of minorities and their clerical leaders to places from where they were displaced during the war; and the development of new laws protecting religious freedom and equality throughout the country.<sup>86</sup> Around 1999/2000, the IRC-BiH also played an active role regarding the situation in Kosovo. Following the Kosovo war, they facilitated a meeting in Sarajevo in February 2000 between the heads of Kosovo's three predominant religious communities. At this meeting the three leaders agreed to a Statement of Joint Moral Obligation. A couple of months later, the three leaders met in Pristina on the occasion of a visit to Kosovo by the IRC-BiH. In the end, the IRC-BiH helped the spiritual leaders of Kosovo to form the Inter-Religious Council of Kosovo and Metohija on 13 April 2000.<sup>87</sup>

With continued support from the WCRP, the IRC-BiH established five working groups, namely on legal issues, women, youth, religious education and media. Each working group has undertaken various activities that have contributed to Bosnia's peace and reconciliation process.<sup>88</sup> They have helped to create a law regarding freedom of religion and religious communities; established a wide

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<sup>85</sup> A possible fourth peace-building area is transitional justice. However, except for the case of South Africa where various WCRP affiliates, among them Desmond Tutu, have joined the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is not clear to what extent affiliates in other countries have dealt with this issue of transitional justice.

<sup>86</sup> Little and Appleby, 2004, p. 16.

<sup>87</sup> Adapted from Steele, 2003, pp. 145-146.

<sup>88</sup> For more information on the activities of each working group, see [http://www.wcrp.org/RforP/CONFLICT\\_MAIN.html](http://www.wcrp.org/RforP/CONFLICT_MAIN.html).

network of women who work together on projects to address society's problems; created dialogue between and equipped youth with the skills to prevent conflict in their own communities; and reached out to the general public through several publications, round-table discussions and radio programmes broadcast throughout the region. Particularly effective has been the work of the Legal Experts' Working Group. The IRC's Legal Experts' Group was formed as a branch of the IRC-BiH in 1999, with representatives from each religious community. Together they drafted a new law regarding freedom of religion and the legal status of religious communities and churches in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The text of the law defined issues relating to freedom of religion, the legal status of churches and religious communities, the registration of religious communities and churches, and the relationship between religious communities and the state. After the Legal Experts' Group completed its first draft of the law in spring 2001, the WCRP helped to organize four public presentations in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar. Approximately 25-30 representatives from all sectors of society attended each presentation to give comments and suggestions. Representatives from the IRC Legal Experts' Group (including a Bosnian attorney from the WCRP), national and international attorneys and representatives from the OSCE and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) were included in the meetings. Subsequently the Legal Experts' Group redrafted the law. In late 2002, the redrafted law was submitted to the Bosnia-Herzegovinian presidency's office for further review. In early 2003, the Law on Freedom of Religion was presented to the Ministry of Human Rights. Several meetings were held between the Ministry and the IRC-BiH Legal Experts' Group in order to finalize a few remaining issues, and in March 2004 the law was approved by the Ministry of Human Rights and passed the parliamentary procedure. For the near future, the WCRP aims to strengthen further the IRC-BiH and to link its efforts with those of other IRCs in the region, such as in Kosovo and with the recently established IRC in Albania. By creating regional inter-religious networks, the WCRP hopes to promote regional, inter-religious initiatives as well.

A final example of the WCRP's peace-building activities may be derived from Iraq. Three weeks after the American intervention in Iraq, the WCRP had set up a meeting with leaders from different religious groups in the country. A little later, in May 2003, the WCRP convened a summit of various of these senior Iraqi leaders from Sunni, Shia, Christian and Sabeen communities, hosted by its international moderator, His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, in Amman.<sup>89</sup> Afterwards, these leaders took various steps to establish an Iraqi IRC. They have countered calls for terrorism in their mosques, churches and temples, and have advocated at the highest levels for a permanent Iraqi government that protects all religious groups equally. They have also been assisted by the WCRP in implementing critically needed humanitarian assistance and conflict-mitigation strategies that are designed to promote tolerance among different religious communities.<sup>90</sup> For example, they got involved with 'strategic humanitarian assistance'—that is, with food distributions to Sunni Muslims by Shia mosques and to Shia Muslims by Sunnis. Christian churches supplied food to mosques for distribution to anyone in need. However, because the situation in Iraq has been so difficult, at the beginning of 2005, after five preparatory meetings with a committee to establish an IRC in Iraq, the WCRP had not yet officially established an IRC in Iraq.

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<sup>89</sup> World Conference of Religions for Peace, 2004, p. 21.

<sup>90</sup> World Conference of Religions for Peace, 2004, pp. 6-7.

### *Impact*

A rather clear impact of the WCRP's work in Bosnia-Herzegovina is—according to the WCRP—the passage of the Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Position of Religious Communities and Churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 2003. Drafted at the request of the IRC by prominent lawyers from the four religious communities, the historic law gives religious communities and individuals rights not previously provided in the pre-war 1976 Law on Religious Communities.<sup>91</sup>

In more general terms, the WCRP has discerned the following positive outcomes of its Conflict Transformation Programme:<sup>92</sup>

- Developed Conflict Transformation Standing Commissions (Global, African Council of Religious Leaders, and European Council of Religious Leaders) that strengthen coalitions among religious leaders of shared experiences in conflict environments and commitments towards common action;
- Increased awareness and support among the INGOs, UN, and other international organizations of the valuable and significant role of the IRCs in resolving conflicts and promoting peace;
- Strengthened the IRCs' capacity to resolve conflicts proactively, prevent further conflicts, and serve as major stakeholders in the rebuilding of just and peaceful societies;
- Increased the IRCs' capacity to serve as independent and sustainable indigenous NGOs that play a leading and constructive role in civil society development;
- Increased commitment among religious leadership to the inclusion and leadership of women in the process of peace-building, and increased the level of programming that includes gender mainstreaming;
- Established regional mechanisms for religious leaders confronted with violent conflict to respond to regional challenges and crises and address the root causes of conflict.

The WCRP's contributions to peace thus seem mainly to consist of challenging traditional structures (gender), drafting committed people to peace-building, the ability to connect different faith communities at various levels, and the encouragement of reconciliation, inter-faith dialogue, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

The WCRP's Secretary-General indicates three important lessons learned regarding faith-based peace-building. The first is the advantage of multi-religious cooperation. Multi-religious cooperation is important but does not require similar religious beliefs; rather, it requires that all of the participating religious communities identify deeply held and widely shared moral concerns as a shared platform for action. The advantage of multi-religious cooperation is that it brings great strengths. First, it can ameliorate tensions and conflicts among religious groups that can directly contribute to poverty. Second, cooperative efforts can be substantively stronger because of complementary and reinforcing capacities for action. Third, cooperation can bring great efficiencies in so far as cooperation on key trainings and service delivery through religious communities allows for greater economies of scale. And fourth, cooperation among religious communities on one issue can help to develop habits of

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<sup>91</sup> World Conference of Religions for Peace, 2004, p. 15.

<sup>92</sup> World Conference of Religions for Peace, 2005, p. 3.

cooperation that are relevant in other areas. A positive experience of multi-religious cooperation in one area builds a base for effective cooperation in another.<sup>93</sup> It is vital that different religious actors have an equal say in multi-religious cooperation. According to William Vendley, ‘in most places of the world today the Christian (infra)structure is overwhelming. Islamic actors and other religious actors usually do not have a similar infrastructure. This may be complicating multi-religious peace-building efforts, because Christian actors like the World Council of Churches cannot set the table for the rest of the world. Other religions must be part of the process right from the beginning. Religious leaders together must create the table’.<sup>94</sup>

A second lesson learned is that religious communities at the national level are the prime actors in peace processes, but not always the prime supporters or initiators of peace processes. According to Vendley, this means that religious communities surely have the potential for peace-building, but that they require external support and incentives to act as peace-builders. External international support is also needed when religious communities themselves are involved in the conflict. External interventions could then be required to delink religious communities from the conflict, to deconstruct the possible religious legitimacy for conflict, and to assist restoring the image of religious communities as peace-builders in conflict-prone settings. Critically speaking, organizations such as the WCRP should carefully consider how to separate harnessing the peace-building potential of local religious communities by enforcing them, in a top-down manner, to refrain from conflict and to work for peace. Or, as Appleby put it already five years ago, ‘eventually, vigorous leadership must come not only or even primarily from the New York-based UN headquarters but from religious leaders heading the national and regional chapters and IRCs; to the extent that the WCRP is perceived as primarily “a first world” organization with a vague *Pax Americana* stamp of approval, it will risk inspiring as much resentment and resistance as cooperation’.<sup>95</sup>

A third lesson learned is that the WCRP as a multi-religious NGO has a role to play in the field of peace-building and conflict transformation. Intervention like the one in Iraq right after the American invasion would have been impossible for secular peace-building agencies. At that moment, the Iraqi population did not sufficiently trust any external peace-builder and was suspicious about outsiders intervening in Iraq. However, the WCRP was trusted in Iraq, because some of the religious leaders on its board were closely related with some of Iraq’s religious leaders, regarding each other as family. This resulted in enough trust and confidence that the WCRP could directly start working with some of the most senior Iraqi religious leaders.

## **David Steele**

### *Description*

David Steele has been included in the analysis because of his long-term experience with the topic of faith-based peace-building. Steele, a Christian theologian by background, has carried out faith-based peace-building work for a number of different international organizations. Following a brief introduction to peace-building in the Balkans, under the auspices of the Mennonite Central Committee and the Life and Peace Institute in Sweden in 1993, David Steele initiated a religion and conflict

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<sup>93</sup> Vendley, 2004, p. 4.

<sup>94</sup> Personal communication by William Vendley.

<sup>95</sup> Appleby, 2000, p. 155.

project in the Balkans under the auspices of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 1994. During the first five years of the project, he carried out reconciliation seminars for religious communities exclusively. Later on, in the lead-up to the war in Kosovo, he started working with actors outside the religious communities, and became involved in back-channel communication between the United States and Serbian and Kosovo Albanian governments before and during the war in Kosovo, aimed at encouraging the Milosevic regime to allow the deployment of NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo. David Steele worked for CSIS from 1994-2002 in the Balkans on faith-based peace-building. He recently joined the Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group (Mercy Corps CMG), which is a merger between the international relief and development agency Mercy Corps and the Cambridge MA-based Conflict Management Group,<sup>96</sup> where he works part-time on the topic of faith-based peace-building.

### *Activities*

One of David Steele's key activities has been to direct an eight-year project (1994-2002) at the CSIS designed to facilitate dialogue and provide conflict resolution training through seminars for religious people in the Balkans. Within this project, Steele exclusively worked with religious communities. Given his background in Christian ethics and practical theology and in international conflict resolution, he felt challenged to bridge the gap between religion and conflict resolution. To gain access to religious communities, he could tap into the networks of his former employer—the Mennonite Central Committee—especially those of the head of the Mennonite's Balkans Peace Initiative, a man who had lived and worked in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1980s. While contacting Muslim Bosnians and

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<sup>96</sup> Mercy Corps CMG combines the conflict transformation and training skills of CMG with the relief and development expertise of Mercy Corps. Former CMG staff plus others within Mercy Corps now provide conflict-related core competencies to Mercy Corps' field operations as well as other traditional beneficiaries. Core competencies include conflict analysis, prevention of conflict escalation, facilitated problem solving, relationship building, conflict management, leadership development, sustainable community development, conflict monitoring and evaluation, and peace and conflict impact assessments. As part of the Mercy Corps team, Mercy Corps CMG aims to develop integrated programming right from the start. As such, the newly merged organization is currently engaged in joint programming in over 40 countries/regions. It has five staff members and no separate budget. It falls under the responsibility of Mercy Corps, which as a whole has over 2,000 staff working in 39 countries and an annual budget of around US\$ 160 million. While Mercy Corps itself started off as a faith-based organization, it has over the years deliberately distanced itself from its faith-based character, by for instance removing the cross from its logo. The CMG was never a faith-based organization, and therefore the newly formed Mercy Corps CMG is neither, and can best be labelled as a secular NGO active in humanitarian relief and development as well as conflict assessment, prevention, and management. In the near future, Mercy Corps CMG hopes to involve religious communities more actively in its peace-building work. Currently, however, the topic of faith-based peace-building is not (yet) a key area for Mercy Corps CMG. Out of the five staff members, only one—Dr David Steele—is working part-time on it, although some of Mercy Corps' field staff do communicate and work with religious leaders. According to Steele, the Senior Management of Mercy Corps is interested in the topic of religion and peace-building. At their request, he recently wrote a concept paper developing an approach to dialogue with politicized fundamentalist religious communities, examining how moderate religious communities might act as agents of reconciliation, and introducing the topic of religion and conflict resolution into Mercy Corps' activities worldwide. The concept paper is currently under discussion at various levels within Mercy Corps, with the expectation that the organization will, in the near future, implement specific peace-building activities with/for religious communities. Although Mercy Corps cooperates with various community leaders, including religious leaders, in numerous countries to build tolerance between various ethnic, racial and religious communities at both national and municipal levels, Steele regards these more as community-based development activities than as faith-based peace-building efforts that focus exclusively on religious communities.

Croatian Catholics went relatively smoothly, building up a relationship with the Serbian Orthodox Church was more difficult. The Church was rather suspicious towards outsiders, particularly Americans. However, through continuous dialogue, Steele gradually gained the trust of various Serbian Orthodox leaders, and managed to gain their support for, and eventually their sponsorship of, numerous inter-faith reconciliation seminars.

Steele's entry points within the religious communities were so-called 'religious change agents'—that is, religious leaders from among the local clergy and influential lay people, as well as hierarchy, who were open to inter-faith dialogue and reconciliation efforts. Some of these 'religious change agents' came from traditions, like the Franciscans, which are known for their peace-building perspective, while others came from communities known to encourage hardcore nationalistic perspectives. These 'agents of reconciliation' often provided the catalyst for dialogue. They, and those contacted through them, frequently formed the nucleus of those invited to the CSIS's reconciliation seminars.

The reconciliation seminars focused on community building among ethnic/religious groups and encouraged cooperative efforts between them. While most seminars targeted various ethnic/religious groups together, a few seminars also focused on members of a single confession or ethnic group, since such homogeneous settings were more conducive to the kind of internal reflection that was most useful in marginalizing extremist elements within the group.<sup>97</sup> According to Steele, creating dialogue between moderate and nationalistic elements within a given religious tradition can potentially confront the latter with perspectives within their own theological tradition that question their nationalistic orientation. When handled well, such an intra-party dialogue over issues of essential identity can lead to recognition, for the first time, of cognitive dissonance between values espoused and values acted. Bosnian Franciscans, for example, were able in a mono-ethnic religious seminar to speak more openly and thoroughly to other Catholics about their theological rationale for reconciliation efforts, thus building a better case against religious extremism, especially among undecided Catholics.

The seminars followed a six-step approach to help transform the participants' attitudes towards others. The six steps included: 1) processing grief by listening to one another's stories; 2) sharing fears in order to build trust; 3) identifying the other group's needs, which helps to rehumanize the enemy; 4) admitting wrongs done by oneself or one's own group to transform the relationships among the participants; 5) forgiving others—defined as 'giving up all hope of a better past'—a process that usually takes a great deal of time; and 6) envisioning a restorative justice that is bigger than punishment or revenge and that is based on meeting the needs of people rather than enacting retribution.<sup>98</sup>

### *Impact*

The reconciliation seminars for religious leaders in the Balkans have yielded a number of concrete results. First, they contributed to relationship-building between the different religious communities. Second, they resulted in a number of joint (humanitarian) efforts. Third, they laid the foundation for indigenous inter-faith institutions. Fourth, their methodology ('the six steps' approach) was later

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<sup>97</sup> Steele, 2003, p. 160.

<sup>98</sup> Steele, 2003, pp. 160-161. For slightly different approaches to reconciliation, see for instance Assefa, 1999, p. 42, who identifies seven instead of six core elements of reconciliation.

applied within a secular context as well. Fifth, the materials that Steele has written on faith-based peace-building work in the Balkans became required reading in the training of some US diplomats.

A living example of improved inter-religious relations comes from the Serbian Orthodox Bishop Hrizostom of Bihac-Petrovac in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a concrete effort to bridge the religio-ethnic divide at the close of one inter-religious seminar in Bihac, Bosnia, in 1998, Bishop Hrizostom led the delegation of participants to visit the mufti of Bihac. This was the first such meeting of Serbian Orthodox and Muslim leaders in this region since the war.<sup>99</sup> Another example comes from the initiatives of Father Ivo Markovic, a Bosnian Franciscan, who was an active peace-builder before, during and after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Father Markovic attended an initial seminar, co-led by David Steele, outside of Bosnia in 1993, during which he expressed the need to learn more about the application of conflict resolution theory and practice to religious peace-building. After the seminar, he became one of the principal figures that enabled the introduction of the CSIS's religious reconciliation seminars into Bosnia during the war. After the war, he was among the first religious leaders from Sarajevo to visit Serbian Orthodox people in the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale. He made 50 trips during the year following Dayton, visiting whole neighbourhoods of Serbian people, taking messages and letters back and forth between them and former Sarajevan neighbours, and taking Serbian young people into the city of Sarajevo to visit it.<sup>100</sup>

A clear joint effort was that at a seminar in Kosovo, a number of young adults, representing most of the religious traditions, decided to meet afterwards to discuss ways in which religious communities could work together to confront organized crime, and to turn other young people away from drugs, prostitution and the trading of weapons.<sup>101</sup> Another example was the determination of participants at an inter-faith seminar in Sipovo, Bosnia (within the Bosnian Serb Republic) in 2000 to raise public consciousness around the problems of corruption in Bosnia after the war. They convinced Bosnian Serb TV to air a prime-time programme highlighting corruption, its affects on society and the failure of political and religious leadership to confront the issue successfully.

Encouraged by the reconciliation seminars, the CSIS's activities were transformed into indigenous initiatives as the Centre for Religious Dialogue (CRD) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established in December 1998 with offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and the Inter-Religious Centre (IRC) in Serbia was opened in April 2000 with an office in Belgrade. The mandates of both organizations have been to develop further the work of training religious people in conflict resolution, reconciliation and peace-building. After a transition period of about three years (1998-2001), the two centres became fully independent from CSIS assistance. To date, they are active in not only their own countries, but in the broader Balkans' region. One example of this was an event sponsored by the IRC in Serbia that brought together religious leaders and educators to discuss how religion should, once again, be taught in schools following the termination of secular communist control over the educational system.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, regarding a third indigenous initiative, the CSIS project in Croatia resulted in the addition of a new programme arm, providing conflict resolution training for religious people, onto the already existing Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights in Osijek. CSIS

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<sup>99</sup> Steele, 2003, p. 136.

<sup>100</sup> Steele, 2003, p. 44.

<sup>101</sup> Steele, 2003, p. 161.

<sup>102</sup> Steele, 2003, p. 162.

seminar participants and consultants formed the nucleus of this programme arm when the CSIS project officially gave complete responsibility for these efforts to the Osijek organization in 1998.<sup>103</sup>

Moreover, the methodology that Steele applied to reconciliation seminars for religious communities, he also applied to reconciliation seminars for non-religious communities. The methodology thus moved beyond the faith communities to influence the peace-building capacity of the wider society. At the request of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Steele assisted in training OSCE staff on the role of religion in conflict resolution, using the same relationship-building process ('the six steps' approach) that had proven so successful for religious people. He also assisted in leading a number of workshops for municipal leaders and professionals, which was sponsored by USIP. Two of these were held in Gjilan/Gnjilane, Kosovo, in 2000 and 2001, and one in Virginia in 2001. The success of both the OSCE and USIP ventures indicates the value of utilizing practices developed in a religious context for other population groups. They demonstrate the potential impact that faith-based initiatives can have on the development of peace-building capacities, both within and beyond the religious communities.<sup>104</sup>

Finally, having gained substantial experience with faith-based peace-building in the Balkans, Steele was regularly called upon to speak about the role of religion in the Balkans in classes at the Foreign Service Institute. In addition to his lectures, materials he had written became required reading for all classes, not just those related to the Balkans. These classes were required for all US diplomats being deployed to the Balkans (or elsewhere) and represented recognition—on the part of the US State Department—that religion plays an important role.

Generally speaking, the activities described above seem to contribute to peace mostly in the form of altering behaviour, attitudes and negative stereotypes, drafting committed people to peace-building, and encouraging reconciliation and inter-faith dialogue.

#### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

One of the key lessons learned, according to Steele, is the tremendous difficulty that Western pluralists (religious or secular) have in creating dialogue with conservative religious communities that see their particular brand of faith as the ultimate expression of truth and their pursuit of its dominance within their culture, or beyond, as part of a divine initiative that will, by definition, bring good to all people. Most moderate Western organizations, irrespective of being faith-based or secular, are associated with Western, humanistic value systems and their very presence is therefore perceived as a threat to conservative religious communities. The Western pluralist approach, with its emphasis on tolerance towards the other, is seen as destructive and opposed to the values that the conservatives hold dear. The key challenge this raises, in the context of many flashpoints around the world, is how to establish true dialogue with conservative, politicized, religious groups. According to Steele, the question is not whether faith-based or secular organizations are better geared for such a dialogue; the key question is how to create a dialogue between equals, where neither side enters with a sense of superiority. It is therefore important, first, to realize that each of us automatically brings a certain value orientation with us into any conversation. We must not forget that secular humanism and Western liberalism are not universally seen as the broad-minded alternatives that they purport to be. The dogmatic certainties, pervasive ideology, and even coercive strategies that sometimes accompany this mindset are usually

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<sup>103</sup> Personal communication by David Steele.

<sup>104</sup> Steele, 2003, pp. 161-165.

apparent to the conservative counterparts. Second, it is therefore very important for the Westerner to avoid acting with a sense of superiority, and to regard the conservative religious communities as equals. To accomplish this, we need to build solidarity with ‘others’ on their terms—finding the points where we hold common or compatible values that can become a basis for common vision, utilizing wisdom from the others’ religious traditions to raise questions and pose alternative viewpoints. Within all religious traditions, there are elements of the tradition that can be used to stretch believers’ perceptions. The challenge is to utilize the conservatives’ own frame of reference to create cognitive dissonance *vis-à-vis* their current attitudes and behaviours.

Steele’s example of building up relationships with some of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s leadership is illustrative in this regard. Through constant dialogue with certain Serbian Orthodox leaders, he gained their trust, enabling the participation of Serbian priests in the reconciliation seminars and even the sponsorship of seminars by some bishops. Within the seminars, Steele was frequently able to motivate the Serbian Orthodox participants, along with those from other faith traditions, to acknowledge the wrongs committed by their own nationality against others. This was done by appealing to their own understanding of the importance of confessing sin. One instance that demonstrates this occurred when a Serbian bishop’s deputy responded to a call for acknowledgment of wrongdoing by telling the story of a Bosnian Serb commander confessing to him his involvement in a massacre of Bosnian Muslim civilians. The deputy bishop ended the story with a ringing call to all Serbian priests to acknowledge that their people had much to account for in the war in Bosnia.

## **International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR)**

### *Description*

IFOR—founded in 1919—is an international, spiritually-based movement of women and men committed to active non-violence as a way of life and as a means of political, social and economic transformation. IFOR has about 70 branches, groups and affiliates in more than 40 countries on all continents with a total of around 100,000 members.<sup>105</sup> It has an international secretariat in Alkmaar in the Netherlands, with eight paid staff and an annual budget of around US\$ 1 million.<sup>106</sup> IFOR can probably better be regarded as a spiritually-based actor committed to non-violence than a multi-faith peace-building actor.

Representatives of IFOR members meet every four years at an IFOR Council to decide on policies and develop international programmes. The Council elects an International Committee, which meets regularly between Councils to oversee the implementation of these decisions. IFOR’s international secretariat coordinates communication among IFOR members, links branches to capacity-building resources, and helps coordinate international campaigns, delegations and urgent actions.

IFOR works on issues of non-violence, but not necessarily in conflict and post-conflict zones. Only part of its work takes place in conflict-affected countries. It has branches in Bangladesh (for

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<sup>105</sup> *Branches* are formally accepted as a branch by the IFOR International Council, which is IFOR’s main governing body. *Groups* have developed a working relationship with IFOR and may eventually seek branch status. *Affiliates* are organizations of people that wish to collaborate with IFOR and that find the IFOR statement of purpose and programme compatible with their own spirit and programme (see [www.ifor.org](http://www.ifor.org)).

<sup>106</sup> The annual budget is 800,000 euro, which includes the IFOR Women Peacemakers’ Programme.

example, the Chittagong conflict), Israel, Palestine and Uganda, among other places. It has groups in Congo Brazzaville, Cambodia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nepal, and it has affiliates in conflict countries such as Sri Lanka. It thus works in conflicts that may or may not have a religious dimension.

With regard to the level of implementation, most IFOR activities are carried out at the grassroots' level.<sup>107</sup> Even though IFOR's international secretariat is active at, for instance, the United Nations in Geneva and New York, and although IFOR has members that operate at the national level of their respective countries, the lion's share of IFOR's activities worldwide take place with civil society at the local community level.

IFOR's activities are carried out through its members, which form IFOR's primary beneficiaries. IFOR's membership includes adherents of all the major spiritual traditions as well as those who have other spiritual sources for their commitment to non-violence. All members subscribe to IFOR's constitution, which commits them to spiritually-based non-violence. As such, IFOR's primary beneficiaries are largely although not exclusively, spiritually-based (faith-based) actors.<sup>108</sup> In terms of cooperation, IFOR works together with both secular and spiritually-based based actors. It has extensive working relationships with like-minded NGOs and CSOs around the world, such as Musicians Without Borders, Pax Christi International, War Resisters International and the World Council of Churches. Besides, IFOR has consultative status with the United Nations' ECOSOC and operational relations with UNESCO.

Because of IFOR's commitment to spiritually-based non-violence and building up fellowships of people committed to that vision, it is active in various peace-building areas Cynthia Sampson, an expert in faith-based peace-building, particularly refers to IFOR as a religiously motivated actor that is active in the area of non-violence training.<sup>109</sup> Specific education in non-violence is undertaken by the IFOR Women Peacemakers' Programme and by many IFOR members. According to IFOR's international director, David Mumford, IFOR is especially active outside the official education system. It is very much involved in training-the-trainer projects at the community level.

However, IFOR members do not exclusively focus on non-violence in education, but are also active in mediation, observing, transitional justice and inter-faith dialogue. For instance, the IFOR branch in Northern Ireland has also acted as an intermediary at the community level between civilians and the police, and civilians and the IRA. In addition, IFOR Japan is dealing with issues of transitional justice, by currently campaigning on the issue of Japanese compensation and an apology to the 'Comfort Women' who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during the Second World War. Moreover, IFOR's International Women Peacemakers' Programme is active in the area of observation, and sponsors a Swiss peace observer in the Palestinian territories.<sup>110</sup> The local IFOR branch in Zimbabwe has participated in training monitors at the recent election. Lastly, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, IFOR supports inter-religious dialogues among, for instance, Jewish, Christian and Muslim leaders in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Also, IFOR's Ugandan branch—JYAK—

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<sup>107</sup> See also Steele, 1994, p. 58.

<sup>108</sup> According to IFOR's international director, David Mumford, one exception is the rather secular IFOR branch in Belgium. Some IFOR members would be committed to non-violence, but would see organized religion as much a part of the problem as part of the solution.

<sup>109</sup> Sampson, 2004, p. 15.

<sup>110</sup> For more information on IFOR's Women Peacemakers' Programme, see <http://www.ifor.org/wpp>.

has been involved for several years in a multi-faith effort for peace in Gulu, facilitating dialogues, among other things.

### *Activities*

In its commitment to spiritually-based non-violence, IFOR is active in different peace-building areas, paying explicit attention to women's concerns in conflict and peace through its Women Peacemakers' Programme. Depending on the country's situation and the strategic choices about how to allocate limited resources, IFOR members undertake different peace-building activities. The below-mentioned example of the IFOR Ugandan branch's involvement in peace mediations in northern Uganda is not necessarily indicative for the peace-building efforts of IFOR members in other countries.

IFOR's Ugandan branch—JYAK (*Jamii Ya Kupatanisha*)—has been involved for several years in a multi-faith effort for peace in Gulu in northern Uganda. JYAK was founded by Bishop Nelson Onono Onweng as a peace club in 1988 to change the culture of violence in Uganda, and was registered as an NGO in 1997. In that same year it started in Gulu with a community vocational school. JYAK became a branch of IFOR in 1997, and contributed significantly to the creation in 1998 of the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI), which is analysed separately in this Annexe III. JYAK promotes non-violence, reconciliation, tolerance and common understanding among the different peoples, ideologies and cultures of Uganda, mainly through education and training.<sup>111</sup>

Just recently, JYAK—together with the Acholi Parliamentary Group and ARLPI, among others—organized an Acholi leaders' retreat in Gulu. The retreat, which took place from 23-26 June 2005 under the theme of 'Together, making a difference for peace', attracted over 60 political, religious and traditional leaders from Acholi.<sup>112</sup> It aimed at harmonizing the peace efforts of Acholi leaders and adopting a common approach in expediting the restoration of peace in the region. The retreat consisted of addresses on how to settle differences and disputes from a Biblical, Koranic and a traditional African perspective. It provided room for the Acholi leaders to discuss the divisions among them. President Museveni also attended the retreat, commending the Acholi leaders for openly condemning violence and indiscriminate killing meted out on innocent people by Joseph Kony's Lord Resistance Army (LRA). The leaders at the retreat came up with a 26-point declaration—the Paraa declaration—and called on the government together with development partners to design, develop and implement a comprehensive programme for the reconstruction and development of the Acholi sub-region.

### *Impact*

The Acholi leadership retreat resulted in a number of achievement and challenges. Some of the key achievements include the honest dialogue among leaders over obstacles that hindered their leadership for transformation; reconciliation among leaders who were not able to work together; former LRA commanders accepted before elders and leaders their mistake and asked for pardon, which was granted; acceptance and recognition that the Council of Chiefs (*Ker Kal Kwaro Acholi*) take leadership in championing the cause of peace and development in the Acholi sub-region; consensus on the Paraa Declaration among the leaders and government, which contained broad directions for the peace process in Acholi; and President Museveni's approval of the Declaration and offer for further dialogue

<sup>111</sup> Adapted from European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999, p. 491.

<sup>112</sup> The retreat was co-sponsored by the Dutch Embassy in Uganda.

on how to implement it. A major challenge of the retreat was the limited involvement of all leaders, LRA and grassroots' people, which should have led to wider support. Another challenge has been the broad directions of work by Acholi leaders, which need to be given a push to make them work. The Declaration surely needs to be operationalized by developing concrete action points and a monitoring framework for implementation. This example does indicate the complexity of measuring the impact of single peace-building events in the overall peace process.<sup>113</sup> Documentation/observation of peace initiatives, violence and other conflicts that result from an intervention could be a good measure of the impact of spiritually-based interventions, according to Reverend Onweng.

At the more general level, IFOR's contribution to peace has been most successful in the domains of dissemination of ideas, including on spiritual non-violence, challenging traditional structures and the ability to connect different faith communities at various levels.

### **Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)**

#### *Description*

MCC is the relief, development and peace-building agency of the Mennonite and Brethren in Christ Churches of North America, based in Pennsylvania. It employs 1,200 long-term workers in 60 countries, and has an annual budget of approximately US\$ 85 million. MCC has more than 80 years of direct involvement in international relief and development work, and over 25 years of international peace-building experience. It is regarded as one of the pioneers in the area of faith-based peace-building.

Rooted in the traditional Anabaptist values of non-violence, social justice and reconciliation, MCC has for a long time been interested in the topic of peace-building. In the 1970s it started within the United States to build the capacity of local churches and congregations to work for peace. Later on in the 1980s, it became internationally involved in peace-building, including through efforts in Nicaragua, Colombia, Somalia and various other (conflict) settings under the rubric of the International Conciliation Service. In the 1990s, MCC took the decision not to continue building its own peace-building training arm, but instead to support such training at institutions of higher learning (such as at Eastern Mennonite University (EMU)). This meant that part of MCC's budget was directed to sending local counterparts and its own staff to these institutions for (peace-building) training. Additionally, MCC decided to integrate peace work more and more into its international relief and development programmes, particularly through employing staff with specific peace-building skills to support and guide local partners to become peace-builders in their own local environment. MCC to date can thus be regarded as a relief, development and peace-building agency.<sup>114</sup>

MCC works in about 60 conflict and non-conflict countries all over the world, trying to integrate peace-building activities into its relief and development programmes. For instance, in the DRC it supports a local Mennonite peace association, which trained village peace committees in conflict transformation as well as published a peace education curriculum for primary schools around Congo. In Bosnia-Herzegovina it funded the Centre for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence in Tuzla, as well as Face to Face in Sarajevo for its work in inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue and peace-building.

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<sup>113</sup> Personal correspondence with Reverend Nelson Onono Onweng.

<sup>114</sup> For other descriptions of MCC's peace work, see Appleby, 2000, pp. 143-150; and see Sampson and Lederach, 2000.

And in Indonesia it partnered with Solo Inter-Faith Forum to promote peace in Solo, and with the Peace Centre of Duta Wacana Christian University by funding the development of new peace training modules.<sup>115</sup> MCC thus undertakes peace-building activities in both religious and non-religious conflict settings.

MCC's activities mainly focus on the grassroots' community level. Through local actors, it seeks to establish working relationships across cultural lines, especially among mid-level community leaders, which include religious leaders, village headmen, local elders and leaders of women's associations. MCC assumes that these local actors have the skills and traditions of peace-building, aims to remind them of those and build on them. It intends to strengthen local peace-building capacities through offering funding, training and other logistical support.

Clearly emphasizing its own Christian identity, MCC attempts—where possible—to work together with local (Mennonite) churches. However, it also cooperates with non-Christian faith-based partners, especially in settings where religion is a polarizing factor, such as in northern Nigeria and on the West Bank, and with various local NGOs that are secular in nature. Or, as Appleby has put it, 'the MCC aims to build relationships and introduce the biblical foundation, peace-building orientation and development philosophy of MCC to church and community leaders in the countries that have MCC programmes'.<sup>116</sup> At the more international level, it also maintains close links with like-minded faith-based organizations such as EMU and Christian Peacemakers Teams, as well as with secular organizations such as the United Nations in New York, to which MCC is accredited.<sup>117</sup>

MCC's core peace-building business is education/skills training in conflict resolution and peace-building, advocacy (to a lesser extent) and mediation (on occasion). In terms of education, it primarily aims to strengthen the peace-building capacity of local actors. It supports local counterparts to go on peace-building training at EMU in the United States, as well as sends out MCC workers specialized in peace-building to support local partners in bringing peace-building training to people caught in situations of conflict and tension. It is preferably engaged with long-term peace-building activities. In terms of advocacy, MCC is an active lobbyist for international peace issues, particularly at the United Nations in New York and the US and Canadian governments. Finally, in terms of mediation, MCC only at times sponsors someone to join and advise local mediators in conflict. More typically, however, it offers training to these local mediators, because it prefers to strengthen local capacities instead of creating its own teams of mediation experts.

### *Activities*

The first example illustrates MCC's support for peace mediations between the Sandinista government and a coalition of exiled Indian groups from the east coast in Nicaragua.<sup>118</sup> The second example describes MCC's inter-faith peace education work in Northern Nigeria.

One of MCC's earliest peace-building actions can be derived from Nicaragua in the late 1980s. At that time, a negotiations' process between the Sandinista government and a coalition of exiled

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<sup>115</sup> See MCC's website: <http://www.mcc.org/areaserv.html>.

<sup>116</sup> See MCC's website: <http://www.mcc.org/peacecommit.html>.

<sup>117</sup> There is a close link between MCC and EMU. MCC not only provided EMU with grants to get started; it also regularly sends staff and MCC counterparts for training to EMU, and it has a MCC representative on EMU's board. MCC also has a historical relationship with the CPT, which it helped to establish in the 1980s. To date, the CPT is an independent organization with its own steering committee.

<sup>118</sup> The example on Nicaragua is derived from Sampson, 2004.

Indian groups from the country's east coast was mediated by a Conciliation Commission of religious figures, which brokered a preliminary agreement between the two sides in 1988.<sup>119</sup> Commission members included a minister, Andy Shogreen, and three other representatives of the Moravian Church (the predominant denomination in the country's east coast provinces); a Baptist pastor and director of an ecumenical relief and development agency, Gustavo Parajon; and an American Mennonite, John Paul Lederach, who served as MCC's conflict resolution consultant. The agreement apparently opened the way for a substantial number of Indian refugees living in exile to return to Nicaragua.<sup>120</sup> Although subsequent rounds of talks failed to resolve the remaining issues at the time, a final agreement was brokered by former US President Jimmy Carter in 1989 on a trip to arrange for monitoring of the upcoming Nicaraguan election, thus opening the way for the remaining Indian leaders to return and participate in the elections. That agreement was signed in a Moravian church on the east coast, with the Conciliation Commission members present.<sup>121</sup>

The second, more recent example concerns MCC's Nigeria Peace Programme in northern Nigeria, in Jos in the Central Plateau, which started in 2001. MCC started working in Nigeria in 1963, primarily in the education sector. As more trained Nigerian teachers became available, it gradually became involved in other activities, such as income generation, health with a focus on HIV/Aids, handicapped services and peace education. MCC's active inter-faith peace involvement started in 2001 with the establishment of MCC's Nigeria Peace Programme. The programme embarked on a series of meetings and consultations in Jos with Muslim and Christian stakeholders involved in the conflict. After identifying the primary stakeholders, it started a number of inter-faith activities—that is, for both Muslims and Christians—including trauma-healing sessions, joint practical activities and inter-faith peace-building workshops to strengthen the resilience of pastors, Muslim leaders and other community stakeholders against groups from outside the community that attempt to incite local tensions. Programme activities targeted Muslims and Christians—those mostly affected by the conflict—at the grassroots' level. It has aimed at the personal transformation of participants and structural transformation of the conflict context, and has focused on sustainable peace. In 2005, the programme has been running for five years.<sup>122</sup>

### *Impact*

As the overall results of MCC's peace-building efforts—and of peace-building work in general—are difficult to measure in a clear way, MCC often relies on stories of incidents where conflict was averted. Furthermore, it looks at how participants of MCC peace-building programmes have utilized the ideas and skills in their own life and own peace-building work.

For instance, the MCC-sponsored peace-building activities in Jos in northern Nigeria have probably—among numerous other factors—contributed to improved community resilience against external spoilers. They managed not to react violently to violence that was externally exerted on them.<sup>123</sup> Additionally, the workshops have—to a certain extent—changed the attitude of individual Muslims and Christians towards the conflict. Participants have come up with the following testimonies: 'I am particularly moved as a result of this workshop, I am totally changed. I know that

<sup>119</sup> Sampson, 2004, quoting Nichols, 1994.

<sup>120</sup> Sampson, 2004, quoting Nichols, 1994, p. 82.

<sup>121</sup> Sampson, 2004, quoting Lederach, 1989.

<sup>122</sup> Tapkida, 2005, pp. 3-6.

<sup>123</sup> This is according to the co-director of MCC's international peace office, Mrs Judy Zimmerman Herr.

Muslims are not my enemies. I wish all Christians were in attendance at this training'; 'I used to see Christians as murderers but now my perception has changed'; and 'This workshop has changed my attitude against the "enemies of the gospel". I see them as products of a societal problem rather than as troublemakers'. Moreover, it has resulted in a number of organizational changes. Among others, inter-faith peace teams are being established in all the 17 local government councils in Plateau State to monitor the progress/indicators of conflict and peace in the state. An Emergency Preparedness and Response Stakeholders Committee is being established in Plateau for crisis intervention by the Catholic Justice Peace and Development Commission, in partnership with MCC. About fifteen inter-faith facilitators from both Christian and Muslim groups have been trained. And a peace office is being established for the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Northern Nigeria (TEKAN), with conflict monitoring and peace teams at denominational, district and congregational levels.<sup>124</sup>

Regarding MCC's support to the peace mediations in Nicaragua, one of the results of the Conciliation Commission, which was comprised of a small group of Protestant church leaders, was that it became the moving force in bringing the Sandinistas into negotiations with the Indian and Creole leaders who sought political and economic autonomy for their people. Their efforts not only led to a series of formal negotiations in 1988, but also substantially contributed to ending a difficult conflict within the wider armed struggle that engulfed the nation for nearly a decade.<sup>125</sup> Another result of the Commission's efforts was that after the preliminary agreement was signed, an increasing number of Indians who had fled the country in the 1980s felt safe to return home. In 1998, the year that the Conciliation Commission-mediated accord was reached, 7,948 Indian refugees returned home, a substantial increase compared with earlier figures.<sup>126</sup>

All in all, MCC's peace-building efforts seem to have contributed in particular to healing traumas and injuries, encouraging reconciliation and inter-faith dialogue, and to a certain extent to mediation between conflicting parties as well.

#### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

MCC argues that establishing long-term relationships, and building up trust as a common result, have shaped the success of MCC's international peace-building work. Generally speaking, the Mennonite congregations, MCC host country partners, and MCC's relief and development work have provided the type of long-term day-to-day presence needed for successful peace-building activities. It is, *inter alia*, these MCC relief and development workers—with their reputation for integrity, disinterested service, and long-term commitment—that inadvertently prepare the way for intentional Mennonite peace-building efforts.<sup>127</sup> For instance, the success of the Conciliation Commission in Nicaragua depended on long-term relationships and trust. According to one of the members, the Commission could play the role of the insider-partial third-party role because of the Commission members' local roots and ongoing presence in the situation, and because longstanding relationships of trust that crossed political boundaries made such involvements possible. The Commission's success could thus be attributed to its perceived integrity and the trust that this generated among the Sandinistas and the Indians.<sup>128</sup> In northern Nigeria, MCC's success also depended on long-term relationships. MCC's

<sup>124</sup> Tapkida, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>125</sup> Nichols, 1994, pp. 65-66.

<sup>126</sup> Nichols, 1994, p. 82.

<sup>127</sup> Adapted from Appleby, 2000, p. 145.

<sup>128</sup> Nichols, 1994, pp. 81-84.

peace worker, Gopar Tapkida, was able to gain the trust of the Muslim communities involved in the peace-building workshops from 2001 onwards, because in the 1970s and 1980s MCC sent teachers to community secondary schools in this region of Nigeria. These teachers, mostly from the United States and Canada, lived in these communities and were neighbours of the Muslim people involved. These community members trusted MCC's peace worker, because they remembered these teachers.<sup>129</sup> Other enabling factors, such as MCC's perceived neutrality, its focus on victims of violence and its less bureaucratic and practical peace-building approach also played a role in MCC's Nigeria Peace Programme.<sup>130</sup>

A second lesson learned that partly relates to the issue of long-term presence is the importance of selecting adequate local counterparts, meaning counterparts with good connections with the communities and regions of intervention, and counterparts that help MCC staff to grasp the local reality and the ways that local stakeholders perceive the reality on the ground. In the case of northern Nigeria, the MCC peace worker could establish contact with Muslims and Christians on both sides of the divide, because he knew the right Christian contacts in the communities that could put him into contact with the key Muslim stakeholders in these same communities.

A final lesson learned is that faith-based organizations such as MCC are relevant in inter-faith conflict if they are open about their own identity and respectful of the 'other'. One example of this is MCC's work in northern Nigeria. Another would be the work of MCC in Iran. MCC began working in Iran with relief response to an earthquake in the late 1980s. Through its work with the Iranian Red Crescent, it was able to register its interest in further contacts with the society. Since the early 1990s MCC has had workers placed in Qom, studying at the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, which is an advanced studies institute for Islamic clerics. This is an exchange in which MCC workers study about Shia Islam, and clerics from the institute study about Christianity at the University of Toronto through the Toronto Center for Anabaptist Theology. Although MCC has not (yet) engaged in specific peace work growing from this relationship, it may well be an example of the ability to operate as an actor with a clear Christian identity—being respectful to people from another religion and culture—in a context where Christians are strongly in the minority.<sup>131</sup>

### **Center for Justice and Peace-Building (CJP) at Eastern Mennonite University (EMU)**

#### *Description*

The CJP is based at EMU, which is a Christian university based in Harrisonburg, Virginia. The CJP started in 1994 under the name Conflict Transformation Programme (CTP), but was renamed in 2005. The CJP works in/on a large number of conflict situations, carrying out a number of practical faith-

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<sup>129</sup> Personal communication with Mrs Judy Zimmerman Herr.

<sup>130</sup> See Tapkida, 2005, p. 7, for a list of enabling factors.

<sup>131</sup> In the next five years, MCC will pay attention in its programmes to the so-called 'Inter-Faith Bridge-Building Initiative'. This is an attempt to pay particular attention to how MCC works at peace-building across faith divides. One assumption under which MCC is working is that when it works in inter-faith contexts, it is vitally important to be very clear about its own Christian identity. So far, MCC's sense is that if it approaches others with a non-violent spirit—in other words, if it really is peaceful, as it intends to be in its interactions—then it will be able to work with persons of other faiths.

based peace-building initiatives. Currently, the CJP has about 29 employees working as staff, faculty and administration, and an annual budget of US\$ 1.8 million.<sup>132</sup>

The CJP aims to further the personal and professional development of individuals as peace-builders and to strengthen the peace-building capacities of the institutions that they serve. Moreover, it builds upon the Mennonite Central Committee's experience in relief, development and peace work. It consists of a graduate programme, a Summer Peace-Building Institute, and a Practice Institute. The graduate programme provides value-based, applied education in conflict transformation and peace-building. The Summer Peace-Building Institute offers specialized, intensive training to peace-building practitioners from around the world. The Practice Institute (PI) in turn attempts to connect the CJP's academic programme with current practice in the United States and abroad.<sup>133</sup> The CJP can probably best be labelled as a faith-based and practice-based centre specializing in peace-building and conflict transformation.

CJP staff, graduates and alumni support conflict transformation and peace-building efforts in potentially violent conflicts in the United States and abroad. Especially through the Practice Institute, they are engaged in countries such as Egypt, Guinea, Jordan, Kurdistan, Lebanon, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Given these countries, the CJP is active in conflict situations with a religious overtone, as well as in (conflict) situations where religion is not a major factor in the conflict.

It is the CJP's premise that conflict transformation approaches must address the root causes of conflict, must be developed strategically, and must promote healing of relationships and restoration of the torn fabric of human community. Even though the CJP focuses its activities on all levels of conflict societies, and is positioned as a think tank for policy or as a preparation ground for leadership in governmental organizations like the United Nations or US State Department, it utilizes an obvious grassroots, community-level approach towards peace-building and conflict transformation, most clearly expressed in its field activities in the US and overseas.

In terms of beneficiaries and partners, the CJP's academic programme is open to people from all faith traditions. The CJP's field activities also target religious and non-religious actors. For instance, the STAR (Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience) workshops that the Practice Institute organizes in the United States and globally for religious and civil society leaders have been attended by a large variety of religious actors—mainly Christian, Muslim and Jewish leaders, and to a lesser extent Hindu and Buddhist leaders—as well as by a substantial number of non-religious civil society leaders. The CJP not only works with different beneficiaries; it also cooperates with a large variety of religious and secular partners, such as the Church World Service (CWS), several Christian Councils in West Africa, the Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy and the Lebanon American University. Despite the CJP's openness to a broad range of target groups, the majority of its beneficiaries and counterparts tend to be faith-based organizations and practitioners.

The CJP covers a wide spectrum of topics, including peace-building, conflict transformation, trauma healing and restorative justice. Its Practice Institute in particular is involved in a large number of practical activities, including training sessions, consultancies, peace-process design, conciliation, mediation and action-oriented research. The CJP's core peace-building business is thus clearly

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<sup>132</sup> Out of CJP's 29 staff members and overall budget of US\$ 1.8 million, eleven staff members (eight full-time) work for the Practice Institute, for which US\$ 675,000 is earmarked.

<sup>133</sup> For more detailed information on the graduate programme, Summer Peace-Building Institute, and the Practice Institute, see the CJP's website: <http://www.emu.edu/cjp>. See also the website of the European Centre for Conflict Prevention: <http://www.euconflict.org/>.

(practice-based) education and training, particularly taking place within the United States at EMU's premises but also in the field in different conflict countries around the world.

### *Activities*

Highlighting one of the CJP's various field activities, this section focuses on the STAR (Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience) workshops in Sierra Leone, an inter-faith activity carried out by the CJP's Practice Institute (PI) in cooperation with the Church World Service (CWS).

The STAR programme is an ongoing programme that was first developed for religious and civil society leaders in the United States in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks. STAR trains clergy and other care-givers to recognize and respond to societal-level trauma. It provides them with tools to help break the destructive cycle of trauma, and work instead towards healing. Starting off with training workshops in the United States, which include both US and international religious and civil-society leadership, it began offering contextualized training opportunities in conflict countries overseas too. After leaders of the Christian Council (CCSL) and Inter-Religious Councils of Sierra Leone attended the STAR workshops at EMU in the United States, they encouraged exporting the programme to Sierra Leone as part of the church community's psycho-social and trauma work.<sup>134</sup> This later resulted in the launch of a five-year STAR programme for West-Africa (2003-2007), covering the three countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The first West African STAR workshop took place in January 2004, in Freetown in Sierra Leone, and was attended by 46 Christian, Muslim and civil society leaders from Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Since January 2004, a number of other STAR activities have taken place in Sierra Leone. They have been implemented by PI and CWS in close cooperation with the CCSL. They have targeted church and community leaders, first to discuss their own experiences with trauma and recovery, and then to carry the skills learned to their congregants and communities. The workshop's curriculum focuses on healing trauma, an introduction to broad justice, security and peace-building issues, and how resolving trauma can promote restorative justice rather than retribution. After having followed one workshop, the participants actually applied the ideas and skills generated at the workshop. In this interim period, PI and CWS—mainly through staff at CCSL—provided them with further coaching and advice. The initial eight-day workshop was followed several months later by a five-day workshop, at which participants shared their experiences and challenges in addressing trauma issues in practice. So far 46 religious and civil society leaders have followed the STAR workshops in Sierra Leone. The PI is currently applying for funds to start new STAR programmes in the countries of Sudan, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

### *Impact*

According to PI's co-director, Janice Jenner, the results of the STAR workshops in Sierra Leone have so far been relatively successful. One tangible outcome is the establishment of the so-called STAR-Net by 42 former workshop participants, who together represent a number of religious and civil society organizations. The STAR-Net activities are guided by the CCSL, which receives financial support from CWS to do so. Tangible results of STAR-Net activities include: 1) local radio broadcasts on the issues of trauma and healing; 2) institution of a required STAR-based course for all students at

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<sup>134</sup> See the Church World Service's website: <http://www.churchworldservice.org/new>.

the Evangelical College of Theology (TECT) in Freetown; 3) development of materials for care-givers of children in difficult situations; and 4) inter-faith memorials/healing rituals and massacre sites.

In more general terms, the PI attempts to evaluate the impact of its STAR programmes in various ways. For the short-term impact, it holds questionnaires among workshop participants. For the longer term, it tries to track the participants to see to what extent they use the lessons of STAR programmes. Additionally, it attempts to grasp the programmes' impact at the personal, communal and societal level by documenting effects at each of these levels. According to Janice Jenner, these ways of evaluation are currently sufficient for the agencies that fund the STAR programme. However, she is of the opinion that a more thorough evaluation of (faith-based) peace-building efforts is required and that measuring the impact of peace-building efforts is currently and will continue to be one of the major challenges in the upcoming period for both donors and peace-building organizations. Despite this ongoing challenge of impact measurement, it seems fair to conclude that the CJP's main contributions to peace include the dissemination of ideas of justice and peace-building, as well as healing trauma and injuries.

#### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

One key observation regards the possible differences between faith-based and secular peace-building actors. Faith-based and secular peace-building practitioners and organizations tend to operate from different paradigms, each with strengths and weaknesses. One difference, according to Janice Jenner, is that faith-based organizations are more inclined than secular organizations to long-term peace-building activities based on strong relationships with local counterparts. Another related difference, she argues, is that faith-based peace-builders tend to be less results-oriented than secular peace-builders. According to her, this commitment to long-term relationships, and a less results-oriented stance are at the same time strengths and weaknesses of faith-based peace-builders. In addition, some—and only some—ecumenical peace-building organizations appear to have fewer specific peace-building and conflict transformation skills than their secular counterparts. In other words, some ecumenical peace-builders do not have the capacity to operate as professionally as their secular counterparts, although faith-based peace-builders often bring experiences and understandings to their work that give them advantages over secular organizations/practitioners. This calls upon these actors and their funding agencies to look beyond a faith-based motivation for peace work or a well-established network of local counterparts, and to regard peace-building as a profession for which an organization requires specific skills and experiences.

### **Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame**

#### *Description*

Founded in 1986, the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame in Indianapolis conducts research, education and outreach programmes on the causes of violence and the conditions for sustainable peace. It is involved in practical peace-building activities, such as running an international network of Catholic peace-building actors to expand its peace-building capacity, organizing capacity-training workshops for faith-based peace-builders, and faith-based reconciliation or mediation efforts in conflict situations on the ground. The Institute has an

annual budget of about US\$ 2.1 million (not including tuition scholarships), and employs ten core faculty, 39 faculty fellows, six visiting fellows and ten institute staff.<sup>135</sup>

The Kroc Institute is headed by Dr Scott Appleby, a well-known expert in the area of faith-based peace-building and the author of *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, and has among its core staff John Paul Lederach—widely known for his pioneering work in conflict transformation—as professor in international peace-building. It plays a leading role in the international discussion on faith-based peace-building, particularly on Catholic peace-building.

The mission of the Kroc Institute is integrally related to the mission of Notre Dame, which is an international Catholic research and teaching university. The Institute draws on Catholic social thought and teaching on war, peace and economic justice as it engages in dialogue and collaboration with other religious and secular traditions to strengthen the capacity for peace-building.

One of the Institute's research projects is the Programme in Religion, Conflict and Peace-Building (PRCP), which started in 1999. This interdisciplinary, inter-religious programme explores the complex roles of diverse religious traditions in contemporary conflicts. The PRCP encompasses the full spectrum of religious involvement in contemporary conflict, from the religious legitimization of violence to religious peace-building efforts, such as mediation by religious groups and efforts to promote inter-religious and intra-religious dialogue. Through deeper understanding of religion's multi-faceted role in conflict situations, the PRCP hopes to strengthen the potential for peace-building within all religious traditions. The PRCP hosts visiting fellows, including both scholars in the humanities and social sciences as well as religious leaders and peace-building practitioners whose research would explore the role of religion in a diverse range of religious, cultural and political contexts, including Hindu, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, Sikh, or Christian traditions and movements.<sup>136</sup>

Geographically speaking, the PRCP focuses on the religious dimensions of conflict and peace-building in regions including the Middle East (particularly Israel-Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey), South Asia (Kashmir, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh), Africa (particularly eastern and southern Africa) and south-east Asia (Myanmar and Indonesia). In general, the programme focuses on contexts where religious identity issues are part of the conflict dynamics and where faith-based actors or institutions have played or could play a role in peace-building.

Drawing on the work of John Paul Lederach and others, the Kroc Institute seeks to strengthen peace-building efforts by building closer links between initiatives at different levels, from the grassroots to the international level. The Institute's educational programmes, and particularly its MA programme in peace studies, educate peace-builders from around the world for a wide variety of career paths. Many move on to lead community-level or national peace-building initiatives in areas of conflict, while others take positions in multilateral organizations or pursue academic careers. The Institute maintains close contact with these former students through an active alumni network of over 380 peace-builders worldwide.

The Institute's work is inter-religious in nature. Its staff include Catholics, Mennonites and Muslims. In its research and international consultation work, the Institute cooperates both with religious and secular counterparts. It maintains close relationships with Catholic peace-building agencies (for example, Catholic Relief Services, Maryknoll and Sant'Egidio) and multi-faith peace-

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<sup>135</sup> Faculty and staff salaries and benefits, together with graduate student stipends, constitute about two-thirds of the overall budget. The remaining third is allocated for research and programmes. The figures are from 2004, and are derived from the Institute's *Annual Report 2004*.

<sup>136</sup> See the Kroc Institute's website: <http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/research/religion.html>.

building actors (such as the International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy), but also with a large number of secular actors such as NGOs, research institutes and governments.

While Institute faculty members are primarily engaged in teaching and research, they also serve as consultants on initiatives ranging from grassroots' efforts to high-level policy discussions. These include conducting conflict assessments and training for community-level and national actors in Nepal in order to prepare a peace-building programme, to the organization of an international assembly of 400 religious leaders in Spain, and the writing of a consultation paper for Northern Ireland's First Minister on improving community relations in Northern Ireland.<sup>137</sup> Faculty members have consulted with ministries of foreign affairs and UN agencies on issues including religiously-rooted violence, faith-based peace-building, economic sanctions and international counter-terrorism efforts. At the same time, the Institute has strengthened links with grassroots' efforts around the world through the Summer Institute on Peace-building for Catholic Relief Services and the Catholic Peace-building Network, which aims to share the best practices of Catholic peace-building efforts. In sum, the Kroc Institute's core peace-building business is mainly in education, teaching and research.

### *Activities*

This section highlights three examples of the Institute's more practical involvement in faith-based peace-building.

One example is the Catholic Peace-Building Network (CPN), which the Institute helped to establish in 2002 with other Catholic institutions, and which the Institute to date is coordinating. The CPN is a voluntary network of practitioners, academics, clergy and laity from around the world, which seeks to enhance the study and practice of Catholic peace-building, especially at the local level. The CPN aims to deepen bonds of solidarity among Catholic peace-builders, share and analyse 'best practices', expand the peace-building capacity of the Church in areas of conflict, and encourage the further development of a theology of a just peace. While it is a Catholic network, the CPN believes that authentic and effective Catholic peace-building involves dialogue and collaboration with those of other religious traditions and all those committed to building a more just and peaceful world. The CPN aims to contribute to Catholic peace-building through regular meetings, a clearing-house function, research and publishing, as well as through training and support. In July 2005, it organized its Second Annual Conference in Mindanao, the Philippines.<sup>138</sup>

A second example is the Summer Institute on Peace-Building (SIP), which the Kroc Institute started organizing in 2001 for the Catholic Relief Services (CRS). SIP is an annual event designed to train CRS participants in conflict analysis and resolution, to deepen their understanding of Catholic social thinking, to establish a long-term network of US-based Catholic peace-builders and their counterparts overseas, as well as to prepare CRS-related programming and planning. In 2003, for instance, 40 international aid workers for CRS participated in the third annual SIP held at Notre Dame. In 2004, SIP brought together some 35 senior CRS field staff and administrators, along with Catholic bishops and other local leaders from war-torn regions. This year the fifth SIP has taken place. SIP

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<sup>137</sup> See the *2004 Annual Report of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies*.

<sup>138</sup> For more information, please visit the CPN's website, <http://cpn.nd.edu/>, or contact the CPN's chairman, Mr Gerard Powers, [gpowers1@nd.edu](mailto:gpowers1@nd.edu), who is also the Director of Policy Studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

trainers usually include Scott Appleby, John Paul Lederach, Mary Anderson ('Do No Harm Approach') and Andrea Bartoli (Sant'Egidio Community in the United States).<sup>139</sup>

SIPs draw extensively on the peace-building framework developed by John Paul Lederach. Lederach provided support for the design, development and evaluation of Catholic Relief Services' justice and peace-building programmes in the 1990s. This involved multiple initiatives, including conceptual design with Baltimore headquarters' staff, programme design, and evaluation in south-east Asian and Latin American (particularly Colombian) programmes. Building on these efforts, Lederach, along with Kroc faculty member Larissa Fast and colleagues at CRS, developed a widely used training manual on peace-building published by Caritas Internationalis. SIPs proved an important testing ground for the ideas and exercises included in the manual.

A third example is the involvement of Kroc Institute faculty fellow and [associate] professor of political science Daniel Philpott in faith-based reconciliation in Kashmir as Senior Associate of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD).<sup>140</sup> In his work in Kashmir under the auspices of the ICRD, civil society leaders have come to embrace a vision of reconciliation through seminars in which they reflect on what their own faith traditions teach about subjects such as conflict resolution, social justice, the healing of historical wounds and forgiveness, and on the meaning of these teachings for themselves and their communities. Since September 2000, Daniel Philpott—together with Brian Cox of the ICRD—has conducted eight of these seminars, involving over 400 members of Kashmiri civil society on both sides of the Line of Control. The results have sometimes been dramatic, as in the case of a Hindu Pandit who apologized to Muslims for his insensitivity to their suffering in the conflict and forgiving them for their violence against Hindus, or of a Muslim man who forgave militants who had killed his father and brother eight years earlier and had riddled his own body full of bullets.<sup>141</sup>

### *Impact*

As an academic institute, the primary impact of the Kroc Institute is its research output and the achievements of its alumni. In these areas, the Institute has made significant contributions to the field of faith-based approaches to peace-building. The peace-building framework developed by John Paul Lederach in *Building Peace* (1997) is widely used by both religious and secular agencies to understand conflict situations and develop broad-based peace-building initiatives. Scott Appleby's nuanced analysis of religious militancy and religious peace-building in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred* (2000) played a key role in shaping the Institute's Programme in Religion, Conflict and Peace-building, which has sponsored research by thirteen visiting fellows. The PRCP is poised to publish an edited volume on religion and conflict in Africa, and a volume on women, religion and violence in South Asia. Related research by Rashied Omar, an imam from South Africa who coordinates the PRCP, examines Muslim approaches to peace-building and the impact of inter-faith initiatives. Current research being conducted by Dan Philpott offers new perspectives on the relationship of reconciliation and justice, with particular attention to religious approaches to these issues. In addition, the Research Initiative on the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict (RIREC)—a collaboration between researchers and

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<sup>139</sup> For more information on the Summer Institute on Peace-Building, see for instance the reports on 2003: [http://www.catholicrelief.org/about\\_us/newsroom/publications/2003\\_kroc\\_report.pdf](http://www.catholicrelief.org/about_us/newsroom/publications/2003_kroc_report.pdf); and on 2004: [http://www.catholicrelief.org/about\\_us/newsroom/publications/2004\\_kroc\\_report.pdf](http://www.catholicrelief.org/about_us/newsroom/publications/2004_kroc_report.pdf).

<sup>140</sup> For more information on the International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy, see the relevant sections in this study.

<sup>141</sup> Philpott and Cox, 2005, pp. 10-11.

peace-building practitioners led by John Darby, Professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies at the Kroc Institute—will shortly publish four volumes on the dynamics of peace processes in the post-accord environment.

The Institute's MA programme claims over 380 alumni originating from over 90 countries. Participants have come from nearly every continent and from a variety of conflict areas, including Israel and Palestine, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, the former Soviet Union, South Africa and the former Yugoslav republics. The Institute currently has graduates working in 68 countries. Several alumni currently lead peace-building initiatives that incorporate religious perspectives, including Zoughbi Zoughbi, director of Wi'am, the Palestinian Conflict Resolution Centre in Bethlehem; George Wachira, executive director of NPI-Africa in Nairobi; Lidia Zubyska, director of the Brussels office and liaison to European institutions and states for the Institute on Religion and Public Policy in Washington DC; and Nell Bolton, Acting CRS/Nigeria Justice and Peace Programme Manager in Abuja.

In terms of specific outcomes and results, the case of Kashmir may also serve as a good example. Asking themselves the question of how the faith-based reconciliation seminars create 'capital' for the peace process between India and Pakistan, particularly as it involves Kashmir, Philpott and Cox indicate two assets. First, the seminars have contributed to transforming the hearts of grassroots and civil society leaders on both sides of the Line of Control in Kashmir, as shown by the Hindu Pandit and the Muslim man above. However, they remark, such transformations alone are not enough. Civil society leaders must also be connected and coordinated with one another. Connectivity—the networking of civil society leaders committed to a common cause—is a second asset for peace that the seminars have generated. According to Philpott and Cox, the faith-based reconciliation seminars in Kashmir have created connectivity in civil society by giving rise to a 'core group' of committed leaders, as well as a network of 'cell groups' that meet together for mutual encouragement in reconciliation. The resulting connections are sometimes surprising: At recent conferences in London and Geneva, leaders from both sides of the Line of Control who had never met before discovered a common commitment to faith-based reconciliation formed through their involvement in the seminars.<sup>142</sup> Finally, if the assets of transformation and connectivity are brought to bear on the Kashmir peace process, it is through an organic linkage between these civil society initiatives and track-I negotiations. In the view of Philpott and Cox, this linkage should preferably be forged through creating two Kashmir diplomacy round tables, one on each side of the Line of Control, which would connect faith-based diplomacy in civil society with the work of track-I officials involved in the peace process.<sup>143</sup>

The authors are of the opinion that the Kroc Institute's contribution to peace-building particularly includes the dissemination of ideas on the role of religion in conflict and peace, ability to connect faith communities of different levels and not only the Catholic community, and encouraging inter-faith dialogue and reconciliation.

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<sup>142</sup> Philpott and Cox, 2005, pp. 13-15.

<sup>143</sup> Philpott and Cox, 2005, p. 15.

## Religion and Peace-Making Initiative (RPMI)

### *Description*

The RPMI is a programme that is carried out under the coordination of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). USIP is an independent federal institution created and funded by the US Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict, and is clearly not a faith-based organization itself.<sup>144</sup> Consequently, the authors have doubted whether to include the RPMI in this study. They admit that as USIP is a secular institution, all of its programmes are secular too. Nevertheless, they have included the RPMI for two specific reasons. One is that the RPMI is headed by Dr David Smock, who is a scholar of religion with a Masters in Divinity from New York's Theological Seminary, and the RPMI as such fits the selection criteria of 'the presence of religious clerics and/or laymen among its staff' (see paragraph 1.5). Another is that the RPMI is a good example of highlighting and strengthening the peace-building potential of faith communities.

In terms of contents, the RPMI builds on and modifies USIP's earlier initiative on Religion, Ethics and Human Rights, which primarily focused on the role of religion in world conflicts and the applicability of human rights' norms to such conflicts. After that, USIP decided that the emphasis of a new programme of this kind should shift from religion as a source of conflict to religion as a source of peace-building.<sup>145</sup> Hence, in July 2000, the Institute started a new programme—the RPMI. The purpose of the RPMI is to enhance the capacity of faith communities to be forces for peace. In other words, it aims to facilitate the resolution of international disputes through aiding the efforts of faith-based organizations, as well as to expand knowledge about the actual and potential roles of faith-based organizations in international peacemaking. Since its start, the Initiative has convened workshops and published reports on the contributions of individual religious communities and faith-based NGOs to peace-building; documented inter-faith dialogue and peace-building; facilitated information exchange and networking among religious and inter-religious peace-builders and initiatives; and it has been active in facilitating inter-religious dialogue among the three Abrahamic faiths or between Muslims and Christians in the Middle East, Macedonia, Nigeria and Indonesia.<sup>146</sup> More recently, the Initiative also started working on an Iranian inter-faith dialogue and a Sudanese inter-faith dialogue.<sup>147</sup> In 2004, the RPMI had a budget of US\$ 488,000, and in 2005 it receives a budget of US\$ 823,000. So far, the RPMI is ongoing and has no end date.

Looking at the countries in which the RPMI is working (for example, Indonesia, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Nigeria, the Philippines and Sudan), it clearly focuses on conflicts with a religious overtone. According to Smock, the RPMI works on conflicts between religious communities, particularly between two or more of the Abrahamic faiths—Islam, Christianity and Judaism.

Being part of an education and research institute that works with local counterparts, the majority of the RPMI's work is probably based in Washington and other capitals around the world. At this (inter)national level, it has organized numerous seminars, workshops, visits and briefings regarding the role of religion and religious actors in conflict and peace processes for varying audiences,

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<sup>144</sup> For more information, see USIP's website: <http://www.usip.org/aboutus/mission.html>. See also European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999a, p. 775.

<sup>145</sup> See Smock, 2005, p. 7.

<sup>146</sup> Sampson, 2004, p. 27, quoting Smock 2001a, 2001b and 2002a, and United States Institute for Peace, 2001.

<sup>147</sup> For more information on the Religion and Peacemaking Initiative, see <http://www.usip.org/religionpeace/index.html>.

including policy-makers, academics, faith-based organizations and religious actors at different levels. For instance, it facilitated a recent high-level visit of an Iranian inter-faith delegation to religious leaders in the United States, sponsored a conference in Cairo with Muslim clerics from the West Bank and Gaza to discuss the link between Islam and non-violence, and is preparing a conference for Muslim and Christian leaders in Khartoum, Sudan. At times, however, the RPMI also works at more sub-national and local levels, for instance in Nigeria, in Plateau State, where it supports the peace-building efforts of its local counterpart, the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre.

The RPMI's beneficiaries are mostly religious and not secular actors. That is, the majority, if not all, of the RPMI's local counterparts are inter-faith organizations that include religion in their work and in their peace-building efforts. It cooperates with, *inter alia*, Muslim and Christian councils in Sudan, Muslim clerics from the West Bank and Gaza, the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in Nigeria, and religious leaders from the United States and Iran.

The RPMI's core peace-building business is education and inter-faith dialogue. Next to educating and training local peace-builders in zones of conflict, it for instance held a two-day consultation on teaching about the religious 'other' in schools, universities and seminaries internationally. In terms of dialogues, it has actively facilitated inter-faith dialogues, including between Iranian and US religious leaders, religious stakeholders in Israel and Palestine, and the New Sudan Council of Churches and the New Sudan Islamic Council.

### *Activities*

This section elaborates on two specific RPMI activities, namely the Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue and the peace mediation efforts of USIP's local counterpart in Nigeria: the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre.

The Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue is part of the Institute's larger Sudan programme. USIP has been working since 1995 to advance peace and resolve conflict in Sudan. Through its research and studies, fellowships, grants, training, rule of law, and religion and peacemaking programmes, the Institute has advanced international efforts to bring religious and ethnic groups together to address their differences, develop peace strategies, and learn conflict resolution skills. The Institute's Sudan activities focus on five major themes: 1) promoting religious tolerance (currently through the Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue); 2) facilitating dialogue; 3) supporting research and education; 4) training leaders, including leaders of religious groups; and 5) raising public awareness on the situation in Sudan.<sup>148</sup> The Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue is envisioned as an opportunity to apply lessons learned from the Institute's experience of working with various religious groups in the Balkans and elsewhere. Hence, in late 2004 the Religion and Peacemaking Initiative started working with the Sudan Inter-Religious Council (SIRC), the New Sudan Council of Churches and the New Sudan Islamic Council of Churches to organize dialogue between Christian and Muslim leaders to promote post-agreement reconciliation. In February 2005, Dr David Smock, the RPMI's director, visited Sudan to prepare further the conference, which took place in July 2005. The Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue has not been USIP's first activity with religious leaders in Sudan. Already in 1997, the Institute held a major conference focusing on religious conflict in Sudan and options for resolution.

In Nigeria, the RPMI is providing advice and financial support to the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre of pastor James Wuye and imam Mohammed Ashafa, whose story is itself a narrative of faith-

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<sup>148</sup> For further information on USIP's Sudan Programme, see <http://www.usip.org/religionpeace/sudan.html>.

based peace-building.<sup>149</sup> In 1992 they fought on opposite sides of a religious conflict. Wuye lost his right arm and Ashafa lost his spiritual teacher and two cousins in a Muslim-Christian clash in Zongon Kataf. But in 1995 they recognized the warrants for peace in their two faiths. They established the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre and committed themselves to working collaboratively to promote inter-faith reconciliation. In 1999 they co-authored a book entitled *The Pastor and the Imam: Responding to Conflict*, which describes their experiences and sets out the Biblical and Koranic mandates for peace. Since then they have helped bring religious peace to the troubled city of Kaduna, and with RPMI support they have trained many religious youth leaders to be peacemakers.

At the invitation of the administrator of Plateau State, in November 2004 Wuye and Ashafa carried their message and skills to Yelwa-Nshar, a town in Plateau State in northern Nigeria, where in May 2004 nearly 1,000 people were killed. They gathered key leaders for five days of sharing and negotiation. No one had previously brought the two communities together for a face-to-face encounter. As facilitators, Wuye and Ashafa used a combination of preaching and conflict resolution techniques. The most remarkable feature of the process was the frequent quotes from the Koran by the pastor and from the Bible by the imam.

Although the atmosphere at the outset was tense and confrontational, on the final day Muslim and Christian leaders managed to draft a peace affirmation, which was subsequently shared with the two communities. The Peace Affirmation referred to issues such as the acknowledgement of local leadership issues, affirmation of the sanctity of all religious place of worship, the recognition of ethnic and tribal diversities, disapproval of the use of derogatory names for Muslims and Christians, condemnation of the unruly behaviour of Muslim and Christian youths, concern that some of their brothers and sisters are still at large having been displaced, as well as the intention to work collectively with the security agencies to maintain law and order in their communities.

Several thousand turned up on 19 February 2005 for the peace celebration, including many of those who had fled their homes in May 2004 and now felt sufficiently safe to return and resettle. The celebration was attended by the Governor of Plateau State and many other dignitaries who gave their support to the peace settlement.

A little later, Wuye and Ashafa turned their peacemaking attention to the city of Jos, the capital of Plateau State, which has experienced comparable religious violence. After three days of interactions between representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities, a similar peace accord was reached and signed.

### *Impact*

The outcomes and results of the faith-based peace-building activities that RPMI sponsors may differ substantially. For instance, the peace agreement that the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre mediated between Christians and Muslims in some of the most strife-torn regions in Nigeria is a dramatic success, according to Dr David Smock. However, the outcomes of the Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue are not yet known. Even the next steps are uncertain, and depend on the outcomes of the conference, which will hopefully generate a number of possibilities for RPMI to facilitate the peace-building efforts of Muslim and Christian leaders at the sub-national and local levels in Sudan. What RPMI does

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<sup>149</sup> This example is a summary of a larger case study on the peace mediation efforts of the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, written by Smock, 2005a. For additional information on the Centre and particularly on imam Ashafa's role in the peace work of the Centre, see the analysis of the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in Annexe III.

to grasp somehow the progress and impact of the Sudanese Inter-Faith Dialogue is to track conference participants and see whether they actually do become—or continue to be—involved in peace-building efforts.

According to David Smock, RPMI is not yet measuring the impact of its peace-building work as well as it should. RPMI did, for instance, contract with a local Nigerian NGO to conduct a post-facto evaluation with one of the peace-building training programmes for religious leaders conducted by the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre. Moreover, it did recently publish the report *What Works? Evaluating Inter-Faith Dialogue Programmes*, which elaborates on the need for evaluation of inter-faith dialogue and faith-based peace-building, and particularly on the need to assess their ‘effectiveness’. The report goes into different modalities and options for evaluating inter-faith dialogue and faith-based peace-building activities in general.<sup>150</sup> However, despite these attempts, there remains a need for RPMI and other organizations in the field of faith-based peace-building to develop better ways of measuring their activities’ impact. On a more general note, however, it is fair to say that RPMI’s efforts have contributed to peace, mainly in the domains of the dissemination of ideas on the role of religion in conflict and peace, encouraging inter-faith dialogue and cooperation, and supporting the mediation efforts of local religious actors.

#### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

Some of David Smock’s lessons learned regarding faith-based peace-building include the following.<sup>151</sup>

One lesson learned is the importance of selecting a credible local counterpart. For example, the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre in Nigeria was successful in peace mediations because of the respect that their founders—pastor James Wuye and imam Mohammed Ashafa—enjoy in Plateau State and beyond. As former religious warriors who are familiar in their personal life with the negative impact of conflict and who have turned into active religious peace-builders, they have a certain leverage in the eyes of the conflict stakeholders. Besides, they have the capacity to integrate successfully and modify Western conflict resolution methodology with religious exhortation and local custom, turning them into effective faith-based peace-builders.

Another lesson learned is that secular and faith-based peace-building are complementary and go hand in hand. Whereas the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre could initiate/facilitate the mediations in Yelwa-Nshar, the Governor of Plateau State and many other dignitaries in the end had to ratify the peace settlement. Another example is that of Sant’Egidio’s contribution to the peace process in Mozambique in the early 1990s. While it could establish the first contact between the RENAMO leadership and the FRELIMO government at its headquarters in Rome, it had to call upon the Italian government, advisers of the United States and the United Nations actually to participate in the peace negotiation process and to sign the General Peace Accord in 1992.

A final observation made by Smock is that ‘it is sometimes more productive to consider emotionally divisive issues when these are discussed by religious leaders than when debated in secular/political contexts. This is particularly true in contexts where governmental and religious authority overlap. When two communities share a faith commitment, even when the commitment is to different faiths, issues can be discussed that might be off-limits in secular/political debate. It has been

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<sup>150</sup> United States Institute of Peace, 2004.

<sup>151</sup> For a more exhaustive overview of lessons learned, please refer to Dr David Smock’s recent publication: Smock, 2005b.

even rather evident in the faith-based dialogue co-sponsored by USIP between American religious leaders and Iranian and Saudi religious leaders. Particularly with Iranians many topics that are off the table in diplomatic discourse can be discussed freely in contexts of religious dialogue'.<sup>152</sup> This may well encourage Western governments to be more open and more sophisticated in their interactions with religious institutions in countries where religion is a significant source of conflict.

## **Muslim Actors**

### **Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC), Kenya<sup>153</sup>**

#### *Description*

The WPDC is a network of 27 governmental and non-governmental organizations representing a variety of people—including businesswomen, elders and religious leaders—operating primarily in the Wajir district of north-eastern Kenya. It attempts to deal with conflicts in its communities at various levels. Although Wajir started as a local organization, it now operates at national and international levels in Africa. Its areas of activity mainly include education, observation and advocacy, with a special focus on intermediation, conflict prevention and resolution. For instance, Wajir initiated the establishment of a Joint Committee of Clans, composed of elders that mediate between conflicting parties, which has been quite effective in preventing conflicts. Wajir also organizes public meetings, discussions, conferences, peace festivals, peace days, workshops, analysis of root causes of conflict and drought monitoring data, instituting early intervention measures and training youth and leaders, which have contributed to conflict reduction in its communities. In its activities, Wajir uses both traditional conflict resolution tools, which require the involvement of the entire clan for the resolution of a conflict, as well as modern mechanisms. Traditional law seeks justice not so much through punishment as through material appeasement.<sup>154</sup> Wajir utilizes religious values and traditions, and cooperation from local religious leaders and elders who are well respected in their community and have significant moral and spiritual legitimacy and leverage. Wajir is considered a Muslim peace-building actor because it operates in an area where the majority of people are Muslim Somalis and where Islamic laws, values and traditions play an important role. For that reason, Wajir members incorporate Muslim traditional leaders and Islamic principles of conflict resolution and peace-building values. However, Wajir also incorporates other African religious leaders and traditions, in addition to Islam.

#### *Activities*

Wajir is regarded as one of the most visible and successful peace-building actors in the region. Its work is quite well recognized and often cited. Initially formed by a group of women to encourage

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<sup>152</sup> Smock, 2005b, p. 73.

<sup>153</sup> Information based on African Centres for Peace Education and Training's website at <http://www.peace.ca/africa.htm>; Nation, 1999, pp. 45; Jenner and Abdi, 2000; Abdi, 2004; and Reinhardt, [http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4\\_womenk.htm](http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4_womenk.htm).

<sup>154</sup> See Information based on African Centres for Peace Education and Training website at <http://www.peace.ca/africa.htm>; Nation, 1999; Jenner and Abdi, 2000; Abdi, 2004; Reinhardt, 2005; and European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, [http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4\\_womenk.htm](http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4_womenk.htm)

dialogue among warring parties in the Wajir district of Kenya, Wajir's activities expanded to different areas of Kenya after about five years.

For instance, Wajir intervenes as a mediator to resolve local conflicts in the Wajir region. One of Wajir's interventions led to a meeting of women from different clans to resolve the conflict at hand. 60 people attended this conflict and a Joint Committee of Clans was formed, which would act as a kind of vigilante body to diffuse tension and to report incidents to police. The formation of this committee helped to prevent conflicts before these conflicts turned violent.<sup>155</sup> Before, one of the major challenges that Wajir faced was the practice and attitudes of the community, which made women believe that they had no role to play in peace-building.<sup>156</sup> The few women who dared to do peace work faced intimidation and rejection. In order to overcome this challenge, women of Wajir approached young and elderly male members of the community who were interested and willing. They slowly worked towards overcoming bias towards women from within the traditional structures. Their success has contributed to a change in the way that women's role is perceived in their society. Consequently, women are now recognized and work actively as legitimate peacemakers in their communities and are more active in communal decision-making.

Wajir also held a peace festival in 1995 entitled 'Peace is a Collective Responsibility', where Wajir invited and funded the chiefs, who were generally the ones to mobilize their communities to fight other clans, to come to the festival. Wajir awarded the chiefs as peacemakers. Being awarded as peacemakers, the chiefs were confused. They all thought, 'I finance war and now I am not only being invited to the peace festival, but I am also being honoured at it, as a peacemaker!' This creative incentive altered the chiefs' psychology and led them to regard themselves as peacemakers. According to one member of Wajir, these police chiefs now think of themselves as peacemakers and favour resolving conflicts non-violently.<sup>157</sup>

A third example concerns Wajir's effort to incorporate peace education in schools. This effort, called Peace Education Network, resulted in the government's agreement to provide peace education at schools and to make peace education a part of the school curriculum in the district.

### *Impact*

As shown above, Wajir's peace-building efforts have, *inter alia*, contributed to: the establishment of Joint Committees of Clans to monitor tensions in the district and aim to prevent violent conflict; increased recognition of women as peacemakers in their communities; a change in attitude among local police chiefs; and the incorporation of peace education in schools. Additionally, Wajir's efforts to resolve regional conflicts also led to a major conference in 1993, where a 28-member committee was instituted, and whose outcomes included the 1993 cease-fire and the 14-point resolution, known as the Al-Fatah Declaration, which is still used as the basis for most conflict resolution in the district today.

Additionally, Wajir's example also led the community to take initiatives to solve their conflicts without waiting for the government.<sup>158</sup> Before, the community would wait for the government to resolve the conflict. Yet the government now involves the community to resolve the conflict without

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<sup>155</sup> European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, [http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4\\_womenk.htm](http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/4/4_womenk.htm).

<sup>156</sup> See Jenner and Abdi, 2000.

<sup>157</sup> Reinhardt, 2005.

<sup>158</sup> See Jenner and Abdi, 2000, pp. 17-18.

using violence. The movement's success encouraged more institutions and individuals to take active roles in peace-building, and the public started raising funds for peace rather than war. Mediation and other non-violent means of resolving conflict have been accepted, rather than violence. Many people started rejecting violence and incitement to violence on an individual level as well. These developments also led to a reduced level of violence in the district. Wajir's success has been influential not only in Kenya, but in neighbouring states as well, as they have been invited to share their experiences. More women and youth became involved in the peace process.

It is thus clear that Wajir has made a significant contribution to peace in the region, and through its peace-building efforts has contributed to altering behaviour, challenging traditional structures, mediating among conflicting parties, encouraging reconciliation and dialogue, and policy change.

### **Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA), Kenya**<sup>159</sup>

#### *Description*

COPA is a membership organization for building its members' capacity and providing support to existing service providers in Africa to achieve sustainable peace in the continent. It aims to promote peace and respond to conflict nationally and throughout Africa, particularly in anglophone, lusophone and francophone countries. COPA's activities include advocacy, education, inter-faith dialogue, and, especially, intermediation based on the traditional Islamic justice and conflict resolution mechanism of *Suluh*. In that respect COPA works with traditional cultural religious leaders in Kenya, Uganda and Somalia, where *Suluh* informs the communities' approach to conflict resolution to resolve conflicts. With regard to its advocacy work, in its response to *Salam's* survey questions, COPA states that the process of *Suluh* informs its training, research and advocacy work to influence Islamic policy governing community peace processes for reconciliation in the region. In terms of its work regarding education, it teaches peace education in schools, publishes books, videos and disseminates these among the population. It does not engage, however, in transnational justice and observation activities. COPA is considered a Muslim peace-building actor because it operates mostly among the Muslim communities and utilizes Islamic principles and mechanisms of peacemaking.

#### *Activities*

COPA works on projects that deal with network development, human safety and security linked to governance, linking practice and policy, peace education among youth, and rapid response to community conflicts. It supports networks (such as the Peace Education Network, as mentioned above) for teachers and students, training the teachers as trainers, giving financial support to undertake school-based activities, monitoring, bringing teachers together at the end of the year to share experiences, helping and funding case studies relevant to teachers' work and helping with printing and publication.

One example of a COPA activity is a joint project with Responding to Conflict (RTC), a UK-based organization, entitled Linking Practice and Policy (LPP). Realizing the risk that community-level peace-building might be destroyed by policies that ignore such initiatives, the project aimed at linking policy and practice. This project involved producing videos at community level, based on

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<sup>159</sup> This information is based on a self-description received by Dekha Ibrahim Abdi via email.

specific peace-building work in Wajir, Kenya; Somaliland; Daveyton, South Africa; and Gulu in northern Uganda. COPA worked with communities where the videos were made to distil the learning from their peace-building experience and create channels of communication between people on the ground and the people making the policies.

### *Impact*

The LPP project led to articulation of key themes, including critical research questions for further exploration in each country, such as: policing in South Africa; isolation and the need to revitalize and strengthen the traditional methods of conflict resolution and the role of non-state actors in Kenya; questions of long-term sustainability of the peace committees in Kenya; the need to evaluate peace and how to strengthen traditional institutions, gain recognition, and have elections free of violence in Somaliland; and how national, regional and global issues—including terrorism—impact on the local situation, therefore the need for early-warning mechanisms, early response, and community policing in Uganda. These themes were pulled together under the heading of ‘Human Safety and Security’, and exchange visits of communities, including peace practitioners, community leaders, elders and police have been organized, in addition to workshops.

The project’s impact has been recorded, based on interviews and questionnaires sent to participants.<sup>160</sup> The participants, for instance, noted:

- Enhanced capacity in the African countries that participated in the project by sharing experiences and developing common strategies, in addition to the learning experience via workshops and exchanges;
- Development over a sustained time period of strong case studies of community peace-building in different contexts in Africa, particularly seeking to identify good practice that can support efforts elsewhere;
- Video case studies in particular became a primary way to strengthen traditional African methods of conflict management and resolution, particularly with elders, chiefs, youth and women;
- Involvement of elders, chiefs and police officers as trainers and resource persons to market the traditional mechanisms of reconciliation and to integrate community policing to African countries/areas where such structures have totally collapsed;
- Involvement of different categories of people (such as the elders, traditional/religious leaders, local leaders, youth, women, NGOs, policy-makers, government representatives, law enforcement institutions and some community members), which has enabled a wide range of stakeholders and role-players within and between African countries in finding ways of undertaking joint activities (such as lobbying and advocacy).

An example of such a joint activity is that a number of community groups from many African countries are currently seeking avenues for engaging constructively with Continental Institution and Processes, the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) through the Peace and Development Platform (PAD). Finally, the project has also created space for the

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<sup>160</sup> In its response to our survey questions, COPA included a mid-term evaluation conducted by Rosalba Oywa, Nuria Abbulahi and Mxolisi Len Khalane in November 2004. This information is based on their evaluation report.

exploration of the Human Safety and Security concept, broadened the understanding of security to include not only the protection of people and their property or the military, but also as a condition that includes constitutional order, non-discrimination, no impunity and all issues of good governance, respect for human rights (including protection from abuses, humiliation, torture, ethnic cleansing and freedom of movement and speech), food security and other basic needs. As a result, current understanding of security now goes beyond state security to include local community development agendas and international issues (such as war, terrorism, struggle for power and control of world resources).<sup>161</sup>

Based on the analysis of projects stated here, COPA's contribution to peace-building thus includes altering behaviours, policy changes, dissemination of ideas, and encouraging reconciliation and dialogue.

#### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

A final remark is that in response to the authors' survey questions, COPA stated—with regard to its activities in Somalia, which is an Islamic country with a justice system that is based on the Islamic community justice system of *Suluh*—that Islamic practices and values inform its training, research and advocacy, especially to influence the state's policies to recognize Islamic policy governing community peace processes for reconciliation. From these communications, the authors got the impression that basing its work on Islamic values renders COPA's work more effective than basing it on secular, non-Islamic models and values. Whether this is the case for peace-building work in Islamic communities in general needs to be substantiated by further research.

#### **Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa (IFAPA), Kenya<sup>162</sup>**

##### *Description*

Coordinated by sheikh Saliou Mbacke of the *Muridiya Sufi* order, IFAPA aims to get religious communities across Africa to work together for the sake of peace in Africa, to deepen inter-faith commitments to dialogue and cooperation for promoting peace in Africa, to equip African inter-faith partners with knowledge and skills related to peace promotion activities, to respond to existing conflict situations, and to respond to the challenges of promoting a culture of peace in Africa, human rights and humanitarian law education. IFAPA attempts to reach these goals by building on existing frameworks, developing practical strategies, methodologies and tools for cooperative engagement by faith communities in the areas of conflict resolution, peace-building and promotion of a culture of peace. Its activities include capacity-building workshops for religious leaders in the areas of conflict resolution and peace-building, advocating for social justice and care for the vulnerable from government authorities, convening regional and sub-regional conferences on peace and dialogue in Africa, conducting a series of presentations, case studies and workshops by experts in the fields of peace and conflict resolution from professional and religious perspectives, and sending inter-faith delegations to express solidarity and mediate between conflicting parties. It thus mainly focuses on

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<sup>161</sup> Response to our survey questions.

<sup>162</sup> Information based on self-description, via email correspondence and responding to survey questions as well as Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa's website at <http://www.africa-faithforpeace.org>.

inter-faith dialogue, but is also involved in education, advocacy and intermediation. As IFAPA's coordinator is a Muslim religious leader inspired by Islamic values of peacemaking and tolerance, IFAPA is included in this report as a Muslim peace-building actor.

### *Activities*

One of IFAPA's major activities is a major inter-faith peace summit—West African Inter-Faith Peace Summit—which it convened in December 2003. The Second Inter-Faith Peace Summit took place in Johannesburg in South Africa from 18-25 April 2005. These summits aim to bring Africa's major religions to work towards peace and harmony and to deal with issues of poor governance, corruption and the HIV-Aids pandemic.

### *Impact*

Based on the directives of the first IFAPA summit, numerous activities have been implemented. Some of these have included:

- Distribution of copies of Inter-Faith Peace Declaration and Plan of Action to African Union, the Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa and East African Community;
- Letters to heads of states and mediators in peace negotiations in Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia, expressing the concerns of the religious community and urging the authorities to find rapid solutions;
- Three sub-regions have organized their respective inter-faith summits;
- A number of national inter-faith peace networks and forums have been established;
- Solidarity visits to Liberia to promote peace and a high-level inter-faith delegation visited Democratic Republic of Congo;
- Inter-faith peace missions in conflict-affected areas across Africa (Liberia, the DRC and southern Sudan);<sup>163</sup>
- Exchange visits between landmine survivor groups in Africa for advocacy and awareness-raising about the suffering of victims of war.

Exchange visits and peace missions aim at providing better knowledge of each other, expressing solidarity and contribute to the promotion of peace in the region. The IFAPA coordinator feels that as a result of IFAPA's work, it has 'managed to make people of different faiths "become friends" by providing a basis for human dialogue and interaction regardless of what religion one belongs to. Then religious misconceptions and prejudice are gradually eliminated'.<sup>164</sup>

Overall, as a peace-building actor in Africa, IFAPA is quite active and successful, as it is a big success in itself to organize a comprehensive summit where representatives of different religious communities from the majority of African countries participate, commit themselves to peace and inter-faith dialogue, and strategize. How to improve and encourage women's participation and role in

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<sup>163</sup> See IFAPA's website at <http://www.africa-faithforpeace.org/>.

<sup>164</sup> Email survey.

peacemaking was also included in the agenda of the initial summit.<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, regional meetings followed the initial summit, leading to the second summit in April 2005. However, it has not been possible to gather more information regarding concrete outcomes and results of the activities stated above, or how successfully each activity that followed these meetings was undertaken. Many of these initiatives and activities take time to produce outcomes, and a thorough evaluation of concrete outcomes and results requires a field trip to the region and interviewing members of the communities involved.

Nevertheless, the authors conclude that IFAPA's main contributions include the dissemination of ideas regarding global governance, HIV/Aids, and encouraging reconciliation and dialogue among different religious and ethnic groups in Africa.

### **Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, Nigeria<sup>166</sup>**

#### *Description*

Founded by the evangelical reverend James Movel Wuye and imam Istaz Muhammad Nurayn Ashafa, the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre's core business is mediation and encouraging dialogue among youth, women, religious leaders and the government. In addition, the Centre undertakes efforts to inculcate and promote the culture of mutual respect and acceptance of the diversity of each other's cultural, historical and religious inheritance; to propagate the value and virtues of religious harmony and peaceful coexistence; to serve as a resource body in conflict intervention, mediation and mitigation; and to cooperate and collaborate with other organizations with similar objectives at local and international levels.

The Centre uses Islam and Christianity as tools to propagate social justice, equality, healing and peace, and works to establish conflict management and poverty alleviation structures for youth and female victims of ethnic and religious crisis. For example, imam Ashafa is an Islamic preacher engaging in outreaching to excluded youth in order to promote peace and reconciliation among the religious groups within Nigeria and other parts of West Africa. He engages in building peaceful coexistence within his immediate grassroots' area as well as with students in teaching what the Koran instructs, including Islamic values and principles regarding peace. He works in areas of intervention in de-escalating ethno-religious crises in a community, state and the country in general. He also works in mediation between people of diverse faiths, as these issues relate to religious, social, political, economic and environmental justice. He works with grassroots' communities, NGOs, religious bodies such as *Jama'atu Nasril Islam* (JNI), and a government body—the Bureau for Religious Affairs-Islamic Matters.

#### *Activities*

The Inter-Faith Mediation Centre has been particularly active in various peace mediations in Nigeria. For example, as the co-founder of the Centre, imam Ashafa was an initiator of the peace agreement

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<sup>165</sup> See its website for more information, at <http://www.africa-faithforpeace.org/>.

<sup>166</sup> Information is based on self-description via email and a meeting in Washington DC on 21 March 2005. See also [http://www.interfaitheducationinitiative.org/8252\\_40888\\_ENG\\_Print.html](http://www.interfaitheducationinitiative.org/8252_40888_ENG_Print.html); [http://www.tools-for-peace.net/day3\\_wednesday.htm](http://www.tools-for-peace.net/day3_wednesday.htm); and <http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/cicr/ejournal/features/kaduna.html>.

between the religious Muslim and Christian bodies of Kaduna State, he facilitated the outcome of peaceful coexistence within the warring communities of the Birom and Fulani communities in Plateau, and he mediated in ethnic-religious conflicts in Zangon Kataf.<sup>167</sup> Because of these achievements and his contribution to peace-building, imam Ashafa, together with reverend Wuye, received the Tanenbaum Peacemakers in Action Award in 2000.<sup>168</sup>

In terms of educational activities, imam Ashafa and reverend Wuye also co-published the book *The Pastor and the Imam: Responding to Conflict* in 1999, as a guide for peaceful management of conflict and reconciliation based on passages from the Bible and the Koran.

In addition to his inter-faith mediation work, imam Ashafa also teaches Muslim youth Islamic values, and the principles and practices of peacemaking. Furthermore, he works on policies that will govern the standard conduct of religious clerics, and aims for a religious peace pact document, which will serve as a working document for the community to observe the laid-down rules and regulations. He also advises on the training of teachers and on the policy of training students with regard to the relevance of religious understanding among the various religious groups in schools.

### *Impact*

Finding out more concrete outcomes and results of the activities undertaken by imam Ashafa and his colleague reverend Wuye would require a field trip to the region and interviews with community members such as school teachers and students. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Ashafa's efforts are widely respected and his concrete achievements recognized by his community as well as the international community. Because of these achievements and his contribution to peace-building, imam Ashafa received the Ansarhdeen Islamic Merit Award for Meritorious Service to Islam in Nigeria in 1999, and, as already mentioned, the Tanenbaum Peacemakers in Action Award in 2000. His religious credentials give him the necessary legitimacy, moral authority and credibility to undertake peace-building roles in his community. His main contributions to peace thus include healing, altering behaviour, mediation, encouraging reconciliation and dialogue between Christians and Muslims.

### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

It is important to note that imam Ashafa was faced with various challenges in his efforts. Some of these challenges and difficulties include: the lack of understanding about the scope of peace itself; his efforts have been viewed by some as being for financial gain, or for promoting the personalities of political leaders that are trying to achieve peace in the community. Others viewed these efforts as bringing about a new-formed religion or because of the funding received from donor agencies. Some criticized them as promoting the West (for example, the US and the UK) and their economic development. Imam Ashafa also had to deal with misinterpretation of the Koran, using it to justify certain ends with conflicting parties.

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<sup>167</sup> See the Tanenbaum organization's website at [http://www.tanenbaum.org/programs/conflict\\_resolution/peacemaker.aspx](http://www.tanenbaum.org/programs/conflict_resolution/peacemaker.aspx).

<sup>168</sup> See the Tanenbaum organization's website at [http://www.tanenbaum.org/programs/conflict\\_resolution/peacemaker.aspx](http://www.tanenbaum.org/programs/conflict_resolution/peacemaker.aspx).

## Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD), Somalia<sup>169</sup>

### *Description*

CRD is an independent not-for-profit corporation that aims to promote the social, economic and political rebuilding of Somalia. CRD aims to empower Somali communities' transition to peaceful change by providing them with a neutral venue to identify their issues and set priorities for response, and it utilizes Islamic values, teachings and principles as a basis of action and guidance.

CRD's main activities include acting as an intermediary, advocacy, and education, mostly at local, national and international levels. CRD's activities do not focus much on transitional justice issues, observation and inter-faith dialogue. Its activities are usually directed at Muslims. They focus on women's and children's issues, but work with various target groups to achieve their aims.

CRD provides a neutral forum for dialogue and creates opportunities to discuss and address development and reconstruction issues that are of common concern to Somali society. It brings together actors from local and international institutions, civil society groups, the private sector, community leaders, and local and international NGOs. CRD identifies and prioritizes reconstruction and development needs, conducts action-oriented research and problem solving, develops recommendations for improved policy and practices, and provides people with the skills that they need to work through their own conflicts. CRD works with Somali political leaders, traditional elders, civil society organizations and religious leaders. It aims to provide Somali non-governmental actors with resources and skills for peace-building and conflict resolution. It has developed close partnerships with and implemented various projects and programmes with international organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Habitat, the European Commission, UNICEF and UNIFEM. It is also an affiliate of War-torn Societies Project International (WSPI), whose Somali programme is designed to assist local and national actors as well as the international community in responding more effectively to the challenges of overcoming conflict, preventing its reoccurrence and building lasting peace in Somalia. CRD undertakes projects aiming at demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration initiatives; reconciliation on land and property disputes; research on issues of political, social and economic rebuilding; and the availability and accessibility of justice for vulnerable groups, particularly women's groups.

CRD is considered a Muslim peace-building actor because it is established and run by Muslims, operates in an Islamic environment and employs Islamic principles, values and practices to promote peace and conflict resolution. In response to the authors' survey, CRD stated that because Somalia is an Islamic country, the social values and principles of Somalians are based on Islam. Connecting its work and aims with these values and principles therefore not only adds to their effectiveness, but also is *sine qua non* of its work. Moreover, the work and activities of the Centre itself are guided by Islamic values and principles, such as the Islamic principle that 'building peace is an Islamic obligation'. The Center therefore stated that it uses Islamic teachings as bases of action and guidance, which adds to its credibility and legitimacy in the community.

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<sup>169</sup> This information is based on self-description received via email. See also CRD's website at <http://www.crdsonalia.org/>

### *Activities*

One of the ways in which CRD aims to contribute to peace-building in Somalia is by bringing together actors from local and international institutions, civil society groups, the private sector, community leaders, local and international NGOs, and external assistance partners. It also provides workshops and skills' training in peace-building, and conducts research.

CRD is currently working with UNICEF on the Youth Peace-building Programme in Somalia to engage youth from various regions in Somalia.<sup>170</sup> The Programme focuses on training in peace-building, conflict resolution and advocacy and seeks to empower Somalia's young people in the areas of peace-building and conflict resolution. More specifically, 250 young Somalians will participate in this programme (50 per cent will be girls). The project aims to provide training and facilitation skills in peace-building and conflict resolution to a core group of 25 Somali youth leaders through training-the-trainers'/facilitators' workshops; to equip Somali youth from across the country with peace-building and conflict resolution life-skills and thereby increase their opportunities to participate in community-based peace processes; to facilitate the establishment of an effective network of Somali youth who are committed to peace throughout the country; and to provide a permanent forum for their continuous engagement in the Somali peace process.<sup>171</sup>

Another project in which CRD is currently engaged is entitled the Dialogue for Peace Project,<sup>172</sup> which among other things involves national reconciliation in Somalia. Through this project CRD is conducting an extensive process of public consultation on issues that are essential to peace-building and state reconstruction, which will involve meetings to be held across Somalia, bringing local communities, civil society representatives and Somali political leaders and international actors together to identify and agree on key issues and methods of addressing them in order to build a sustainable peaceful society.

### *Impact*

As both the Youth Peace-Building Programme and the Dialogue for Peace Project are still ongoing, it has not been possible to gather information on the concrete results and outcomes of the activities involved in these projects. Even though these concrete outcomes and impacts are not yet available, the authors argue that some of CRD's significant contributions include altering attitudes, encouraging dialogue and reconciliation, and dissemination of ideas. The authors reached this conclusion based on information received from the organization itself as well as information on its website.

### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

It should be remarked that even though CRD has faced various difficulties and challenges in its work, its beneficiaries and international partners value its peace-building work. Some of the challenges encountered by CRD include: lack of security; limited resources; and war profiteers. Moreover, deep mistrust among the people and political leaders and external influence on the current Somali dynamics are other challenges it faces. Based on the evaluation<sup>173</sup> of external evaluators, people that have

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<sup>170</sup> Based on an email survey.

<sup>171</sup> For more information on this project, see CRD's website at <http://www.crd-somalia.org/youth.shtml>.

<sup>172</sup> See also CRD's website: <http://www.crd-somalia.org/events.shtml>.

<sup>173</sup> This information is also based on self-reporting via email surveys.

participated in CRD's peace-building forums and members of the community who participate in its work, however, CRD is a respected institution that is considered neutral and where people can voice their ideas and concerns. Continued partnership and collaboration with organizations such as UNDP, the World Bank and the EU indicate that these organizations value CRD's work, contributions, professionalism, transparency and work ethics.

### **Idaacadda Qur'anka Kariimka (IQK)(Holy Koran Radio), Somalia<sup>174</sup>**

#### *Description*

*Idaacadda Qur'anka Kariimka (IQK)* is a radio station that was established in 2001 in Mogadishu, Somalia, whose core peace-building business is advocacy and education at the local and national levels. Towards that end, the station airs discussion programmes on important events and issues, educational and health programmes, as well as daily peace messages based on Islamic values for peace, justice and tolerance.

Until the 1990s there were only two radio stations active in Somalia. During the 1990s, Somali intellectuals debated and supported founding radio stations to support the peace process following the civil war. IQK was established within this context. In addition to providing the Somali community with media services, IQK aims to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Somalia by neutral and independent reporting. The station focuses particularly on the reconciliation efforts following the confrontations, by transmitting the appeals and meetings of the chiefs and clans, and absolutely avoiding the transmission of threats and menaces carried out by some struggling parties. Towards that end, the station emphasizes the values of Somalian society, which are rooted in the Islamic tradition. They emphasize the Islamic values and principles of peace, conflict resolution, justice, equality and tolerance.

#### *Activities*

IQK radio station is involved in a number of peace-related efforts, one of which is to air a daily peace message in a distinguished poetic style sponsored by the local Somalian organization DBG. The station aims to play a neutral party by not taking sides in political and tribal conflicts, as well as aims to promote understanding and cooperation among all parties by airing the different dialogues. For example, in addition to a special programme on Fridays, the radio also airs a daily programme for one hour where listeners discuss developments in their community with the aim of getting them used to listening to the other side. With these kinds of educational programmes, the station aims to alter harmful traditions such as the exclusion of various clans and depriving them of their rights to cooperate and intermarry. Moreover, the station broadcasts charitable deeds to encourage and publicize them. It also airs educational and health programmes that are relevant to society's needs. The radio station has cooperated with Somalian media internally, and with global media establishments such as the BBC, Independent Radio News and UNICEF.

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<sup>174</sup> The information is based on email and telephone communications.

### *Impact*

Journalists in Somalia have been pressured and harassed by both militias and different sections of the government. For example, on 18 March 2004 two IQK reporters were harassed and refused entry to report on a closing ceremony of a seminar being held by the Mogadishu police force at the Police School, which was officially brought to a close by the President of the Transitional National Government of Somalia, Dr Abdulkassim Salad Hassan.<sup>175</sup>

Despite these difficulties, IQK continues to serve the Somali community and to transmit a message of peace based on Islamic values. As a radio station, it reaches out to a large number of people, including women, youth and the illiterate. Even though the authors have not managed to obtain much information on the results and impact of IQK's radio broadcasts, it seems that its main contributions to the Somali peace process include: altering behaviour; disseminating ideas of justice, peace and rights; challenging traditional structures; and encouraging reconciliation and dialogue.

### **Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL)<sup>176</sup>**

#### *Description*

IRCSL was established in April 1997 by religious leaders with the active support and encouragement of the World Conference on Religions for Peace (WCRP). It can mainly be regarded as a multi-religious initiative, where Muslim actors play a role. Its Muslim members include the Supreme Islamic Council, the Sierra Leone Muslim Congress, Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Sierra Leone, the Council of Imams, and the Sierra Leone Islamic Missionary Union. Christian members include the Roman Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Churches' Council and the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone (an umbrella for eighteen Protestant denominations).

The Council was primarily inspired by religious beliefs in the promotion of social justice. The example of the Inter-Religious Council in Liberia, which was very vocal against human rights' abuses during and after Liberia's civil war, was another inspiration for the Council. Finally, religious leaders were urged by members of their communities to take an active role in stopping the violence and also in the peace process.

IRCSL mainly operates in the areas of mediation, inter-faith dialogue and advocacy at national and international levels. Rather than focusing solely on the Muslim community, the Council's work focuses on Sierra Leone's various religious communities. Among other things, the Council's most significant contribution to peace-building has been its mediating efforts between conflicting parties, which is its main area of activity. For instance, some of the founders had been active throughout the Abidjan peace talks in 1996, earning the respect of both the government and the rebels in the process. The Council's efforts have contributed to the reduction of violence, as well as the prevention of further human rights' violations.

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<sup>175</sup> See <http://www.apfw.org/indexenglish.asp?fname=report%5Cenglish%5Cspe1013.htm>

<sup>176</sup> Turay, 2001, at <http://www.c-r.org/accord/s-leone/accord9/society.shtml>.

### Activities

Some of IRCSL's founders were active mediators throughout the Abidjan peace talks in 1996. During the conflict, the Council became a bridge between the government and the rebel forces. Although IRCSL could not prevent the *coup* in 1997, it actively pursued dialogue with the *coup*'s leaders, listened to their complaints, and condemned the *coup* and human rights' abuses committed by the junta. They also tried to convince the *coup*'s leaders to listen to the population and international community and pressured them to return the country to civilian rule. Although they were not able to stop the violence completely, the Council's high visibility and engagement with the junta prevented greater abuses against civilians.<sup>177</sup> Their involvement and attitudes earned the respect of both the government and the rebels. When violence returned in late 1998, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy turned to IRCSL as a key player in the search for peace, to initiate dialogue between the government and the rebels. IRCSL launched a campaign for a negotiated settlement and recommended convening a national consultative conference, closing the border with Liberia, and the appointment of a peace ambassador. More specifically, early involvement with the rebel leaders secured the release of 52 hostages, including a large number of child soldiers. IRCSL also met with the heads of states of Guinea and Liberia. The Council appealed to President Charles Taylor of Liberia, whom they suspected had great influence over Colonel Foday Sankoh and his rebels. During the violence, religious leaders stayed in Sierra Leone to advocate peace. They issued press releases over the national radio and two international broadcasting services: the BBC and Voice of America. They wrote statements to those who usurped power, asking them to hand over power, held face-to-face meetings with junta leaders, talked through arm-radio/transverse, networked with partners, provided humanitarian assistance and finally participated in the Lome peace talks in June 1999.<sup>178</sup>

After signing the peace accord, IRCSL gradually became involved in various post-conflict rehabilitation and longer-term development efforts. In 1999, for instance, it provided strategic humanitarian assistance and, as a credible and neutral voice for peace, distributed bags of rice to both sides of the dividing line. Later, in February 2001, WCRP facilitated a strategic planning workshop for IRCSL that addressed the Council's future priorities and plans. In addition, IRCSL and WCRP conducted human rights' training that was focused on preparing trainers for each of the four regions of Sierra Leone in which IRCSL had established committees. Throughout 2002-2003, IRCSL continued its peace-building work, including by conducting human rights' training seminars throughout Sierra Leone, sponsoring national days of prayer and reconciliation, engaging in multimedia programmes promoting religious tolerance, and making numerous public statements urging all stakeholders to fulfil their commitments for peace. In that same period, IRCSL also organized national, regional and district conferences to educate the population on the newly established Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), into which IRCSL's President was nominated in 2002 as the President of the TRC for Sierra Leone. In October 2003, after various preparatory meetings facilitated by WCRP, IRCSL—together with IRC Liberia, IRC Guinea and the Forum of Religious Confessions Côte d'Ivoire—formed the West Africa Inter-Religious Coordinating Committee (WACC), which serves as an inter-religious network to support regional initiatives for the advancement of peace, stability and security in West

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<sup>177</sup> See Turay, 2001, at <http://www.c-r.org/accord/s-leone/accord9/society.shtml>.

<sup>178</sup> 'Case Study 2: Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone', presented at Inter-Faith Peace Summit in Africa on 14-19 October 2002, Johannesburg, South Africa. See Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa's website at <http://www.africa-faithforpeace.org/programs.php>.

Africa. Since 2004, IRCSL has also served on a collaborative forum that is responsible for monitoring the Special Court of Sierra Leone.<sup>179</sup>

### *Impact*

IRCSL's involvement in Sierra Leone's peace process has led to various outcomes and results. These Council activities seem to have contributed to the restoration of democratically elected government; disarmament, demobilization and now reintegration of ex-combatants; and institution of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. Moreover, 'the Council's active role in encouraging and promoting the negotiations that resulted in the Lome Agreement [in 1999] was recognized by giving IRCSL a predominant role in the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders, which was to be established to mediate disputes of interpretation of the accord'.<sup>180</sup>

### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

Although the impact of IRCSL's involvement was quite positive, it was not without costs and challenges. First, the process took a long time and the Council's persistent, resolute involvement. Some religious leaders left the Council and joined the rebels, and in the process some lost their lives; others felt threatened and afraid of the Council's ventures, so they withdrew; and many became pliable and played double roles.<sup>181</sup> One lesson learned was that religious leaders should avoid taking sides on national political matters, which does not mean, as indicated above, that they have no role to play in mediation.

Against these challenges, the Council has proved successful in encouraging reconciliation and dialogue, connecting with other religious leaders, as well as other segments of society, and mediation.

## **Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace or Sudanese Women's Initiative for Peace**

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### *Description*

The Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace is mainly an advocacy group for bringing about peace and development in Sudan. Other areas of activity include education, inter-faith dialogue and research. As part of the Royal Netherlands Embassy's initiative, the Network works with other groups in Sudan to advocate peace and development. It also engages in the education of adults and children for peace and development, conflict resolution training and conference organizing. The group especially focuses on women, both Muslim and non-Muslim, and works towards integrating women's agendas into the peace process. It intends to unite women of Sudan, irrespective of religion, ethnic or racial origin, especially in areas of conflict such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Beja and Blue Nile. In these efforts, the Network works with civil society organizations, government, opposition and other parties to include women's issues into the peace process, particularly the Inter-Governmental

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<sup>179</sup> For more information, see WCRP's website: [www.wcrp.org/RforP/CONFLICT\\_MAIN.html](http://www.wcrp.org/RforP/CONFLICT_MAIN.html). For more information on other IRCs like the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina, also see the analysis of WCRP in paragraph 4.2.

<sup>180</sup> Turay, 2001, p. 5.

<sup>181</sup> 'Case Study 2: Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone'.

<sup>182</sup> This information is based on email communications and response to our survey questions.

Authority on Development (IGAD) process. In its work, the Network employs Islamic values of peace, with a particular emphasis on Islamic ideas of respecting ethnic, racial and religious diversity, respect for human life, and tolerance. This is an integral aspect of its work, as Sudan is an Islamic state with a non-Muslim minority, and Islamic values play a crucial role in the social life of the Muslim community as well as government policies. One of the Network's important achievements was to organize the Maastricht Conference in 2000, and to issue the Maastricht Declaration of Sudanese Women's Peace Initiative.

#### *Activities and Impact*

The advocacy work of the Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace, in developing a women's agenda for peace contributed to the Sudanese peace agenda's orientation towards all civil society groups and other community members as well as educating these groups on the peace process, and thus to policy change. This was a novel development that had never happened before. Its work also contributed to the inclusion of women's perspectives and issues in the peace process, thus challenging traditional perceptions and structures. It was also able to build solidarity among Sudanese women from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. The Network also worked to organize the Maastricht Conference in 2000, which issued the Maastricht Declaration of Sudanese Women's Peace Initiative.<sup>183</sup> However, it is not possible to collect more information on the concrete outcomes and results of these activities without a field trip to the region and interviewing different members of the community.

#### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

Similar to many other Muslim peace-building actors, the Network faced various difficulties, including the negative perception of women's role in the public space. However, the Network's success and persistence contributed to challenging traditional structures and changing attitudes towards women.

Another challenge faced by the Network was the misunderstanding between it and the Netherlands' initiative. When the initiative was first launched, Sudanese people were not clear about its goals and objectives. There was a suspicion that the initiative wanted to use Sudanese women for its own interest. Even the women involved in the initiative were not fully convinced by the process. Based on this miscommunication, an initial mistrust developed between the initiative and the Sudanese people. Moreover, Sudanese women were not accustomed to being involved in the peace process because of the way in which women were perceived in their community. They felt that the project's aims and participation in the peace process were something they could never reach. However, these misperceptions and mistrust faded away after the first year of the initiative as the Sudanese women started taking the lead, and also ownership of the initiative, as well as seeing the positive impact of their involvement. The Network is therefore now convinced that this project and its involvement enabled them to challenge and, to a degree, change the traditional structures.

In conclusion, the authors think that the initiative's main contributions to the peace process have been in the areas of policy change, challenging (gender) structures and dissemination of ideas.

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<sup>183</sup> See also Africa Faith and Justice Network's website at <http://afjn.cua.edu/Archive/sudan.maastricht.cfm>.

## Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI), Uganda<sup>184</sup>

### Description

ARLPI is a multi-faith peace group in northern Uganda that provides a proactive response to conflicts through community-based mediation services, advocacy and lobbying and peace-building activities.

ARLPI's core business is mediation and observation. ARLPI's specific activities include workshops and education projects, reporting facts about the war and violence, advocating human rights and peace, organizing peace rallies and prayers, and mediation. ARLPI has established a network of peace committees in the main centres throughout the Acholi sub-region. It trained Volunteer Peace Animators (VPA) for both Gulu and Kitgum districts, and it managed to establish rapid response teams and a peace forum engaging youth, elders and women in the peace process. It also initiated a meeting with fighting clan members and negotiated a document known as the Al Fatah Declaration, which constituted the bases for a peace settlement between feuding clans.<sup>185</sup> Moreover, it has mediated in violent conflict between the Acholi and their Jie neighbours, between Teso and Karimojong rural communities, and also between rebels and the government. Because of its efforts for peace, ARLPI received the Japanese Niwano Peace award in 2004.<sup>186</sup>

In this report, ARLPI is categorized as a Muslim peace-building organization, because some of its leaders are Muslim religious leaders, such as Sheikh Musa from the Qadi district of Kitgum, Suleiman Wadrif from the Qadi district of Gulu,<sup>187</sup> and Lanyero Karima Obina from the Acholi Muslim Youth and Women's Association.<sup>188</sup>

### Activities

One example of an ARLPI activity is its effort to mediate between the government of Uganda (GoU) and the rebel group Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has won ARLPI international recognition as the voice of the suffering people in northern Uganda. Soon after the launch in 2002 by the Ugandan Army of 'Operation Iron Fist' inside Sudan—a move publicly opposed by ARLPI—some of the main religious leaders, together with some traditional cultural leaders, after gaining the government's consent, started meeting with rebel top commanders to form a bridge between the rebels and the GoU. 21 meetings of this kind have taken place, often amid high risks, misunderstandings and threats. Despite all these trials, ARLPI's position regarding a peaceful end to the conflict has remained firm.

Another activity in which ARLPI is currently engaged is the project entitled Community Mediation and Peace-Building Programme (CMPP), which aims at enhancing the community's capacity to engage in non-violent conflict resolution and peace-building in northern Uganda.

For additional information on multi-faith peace-building efforts in northern Uganda, also see the analysis of IFOR's Ugandan branch: JYAK (*Jamii Ya Kupatanisha*).

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<sup>184</sup> The information is based on Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative's website at <http://www.acholipeace.org/>; and also [http://www.overcomingviolence.org/dov\\_nsf/0/6c8f93db004feefac1256dc10051e61f?OpenDocument](http://www.overcomingviolence.org/dov_nsf/0/6c8f93db004feefac1256dc10051e61f?OpenDocument); and <http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/therole.shtml>.

<sup>185</sup> Beyna, Lund, Stacker, Tuthil and Vondal, 2001, p. 18, at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ICT/research/ICT>.

<sup>186</sup> <http://www.interfaithnews.net/wp/2004/07/15/niwano-peace-prize-awarded-to-ugandan-interfaith-organization/>

<sup>187</sup> <http://www.km-net.org/about/partners/arig/intro.htm>

<sup>188</sup> <http://www.cpwr.org/2004Parliament/news/advisory.2004.07.13.htm>

### *Impact*

ARLPI's mediation efforts between the GoU and the LRA have not yet resulted in any kind of peace accord. Very practically, however, ARLPI's contacts with the rebel officers have led some rebel officers to lay down their arms and to take advantage of the current government's amnesty.<sup>189</sup>

The specific outcomes and results of the CMPP's project are not yet clear, as the project is still ongoing. Based on ARLPI's previous experience, targeted project results will most probably include:

- Strengthening inter-faith networks for peace;
- Strengthening the capacity of community members in peace-building;
- Strengthening peace mediation and mediation services;
- Enhancing and strengthening advocacy and research on peaceful dialogue at local, national, and international levels;
- Enhancing community coping mechanisms for resettlement and reintegration of people from and within the internally displaced persons' camps and those displaced in other districts;
- Improving the women's capacity to engage in non-violent approaches to conflict resolution and peace-building;
- Improving the management and coordination of ARLPI's programme.<sup>190</sup>

Other expected impacts of the project include:

- Members of the community will reconcile;
- The GoU and LRA will be able to sit down and negotiate peace and a meaningful peace process will be built and sustained;
- The Acholi community and its neighbours will have a harmonious coexistence;
- Community members will be willing and able to accept returnees in their midst;
- Religious actors and ARLPI staff will be empowered in peace-building;
- A strong inter-faith network for peace will be formed and will become active in most of the region's areas;
- Peace-building activities will be integrated into other community activities;
- Peace committees at sub-county levels will be strengthened and made functional;
- Collaboration and networking for peace among different stakeholders will be enhanced;
- Peace committees and religious leaders will be involved in exchange visits;
- Women will become active in community reconciliation and peace processes;
- Culture of tolerance and avoidance of violence as a way of resolving conflict will be promoted.

In more general terms, the authors conclude that Acholi's main contributions to peace-building include: altering behaviours; reducing violence; contributing to change in the government's policy and attitudes by encouraging it to negotiate; mediation; encouraging reconciliation and dialogue among different parties; and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

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<sup>189</sup> See Acholi Peace's website at <http://www.acholipeace.org/>.

<sup>190</sup> The information is based on email communication with ARLPI.

## **Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina<sup>191</sup>**

### *Description*

The Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina mostly operates in the areas of education, advocacy, inter-faith, and as an intermediary at the national level. It does not seem to engage in observation so much. The Community has been involved in peace-building activities under the leadership of Reis-ul Ulama Mustafa Ceric in various capacities. These activities involve advocacy for peace and justice, reconciliation and education for peace. One of the Community's important activities has been to participate in the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, H.E. Reis-ul Ulema, with other religious leaders, has issued a statement of shared moral commitment because of concern about the slow and inefficient implementation of the Dayton Accords and continuing violence in the region. Among other things, this statement stated that the task of religious communities was to establish durable peace based on truth and justice, to show respect for each religious tradition and to cooperate. The statement also called for respecting the dignity of all human beings, condemning violence, acts of hatred and revenge, and the abuse of the media to spread violence.

### *Activities*

The Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina<sup>192</sup> has been involved in peace-building activities under the leadership of Reis-ul Ulama Mustafa Ceric in various capacities. One example of the peace-building work of the Community is that it has enabled over 100 imams to visit peace-building organizations in the West, and to participate in international workshops and conferences. For example, members of the Community have been invited to share their experiences at international platforms, such as at the inter-faith colloquium on the future of religion and inter-communal relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which took place in Serbia from 12-14 October 1997, and which was organized by USIP.

### *Impact*

The imams' involvement in these programmes has increased their own peace-building capacity, and has encouraged peace-building, inter-faith/inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation among the Muslim community. Increasing numbers of refugees who are returning to their homes may be viewed as a sign for increasing religious tolerance and feeling of security. While it has not been possible to gather more specific information on the Community's specific programmes and their concrete outcomes, the authors conclude that the main contributions of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina include altering behaviours and stereotypes, the ability to draft people and encourage reconciliation and dialogue.

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<sup>191</sup> Dakin, 2002; and Leban, 2003.

<sup>192</sup>See [http://www.wcrp.org/RforP/Conflict/SHARED\\_MORAL\\_COMMITMENT.pdf](http://www.wcrp.org/RforP/Conflict/SHARED_MORAL_COMMITMENT.pdf); <http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss15/dakin.shtml> - [Heading82](#); [http://www.icnl.org/JOURNAL/vol6iss1/rel\\_lebanprint.htm](http://www.icnl.org/JOURNAL/vol6iss1/rel_lebanprint.htm) Dakin, Leban,

## **Žene Ženama (Women to Women), Bosnia-Herzegovina<sup>193</sup>**

### *Description*

*Žene Ženama*<sup>194</sup> is a self-organized women citizens' initiative that develops women's capacities by its work on advocacy for women's human rights. It aims to incorporate a gender perspective in themes such as democracy, women's rights and non-violence. It mainly operates in the areas of education and advocacy, at both the local and national levels, focusing on women. For instance, since 1997 it has been developing the so-called strategy of 'domestic concept of women's empowerment' to address the specific concerns of women in issues such as violence, poverty, unemployment, education, health, security and peace. The advocacy work of the organization also includes pressing for a gender-sensitive perspective in interpreting human rights through education, support and promotion.

Women to Women employs an approach that integrates psycho-social support or empowerment, acquisition of knowledge and skills on conflict prevention, skills of non-violent communication and meeting face to face with the past. It has various programmes devoted to peace-building, security and confidence-building, involving schools and universities, NGO activists, religious organizations, institutions of the system and international organizations. Each programme identifies specific needs (social, economic, cultural and political).

Although *Žene Ženama* does not identify itself explicitly as a Muslim organization, it is led by Muslim women. It takes religious beliefs and principles into consideration, and advocates for integrating the good principles of all four religious traditions of Bosnian Society (Orthodox, Catholicism and Judaism, as well as Islam) into its approach of peace-building as a factor for empowerment of people in their private life as well as in public life. Because it works with religious communities, where religious and ethnic orientations are the most important terms of reference for each individual, utilizing religious values is a major component of its work. And religious values and principles have a big influence on all aspects of people's lives. It thus uses Islamic values and principles as an integral aspect of its work, especially when dealing with Muslim communities.

### *Activities*

Women to Women has undertaken various projects in the area of peace-building in the western Balkans, such as capacity-building for women and women's groups on themes such as gender, peace and security; psychosocial assistance in peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina; activists across borders (a project of ten women's organizations on peace-building); and trust-building in local communities.

The organization also attempts to link practice and policy-making. In 2004 it advocated the incorporation of human rights, democracy and justice in public processes. It participated in a platform for peace-building and worked towards establishing a state court, which will prosecute war crimes. Finally, its work also contributed to establishing the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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<sup>193</sup> This information is based on self-description. The Croatian women's organization the Centre for Women Victims of War referred the authors to *Žene Ženama* for its sincere and respected efforts, and the quality of its work inspired by Islam.

<sup>194</sup> This information is based on self-description.

### *General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

Women to Women was faced with various challenges. Some of these challenges include the influence of politicians in citizens' everyday living; powerful ethnic and religious orientations; poverty; dealing with the large number of war crimes; dealing with refugees; accessibility to justice and human rights; and the structure of political and state authority, which is established on the basis of ethnic principle. Moreover, lack of a joint platform for peace-building, where communities' common issues can be discussed, is another limitation identified by *Žene Ženama*. Despite these challenges, the authors are of the opinion that Women to Women has contributed to policy changes, encouraging dialogue and reconciliation and the dissemination of ideas.

### **Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Pristina, Kosovo**

#### *Description*

Established in 1992, the Faculty aims to educate students and the Muslim community in Kosovo about Islamic teachings regarding peace and tolerance.<sup>195</sup> It contributes to peace-building in the region, in particular educating students from an Islamic point of view in the areas of peace-building, coexistence and tolerance. Besides education, it is also active in the areas of advocacy and inter-faith dialogue. The Institute participates in and organizes conferences and seminars, and appeals for peace and tolerance through public magazines, TV and other public sources. The Faculty cooperates with international and regional organizations such as the World Conference on Religion and Peace, Norwegian Church and Boston University.

#### *Activities*

The Faculty has been active in numerous peace-related initiatives in/on the Balkans. For example, as part of a peace-building project, the Faculty took part in a ten-day seminar in Coux (Switzerland) organized by the University of Boston and other organizations such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This seminar included students from different religious communities in the Balkans, such as students from Belgrade, from Sarajevo, from Zagreb in Croatia and from Kosovo, to discuss the topic of: 'What kind of role should religious leaders play in the Balkans in the future?' At this seminar, both students and religious teachers, such as Xhabir Hamiti from the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Pristina, discussed issues such as tolerance, freedom and coexistence. At the end of the seminar, the participants agreed that they all belong to one God, and if they believe and respect the God, they have to respect each other. They should hence work very hard for reconciliation among different ethnic and religious groups in their countries.<sup>196</sup>

#### *Impact*

Although the authors did not manage to gather more information regarding the concrete outcomes and results of the Faculty of Islamic Studies' activities, Mr Xhabir Hamiti of the Faculty did state during telephone conversations that he uses Islamic values of peacemaking to promote peace and

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<sup>195</sup> The information is based on self-reporting via email communications and the survey.

<sup>196</sup> Email dated 21 April 2005.

reconciliation between religious and ethnic communities, to educate students in the fields of Islam and peace, to publish in these areas, as well as to organize conferences and meetings. He also stated that the Faculty's encouragement and involvement in this project have encouraged students and the Muslim community in Kosovo to participate in reconciliation, dialogue and also to reduce negative stereotyping. Consequently, based on the current information, the Faculty's contribution to peace has mostly been in areas of disseminating ideas about peace, tolerance and democracy, and encouraging reconciliation and peace.

### ***Salam Institute for Peace and Justice, United States***<sup>197</sup>

#### *Description*

Established in 2004, *Salam* is a non-profit organization for research, education, and practice on issues related to conflict resolution, non-violence and development, with a focus on bridging differences between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Its operation areas include education, advocacy, inter-faith and intermediation, both among Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims at international levels. Education is the main area of business of *Salam*. *Salam*'s activities include providing scholarly and professional knowledge and expertise to governmental and non-governmental organizations and individuals on various dimensions of political, socio-cultural, religious and economic aspects of conflicts in an Islamic context, thus enhancing the knowledge base of Islamic models for conflict resolution and peace, disseminating these among conflict resolution practitioners, academics and policy-makers, promoting and undertaking inter-faith dialogue, building capacity for peace actors in the Muslim world, and providing training to religious leaders and other peace-building actors, especially among Muslim communities.

#### *Activities*

In the short time since it became operational, *Salam* has undertaken various projects. One involved comprehensive research and writing a report on the education system in the Muslim world, entitled *Implementing Approaches to Improved Quality of Islamic Education in Developing Nations*, for Creative Associates International. This report analysed Islamic educational systems in the Muslim world with the aim of developing strategies to improve it. *Salam*'s research paid particular attention to the *madrasa* system in countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan. Based on its assessment, *Salam* concluded that there is a dire need to improve the quality of the education system and a need to revise the traditional *madrasa* curriculum, especially to include Islamic values and principles of peacemaking and tolerance. However, *Salam* also concluded that this revision should not take place without serious consideration of the context and should not be imposed. Moreover, *Salam* observed that a new curriculum will only be accepted if such a curriculum is attached to the larger project of improving the infrastructure and condition of the *madrasas* in general. *Salam* is currently seeking funding to develop curricula for these schools.

Another project in which *Salam* is currently involved is the inter-faith dialogue between Muslims and evangelical Christians in the United States. This project is undertaken in conjunction with the

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<sup>197</sup> This information is based on self-description; see [www.Salaminstitute.org](http://www.Salaminstitute.org).

Fuller Theological Seminary<sup>198</sup> and aims to encourage collaboration between Christian and Muslim communities through inter-faith conflict resolution training and workshops, to reduce misperceptions and to pursue social justice goals in the community. So far, two meetings have taken place between the two communities. This project also entails research and development, leading to a publication for both religious communities, designing a community dialogue process, and also developing pilot projects in selected communities to further mutual understanding. Because this is still an ongoing project, *Salam* is not able to state the particular outcomes and results of the project.<sup>199</sup>

#### *Impact and General Observations Regarding Faith-Based Peace-Building*

It is probably too early to assess the impact of *Salam*'s projects during the last year. However, based on its experience, *Salam* did observe a pressing need for Muslim participants to convene an intra-faith dialogue before the inter-faith dialogue takes place. During the process it became clear that it was crucial for the success and effectiveness of the inter-faith dialogue to provide an opportunity and space for Muslims to discuss and identify their needs prior to meeting the other group. There is no recognized Islamic authority or a hierarchical religious structure that interprets Islamic texts. There are thus various different interpretations of Islamic texts. Consequently, Muslims who were present at the meeting did not have the opportunity to clarify their concepts and approaches beforehand. This led to lack of consensus and intense debating. Based on this experience, Muslim participants emphasized the need for an intra-Muslim dialogue before meeting with their Christian partners.

#### ***Salam Sudan Foundation (SSF), United States***<sup>200</sup>

##### *Description*

Established in 1985, SSF is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit cultural foundation dedicated to promoting a universal culture of justice, peace, dignity, democracy and human rights. It operates at the international level, mainly in the areas of advocacy and inter-faith dialogue. SSF's activities can be mostly categorized as advocacy for peace and more specifically involve raising US and Western awareness about Africa and the Middle East, raising Middle Eastern and African awareness about the United States and the West, and aim to develop a more enlightened, shared policy agenda for action that can contribute to peace, security, democracy and prosperity. In that respect the main focus areas include cross-cultural, inter-religious, and development-focused research, reflection, education, dialogue and communication, with the objective of contributing to global efforts for conflict resolution through education for peace and a more compassionate dialogue of cultures, civilizations and religions. In its efforts of citizen and public diplomacy, *Salam Sudan* wrote a letter to US President G.W. Bush regarding the situation in Sudan, and organized a meeting in February 2005 on 'The Sudan Peace Process: Where Do We Go From Here?', where various NGOs, think tanks, human rights' groups, religious communities and government agencies participated.<sup>201</sup> Thus motivated by Islamic values of peace and tolerance, *Salam Sudan*'s contribution has mainly been to disseminate ideas about

<sup>198</sup> See <http://www.fuller.edu/> for more information on the Fuller Theological Seminary.

<sup>199</sup> For more information, see [http://www.salaminstitute.org/Salam\\_Projects.htm](http://www.salaminstitute.org/Salam_Projects.htm)

<sup>200</sup> This information is based on self-description. See *Salam Sudan*'s website at <http://www.salamsudan.org/>.

<sup>201</sup> <http://www.salamsudan.org/>

democracy, human rights and justice, both in Sudan and in the world, to encourage dialogue and reconciliation and to influence the policies of Sudanese and US governments.

### *Activities*

In its attempt to promote democracy, peace, human rights and justice in Sudan and throughout the world, the *Salam* Sudan Foundation undertook many activities. For example, the President of the Foundation, Hisham El-Tinay, led a delegation to Khartoum and met with President Abdel Rahman Suar El Dahan, advising him to help Sudan move towards democracy, and signed the Civic Organizations' National Charter to resist any future military intervention in politics. Based on his influential work, El-Tinay was invited by the grassroots' community (*Um Rwaba-Kordofan*) to be their representative and run for a seat in the new parliament with their Umma Party.<sup>202</sup> More recently, on 9 February 2005 the Foundation held the panel discussion mentioned above, entitled 'The Sudan Peace Process: Where Do We Go From Here?', in Washington DC, where a large number of Washington-based think tanks, human rights' organizations, government agencies, universities, various faith communities and nationalities, NGOs and grassroots organizations came together to discuss issues regarding the peace process in Sudan. El-Tinay also wrote letters to President Bush regarding the current situation in Sudan.

### *Impact*

The founder and President of *Salam* Sudan, Hisham El-Tinay, travelled to Sudan and engaged intellectuals, politicians, Muslim and Christian leaders and the public on issues such as justice, peace, democracy and human rights in Sudan and globally, as well as on the importance of working for a better understanding among Sudan, Africa, the Arab and Muslim world, America and Europe, through better and sustained dialogue. *Salam* Sudan is credited with having played a positive role, by lobbying both the US administration and the Sudan government, leading to a strategic shift towards peacemaking<sup>203</sup> and the signing of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya, on 9 January 2005. Hashim El-Tinay received the Tanenbaum Peace Award in 2001 for his work in Sudan.

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<sup>202</sup> For more information on the Umma Party in Sudan, see <http://www.umma.org/>.

<sup>203</sup> See the correspondence with President George W. Bush and President Omer H. El-Bashir at *Salam* Sudan's website (resources page): <http://www.salamsudan.org/>.

## **Annexe IV: Impact Measurement of Peace-Building Programmes: Two Illustrations**

### **Linking Peace-Building with Relief and Development Programmes**

One option to measure the impact of peace-building programmes is to integrate peace-building elements into relief and development programmes. Table 5, which was developed by World Vision International, shows the attempt to integrate peace-building strategically into World Vision International's so-called transitional development programmes. As monitoring and evaluation of these transitional development programmes is well developed, World Vision International's director for peace-building and reconciliation regards linking peace-building with relief and development programmes to be an option for the impact assessment of peace-building efforts.

**Table 5: Linking Peace -Building, Relief and Development as an Attempt to Measure Impact**

	<b>Creating a Culture of Good Governance</b>	<b>Transforming People</b>	<b>Working in Coalitions Impacting Commonly Recognized Boundaries</b>	<b>Enhancing Community Capacities that Generate Hope</b>	<b>Developing Sustainable Livelihoods with a Just Distribution of Resources</b>
<b>STRATEGIC PROCESSES: DESCRIPTIONS</b>	<p>Make sustained use of participatory methods that strengthen community-based organizations and form a culture where diverse groups within communities own their development and strengthen good governance.</p> <p>Support communities to solve problems constructively, challenge and reduce leverage of manipulators, have an enhanced knowledge of vulnerabilities, forecast, analyse and prepare to face either opportunities or threats, and build peaceful and resilient communities to respond to conflicts.</p>	<p>Facilitate value- and faith-based transformation of people and relationships, including healing from trauma and brokenness and reintegration into the community.</p> <p>Link people to one another and to the environment to build peaceful and resilient communities, utilizing both traditional and new coping mechanisms to deal with conflicts.</p>	<p>Participate in and create formal and informal alliances that intentionally impact beyond project, geographical, ethnic, religious, caste, organizational affiliation or socio-economic boundaries at local, national, regional and global levels.</p> <p>Work in coalitions with shared goals to respond to crises such as conflicts and to build less vulnerable, more resilient and peaceful communities.</p>	<p>Identify traditional mechanisms, values, wisdom and resources that help assess community capacities and vulnerabilities and generate hope for achieving peaceful and resilient communities.</p> <p><b>Invest in people, structures, and systems towards enhancing the capacities of families and communities to cope, mitigate and respond to conflicts.</b></p>	<p>Develop and strengthen appropriate economic systems and environments that support sustainable livelihoods, reduce vulnerabilities, and enhance peaceful and resilient communities.</p> <p>Strengthen community processes for the just distribution of resources, including project resources, towards reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing community resilience.</p>

	<b>Creating a Culture of Good Governance</b>	<b>Transforming People</b>	<b>Working in Coalitions Impacting Commonly Recognized Boundaries</b>	<b>Enhancing Community Capacities that Generate Hope</b>	<b>Developing Sustainable Livelihoods with a Just Distribution of Resources</b>
<b>STRATEGIC PROCESSES: ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS</b>	<p>Formation of CBOs that model solidarity among diverse groups and contribute to wise governance.</p> <p>Reduced leverage of manipulators (actors/systems that gain from destructive conflict are challenged and reduced).</p> <p>Enhanced local capacities to forecast, analyse, prevent and / or deal with conflict.</p> <p>Strengthened participatory systems of governance.</p>	<p>Enhanced capacity and value-based commitment to resolve differences/conflicts without destructive or violent means.</p> <p>Strengthened traditional and creation of new coping mechanisms for peace-building with the family as a basic unit.</p> <p>Facilitated participatory ‘targeting’ process of considering the vulnerabilities and capacities through the lens of local capacities for peace.</p> <p>Facilitated mutually supportive and bonded relationships in the face of destructive conflicts.</p>	<p>CBOs and WVI have formal and informal networks and alliances at local, national, regional and global levels for peace-building.</p> <p>Area Development Programmes design incorporates national and global contexts, issues, patterns and trends in conflicts and peace-building.</p> <p>Impact of conflict and peace-building and relationship among diverse groups are monitored and evaluated regularly</p>	<p>Data from regular analyses of capacities / vulnerabilities are used in designing projects.</p> <p>Participatively identified capacities and partner with ‘agents of hope (connectors)’ in conflict situation.</p> <p>Decreasing vulnerabilities and increasing capacities of these partner groups are monitored.</p> <p>Partnership with ‘agents of hope’ able to increase connectors and decrease dividers.</p>	<p>Just distribution of community and project resources is ensured through sustainable livelihood programmes.</p> <p>Economic development is used to reduce vulnerability to destructive conflict.</p> <p>Economic development results in enhanced community-coping mechanisms during times of conflict.</p> <p>Sustainable livelihood programmes enhance effective functioning of community structures and civil society.</p>

	<b>Design</b>	<b>Implementation</b>	<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<b>Phase Out</b>
<b>GUIDELINES FOR INTEGRATING PEACE- BUILDING IN DIFFERENT PHASES</b>	<p>Use of Local Capacities for Peace/Do No Harm as a tool of analysis before programme inception and during project cycle.</p> <p>Formation of strategic partnerships with churches, CBOs, local interest groups and government institutions</p>	<p>Active participation and cooperation of the church, government, community and other interest groups.</p> <p>Improvement of economic conditions to address inequities in resource distribution/ownership.</p>	Simple community monitoring and evaluation process are developed and implemented.	Use of effective mechanisms to resolve conflicts without violence.

### Developing Indicators

Another option to assess the impact of peace-building programmes is to try to develop a set of indicators that show how the activities undertaken actually contribute to the set objectives. Table 6, as developed by Dr David Steele of Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group, is an illustration of how peace-building organizations are attempting to grasp the impact of their work by defining clear objectives, outputs and activities and by developing specific indicators to assess progress.

**Table 6: Developing Indicators to Measure the Impact of Peace-Building Programmes<sup>204</sup>**

**GOAL:** Ask: What is the impact we want to achieve? What does our community look like if we are successful?

Answer: Improved relations between ethnic groups at the municipal level in Macedonia

Definitions: ‘Improved relations’ refers to relationships within and among local government, civil society, and the private sector. Specific municipalities include those existing along a line of overlap between ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian populations, stretching from north-east to north-west to south-west within Macedonia.

SMART OBJECTIVES <sup>205</sup>	KEY OUTPUTS <sup>206</sup>	MAJOR ACTIVITIES <sup>207</sup>	INDICATORS <sup>208</sup>
<u>Ask:</u> What are the desired effects on people’s knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours.	<u>Ask:</u> What final goods and services will we provide?	<u>Ask:</u> What daily efforts contribute to our outputs?	<u>Ask:</u> How will we know if we have achieved our objective?

<sup>204</sup> Source: Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group, February 2005.

<sup>205</sup> Reminder: Does achievement of each objective contribute directly to achieving the goal?

<sup>206</sup> Is each output necessary to achieve the objective?

<sup>207</sup> Does each major activity lead directly to the outputs?

<sup>208</sup> Does each indicator directly measure progress towards the objective? If not, does it come as close as possible? Do we have enough to get a fairly reliable measure of our effects/impact? Do we have more than we need or too many to handle on a regular basis?

SMART OBJECTIVES <sup>209</sup>	KEY OUTPUTS <sup>210</sup>	MAJOR ACTIVITIES <sup>211</sup>	INDICATORS <sup>212</sup>
<p>1) 50 municipal and community and central government leaders of diverse ethnicities, within eight municipalities/regions that have experienced significant ethnic tensions, increase their knowledge about, and practice of, conflict management, including their ability to:</p> <p>a) Understand conflict dynamics and access a toolkit for managing difficult relationships;</p> <p>b) Understand and practise effective problem-solving processes; and</p> <p>c) Function as municipal leaders and access a toolkit for effective strategic planning.</p>	<p>A series of three two-day seminars, each organized for the same 40 participants from municipalities that have experienced significant ethnic tensions and primarily ones in which MCCMG has not previously worked.</p>	<p>Interview key persons and groups in each municipality in order to understand their perspective regarding conflict in their municipalities and select seminar participants.</p> <p>Five days of meetings with stakeholders outside of the principal actors at the municipal level (central government ministries, security forces, etc.), in order to gain information and understand their perspective regarding conflict in the selected municipalities.</p> <p>Work with training staff and local consultants to prepare each seminar agenda, manual materials, exercises and evaluation process.</p> <p>Three two-day seminars, each focused on one of categories a, b and c under objective.</p> <p>Following each seminar, hold staff evaluation, compile any lists of future plans, hold post-seminar interviews to gain feedback on the event.</p>	<p>1) Percentage of project participants who rate their own knowledge about conflict management higher following each seminar than it was prior to the event.</p> <p>2) Percentage of project participants who rate the knowledge level about conflict management among leaders within their municipalities higher following each seminar than it was prior to the event.</p>

<sup>209</sup> Reminder: Does achievement of each objective contribute directly to achieving the goal?

<sup>210</sup> Is each output necessary to achieve the objective?

<sup>211</sup> Does each major activity lead directly to the outputs?

<sup>212</sup> Does each indicator directly measure progress towards the objective? If not, does it come as close as possible? Do we have enough to get a fairly reliable measure of our effects/impact? Do we have more than we need or too many to handle on a regular basis?

SMART OBJECTIVES <sup>213</sup>	KEY OUTPUTS <sup>214</sup>	MAJOR ACTIVITIES <sup>215</sup>	INDICATORS <sup>216</sup>
<p>2) Two or more parties to disputes within the same municipality work together productively and strategically, utilizing problem-solving methodologies to analyse, understand, and peacefully resolve disputes within the same eight municipalities/regions.</p>	<p>Two days of facilitated inter-ethnic brainstorming with representatives of all disputant parties in each of eight municipalities/regions (sixteen days in total), including participants of previous and current seminar series, to focus on effectively managing serious disputes related to issues such as decentralization, territorial division and IDP returns.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Interview key persons and groups in each municipality in order to identify specific concerns of each ethnic group and understand their perspective regarding conflict in their municipalities.</li> <li>2) Interview stakeholders outside of the principal actors at the municipal level (central government ministries, security forces, etc.) in order to gain information and understand their perspective regarding conflict in the selected municipalities.</li> <li>3) Work with project staff, local consultants, and working group leaders to prepare meeting agendas, handouts, exercises and evaluation process.</li> <li>4) Two days of facilitated brainstorming sessions in each municipality, led by staff, local consultants and working group leaders, and designed to:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Distinguish between concrete interests and positions;</li> <li>b) Discover new alternative options for resolving disputes;</li> <li>c) Select those options that best meet the interests of all parties and those that are most feasible;</li> <li>d) Commit to a best option or set of options and determine first steps of an action plan.</li> </ol> </li> <li>5) Following meeting, hold staff evaluation, compile any lists of future plans, hold post-event interviews to gain feedback on the event.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Percentage of participants who can identify the needs/interests of members of other ethnic groups and whose vision for the municipality factors in these needs/interests of ‘the other’.</li> <li>2) Number of proposed dispute resolution options that serve the interests of each ethnic group within the population.</li> <li>3) Number of project participants evaluated by themselves and other participants to be effective problem-solving facilitators.</li> <li>4) Number of municipalities where disputes have been resolved.</li> </ol>

<sup>213</sup> Reminder: Does achievement of each objective contribute directly to achieving the goal?

<sup>214</sup> Is each output necessary to achieve the objective?

<sup>215</sup> Does each major activity lead directly to the outputs?

<sup>216</sup> Does each indicator directly measure progress towards the objective? If not, does it come as close as possible? Do we have enough to get a fairly reliable measure of our effects/impact? Do we have more than we need or too many to handle on a regular basis?

SMART OBJECTIVES <sup>217</sup>	KEY OUTPUTS <sup>218</sup>	MAJOR ACTIVITIES <sup>219</sup>	INDICATORS <sup>220</sup>
<p>3) 100 municipal, community and central government leaders (including 50 participants each from previous and current seminar series) within the selected municipalities enhance their capacity for leadership, which is better able to:</p> <p>a) Equip and empower, in each of the same eight municipalities/regions, between one and three inter-ethnic working groups, established to initiate programming that meets basic needs and helps resolve disputes,</p> <p>b) Oversee the development and implementation of strategic plans that put into operation the most valuable and feasible one to three inter-ethnic initiatives in each municipality.</p>	<p>1) Two days of facilitated inter-ethnic brainstorming with working groups, developed in each of eight municipalities/regions (sixteen days in total), including previous MCCMG-targeted municipalities and new ones, designed to develop a process for implementing cooperative inter-ethnic projects.</p> <p>2) Three half-day meetings of indigenous steering committee to help evaluate current programming and set goals/strategies to promote future conflict management programming.</p>	<p>1) Interview key persons and groups in each municipality in order to identify specific concerns of each ethnic group.</p> <p>2) Interview stakeholders outside of the working group participants (e.g. central government ministries, security forces, municipal officials) in order to gain information and understand their perspective regarding the issue that the working group plans to address.</p> <p>3) Select initial steering committee members, including one representative from each municipality/region in which MCCMG has previously worked, adding to the committee later in the year one representative from new municipalities.</p> <p>4) Work with project staff and local consultants to prepare meeting agendas, handouts, exercises, and evaluation process for all meetings.</p> <p>5) Hold brainstorming sessions that assist working groups to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>) Identify what the working group itself has the ability to do in order to implement the project;</li> <li>b) Identify other resources and obstacles;</li> <li>c) Design strategies for implementation.</li> </ul> <p>6) Following meetings/visits, hold staff evaluation, compile any lists of future plans, and hold post-event interviews to gain feedback on the event.</p>	<p>1) Number of specific new initiatives in inter-ethnic cooperation that address community issues of key importance and for which a strategic plan has been developed by a project-related working group.</p> <p>2) Number of municipalities in which new initiatives in inter-ethnic cooperation have been successfully implemented.</p> <p>3) Number of project participants evaluated by themselves and other participants to be effective facilitators in the implementation of working group projects.</p> <p>4) Ability of the steering committee, at the end of one year, to develop a strategic plan for the next year of project activity.</p>

<sup>217</sup> Reminder: Does achievement of each objective contribute directly to achieving the goal?

<sup>218</sup> Is each output necessary to achieve the objective?

<sup>219</sup> Does each major activity lead directly to the outputs?

<sup>220</sup> Does each indicator directly measure progress towards the objective? If not, does it come as close as possible? Do we have enough to get a fairly reliable measure of our effects/impact? Do we have more than we need or too many to handle on a regular basis?

		7) Assist working groups to implement learnings/action plans: encouraging assignment of responsibilities within each group; allocating seed money from project budget to each group; and assisting them to prepare proposals to meet additional funding needs.	
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## Annexe V: Factors Shaping Faith-Based Peace-Building

Based on a short review of the literature on religion, conflict and peace,<sup>221</sup> a number of contextual, institutional and personal factors can be defined that shape the possibilities for faith-based peace-building and that influence the performance of (local) religious actors in the field and (international) faith-based peace-building organizations that support them.

In most cases, the factors outlined apply both to the (local) religious actors and to the (international) faith-based peace-building actors. The overview of factors should not be regarded as complete and exhaustive, but more as indicative for what factors play a role in the area of faith-based peace-building.

It should be noted that the factors outlined do have a positive and a negative side. For instance, the long-term presence of religious actors in a conflict zone can be seen as something positive, but may become negative if people associate this long-term presence with repressive governments in the past, colonialism, or with shunning away from politics and political oppression. A case in point could be Sri Lanka. Although, according to Jayaweera, the churches currently strike a lofty moral tone, their voice lacks credibility, both internationally and nationally, and not because they stand for righteousness, but, to the contrary, because their history is highly tainted by lack of it.<sup>222</sup>

This annexe should be regarded as complementary to the information generated by the actors in this study in chapter 4.

### Contextual Factors

Contextual factors that shape faith-based peace-building are, *inter alia*, that:

- In various conflict-affected areas the state apparatus is weak or absent and religious structures are some of the strongest institutions in place;
- Religion is, on a wide base, deeply rooted in society. In contrast to Western Europe, for example, secularization is a relatively unknown phenomenon in large parts of the world;
- The less stable the situation, the clearer religious actors may position themselves. While peace times may make it difficult for religious actors to define their fields of action, conflict times usually trigger religious actors to ‘fight’ for peace and justice, or conversely to fight against it.

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<sup>221</sup> Sources for information included, *inter alia*, Johnston and Sampson, 1994; Johnston, 1994; Rubin, 1994; Haynes, 1996; Tschuy, 1997; Appleby, 2000; Appleby, 2001; Belshaw, Calderisi and Sugden, 2001; Ellis and ter Haar, 2003; Smit, 2003; BBO, 2004; and Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2004. Another useful source of information is the ICRD’s website: <http://www.icrd.org/politicians.html>.

<sup>222</sup> Jayaweera, 2001.

## **Institutional Factors**

The performance of religious actors and their supporting faith-based peace-building actors likely depends on institutional factors, such as:

- Being regarded as a moral beacon. ‘Dealing with or resolving conflict is not only a political but also a moral issue. Therefore religious actors could better give people the capacity to deal with the more deep-rooted sources of human conflict than politicians, military or the business community;’<sup>223</sup>
- Presence before, during and after conflict. Religious actors usually have a long-term commitment with the community and as such are well embedded in a cultural and relational sense;
- Status and legitimacy. Their daily contact with the masses, long record of charitable services, and reputation for integrity in most settings have earned religious leaders privileged status and unparalleled legitimacy.<sup>224</sup> For instance, the Catholic Church in Rwanda was even after the genocide still regarded as a trustworthy partner in promoting reconciliation.;<sup>225</sup>
- Political leverage. Religious actors must have sufficient leverage in the eyes of governments and politicians in order to influence peace processes, if they decide to become politically active;
- International network. ‘The blooming of religious movements has created international networks that bind groups of people, often without reference to states.’<sup>226</sup> This may make it easier for religious actors to mobilize international support and more difficult for a government to dominate them;
- Wide presence in society. ‘Religious actors rooted in local communities with representatives operating in regional, national and often international organizational structures, inhabit a unique social location.’<sup>227</sup> Moreover, a religious actor could be a stable institution, which is present in urban and rural areas, even in areas of conflict where many other NGOs are unable to operate;
- Good leadership of the religious organizations;
- Adequate organizational structure that has an exemplary function, and which prevents religious actors themselves from becoming involved in corruption, human rights’ violations and misuse of power;
- Transparency with regard to its own functioning;
- Compassion plays a great role in experiencing and exercising faith;
- Women can play a significant role.

## **Personal Factors**

Indispensable attributes of religious individuals building peace—whether or not in relation to a larger religious organization—include:

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<sup>223</sup> Appleby, 2001.

<sup>224</sup> Appleby, 2001.

<sup>225</sup> Smit, 2003.

<sup>226</sup> Ellis and Ter Haar, 2003.

<sup>227</sup> Appleby, 2001.

- Religious and spiritual baggage. ‘Religious individuals operating on a religious or spiritual level are often better equipped to reach people at the level of the individual and the sub-national group—where inequities and insecurities are often most keenly felt—than are most political leaders who walk the corridors of power;’<sup>228</sup>
- Certain spiritual authority. This either through their ties with a religious institution or through the trust evoked by a personal spiritual charisma;<sup>229</sup>
- Ability to persevere against overwhelming odds, as their motivation to be reconcilers and peacemakers stems from a deep sense of religious calling;<sup>230</sup>
- Specific peace-building skills. Not every religious individual can play a peace-building role. Peace-building is a kind of sport for which skills need to be developed. Religious individuals therefore require continuous capacity-building in various aspects of peace-building;
- No ‘guilt of association’ with the policies and acts of central headquarters or other branches of the religious organizations for which they are working;<sup>231</sup>
- Principles and values like truth, justice, respect, tolerance, humility, commitment, dialogue-led; and sensitive to social/cultural/personal and gender dimensions;<sup>232</sup>
- Support. If individual religious leaders cannot free up time and do not have enough personnel and resources, it is often impossible for them to engage in peace-building actions next to the normal job.

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<sup>228</sup> Johnston, 1994.

<sup>229</sup> Johnston and Cox, 2003, p. 17.

<sup>230</sup> Johnston and Cox, 2003, p. 17.

<sup>231</sup> Appleby, 2001.

<sup>232</sup> Adapted from International Alert, 2004, p. 8.

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